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ABSTRACT 
Worldwide, the trend is towards liberal political development. Political 
development has occurred in third world countries too, but the context, form, pace and 
direction is very different. The colonial legacy has a distinct sway over the political 
development of these countries. In the absence of detraditionalized and secular mass 
political culture, strong leaders typically supported by armies manipulated the 
political discourse and established authoritarian rules. Southeast Asian countries 
typically symbolized this state of affairs. It is against this background that the political 
development in Southeast Asia has to be delineated, analysed and understood. 
Malaysia stands out as a unique case of political development, yet it shares a number 
of features with the other political systems of the region. Each country got 
independence at different level of political development. Only two countries, 
Mala)'sia and Singapore were able to maintain total civilian control over the military 
and their political systems have shown tremendous resilience. It has brought various 
classificatory labels to the Malaysian political system such as "semi-democracy," 
"quasi-democracy," "illiberal democracy," "democracy without turnover," or even, 
"semi-authoritarian" state. The process of political development is intimately 
connected to the precarious ethnic composition of the country. The political debate is 
guided as well as constrained by ethnic considerations, in the country. Malaysia 
acquires special significance and role in the region as it unites northern and southern 
parts of Southeast Asia so that the region appears as a natural unit in geographical, 
cultural, ethnic, economic and political terms. 
Political development in a country can only be fairly gauged only over a long 
period of time. Political development just does not take place at the structural level. 
When the process of political development in Southeast Asia is studied and analyzed 
in its varied aspects, whatever broad similarities we may find - for instance, 
commonality of political and socio-economic problems, authoritarian streaks in 
traditional political culture, the military's political role, the ethnic pluralism, the 
influence of religion, outward-looking economies, emergent middle class, patron-
client relationships, personalism, multi-party fragmented system, controlled 
opposition, curbs on civil and political rights or resurgent democratic trends -
generalizations still elude us. In short, the historical background and democratic 
experience vary from country to country. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has reinforced the cultural, economic and political linkages. 
Southeast Asia, like South Asia is a region of great diversity and contrast. Each 
of the ten countries of the region represent distinct culture, tradition, history, 
language, religion, ethnicity, and stage of economic and political development. The 
ethnic or communal politics engulfs all the polities of Southeast Asia. This feature has 
significantly moulded the political development process of these polities. 
The party system ranges from single-party communist systems in Laos and 
Vietnam and single party (bourgeoisie-civilian) monopoly system of Singapore to the 
transifional open multi-party systems of Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia. Burma 
is directly ruled by military-junta. In none of the countries, healthy bi-party system 
prevails. Some states have seen relative political stability, while some others have 
experienced acute polifical instability. A single political party. People's Action Party 
(PAP), has ruled Singapore, with authoritarian measures curbing the growth of 
opposition political parties, since 1965. Indonesia has also seen two long bouts of 
political stability, but under authoritarian regimes. Doubtless the military has played 
its role in the politics of most of Southeast Asian countries. The military continues to 
be one of the most important institution in terms of its bearing upon political stability 
in countries like Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines etc. 
The experience with economic development is also variegated across the 
region. Singapore and Brunei have been adjudged as High Income countries by the 
World Development Report. The High Income countries of Singapore and Brunei 
have the highest ranking, followed by Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines. 
The concept of political development is extremely useful and holds great 
promise. The concept of political development in its application must be able to locate 
precisely the development of some conceptually specific thing, which for analytic 
purposes we identify as goals of political development in the present study. 
As we scan through the literature, we find that political development is often 
confused with economic development. Ward and Rustow dealt with the problem of 
stages of political development. Kenneth Organski suggests that quite different 
political systems may be able to solve a crucial economic crisis of development. 
Therefore, his analysis appears to show his concern towards economic development, 
not towards political development. No doubt, political development and economic 
development are mutually reinforcing in most cases. Political development is 
precursor as well as consequence of economic development. 
Political modernization is a relatively technical process. The political scientists 
commit error in using the two concepts interchangeably and often they use the 
concept of political development for political change without first conceiving properly 
the goals in direcfion of which change should be measured. 
The notion of capacity of the poHtical system is also introduced by Pye in 
conceptualizing political development but in a much more inclusive sense. Although 
Pye does not attempt a definition of political development but he clearly speaks as to 
what he mean by political development. 
When we talk about the performance of the political system we can't be 
oblivious to the goals of political development. The development of the capacity is 
just one dimension, rather a means, howsoever important, in the direction of political 
development. No doubt, differentiation is an essential attribute of a developed 
political system.. Huntington states five goals of development: growth, equity, 
democracy, stability and autonomy. The former two pertain to economic development 
in fact, while the latter three he means as goals of political development. Political 
development can't be conceived in terms of merely selected aspects of political 
development. It is true that political development should be conceived within the 
context of the overall process of development, at the same time, we should be able to 
conceptualize political development and also answer as how the different goals can be 
reconciled to account for political development. 
Social mobilization may be a correlate or even a cause as vv-ell as a 
consequence of political development, but it is not political development. Political 
development as a process has to be located in the political sphere, and that too in 
terms of certain clear-cut objectives. 
Polifical development, indeed, means the increase in the variables of equality, 
capacity and differenfiation. The concept of political development must clearly show 
how citizenship building and insfitution building should go together in the process of 
development. The political culture and the political process should be oriented 
towards increased levels of popular participation and popular control. We define 
political development as a process by which a political system moves towards 
increased levels of equality, liberty, capacity and differentiation 
The Malay traditions in Malaysia have been accorded special place - their 
religion, Islam being the state religion, their language, Malay being the National and 
the official language and Malay sultans accorded privileged constitutional status as 
Conference of Rulers. This also provides a clue to the Malaysia's political and 
economic development since independence. The first elections after Independence for 
central and state legislatures were held in 1959. These elections led to entirely elected 
legislatures for both centre and states. The Alliance between three major political 
parties, the UMNO, the MCA and the MIC representative of three major 
communifies, the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians, emerged a clear victor setting 
pace for future political development by winning seventy four seats out of 104 seats. 
The UMNO contested seventy seats and won fifty two seats. The Alliance had won in 
all the states except Kelantan and Trengganu where the PAS captured power. Thus, 
the main threat to the Alliance at first General Elections came from the PAS, a 
Muslim-dominated Malay party, not from Non-Malays-based opposition parties. 
The formation of Federation of Malaysia was a great political and economic 
advance for all the territories concerned. Special Position in the federal scheme was 
given to the Borneo Territories and Singapore The immigration into Sabah and 
Sarawak was made subject to the jurisdiction of state governments of those territories. 
However, due to conflict between the two, the UMNO and the PAP, over the 
sphere of influence, Singapore was separated from Malaysia in 1965. The whole 
episode and the unfolding debate over the official language issue and demand for a 
Chinese medium University communalized the political atmosphere and led to the 
riots in 1969. The Emergency was imposed and even the constitution was suspended 
for next two years. A New Economic policy was envisaged and national ideology was 
framed. The politics of accommodation was pursued after that. Many more political 
parties were brought under the umbrella of Ruling Alliance. Except the DAP, all other 
political parties have participated in the government process at one time or the other. 
It has given tremendous leverage to the UMNO to control and shape the course and 
pace of political change in Malaysia. 
Sabah did not have even a political party before the merger talks took place. 
Most of the local political parties, which had grown in the territories, joined the 
federal Alliance. An interesting feature having an impact upon the political 
development of Sabah was that all the parties, ruling as well as opposition, formed 
part of the Sabah Alliance, which remained part of the ruling Alliance at the Centre. 
Although, the same pattern of political alignments among different ethnic parties 
followed in these states as in Malaya, yet the process of political development in these 
states remained insulated from the direct political activity of the mainstream 
peninsular national political parties for a long time. At the same time, the role and 
impact of federal government and bureaucracy steadily increased and the Malay 
patterns of political culture became more pronounced in these states. The erosion of 
autonomy of state sphere was imminent, but the development process also encouraged 
political integration and centralization. 
Mahathir rose to prime ministership in 1982. He proved to be very efficient, 
affective, but a bit authoritarian too. Malay political culture is traditionally 
characterized by consensus, compromise, reconciliation and accommodation. The 
Malay consensus within the UMNO was broken when Tengku Razaleigh challenged 
Mahathir for the UMNO presidency while Musa Hitam defended his post of Deputy 
President against Ghafar Baba, the Deputy Prime Minister. The UMNO General 
Assembly elections in had far-reaching implications for the process of political 
development in Malaysia. Though, the elections endangered unity within the UMNO, 
yet, further brought the UMNO to centre-stage of Malaysian politics. The UMNO 
elections became equally important affair in Malaysian politics like the general 
elections. 
Political leadership in Malaysia is provided by UMNO. At the triennial party 
elections of the UMNO in 1993, Anwar Ibrahim was elected Deputy President 
(normally, a stepping stone to the leadership of the party). In a blitzkrieg, he 
increased his hold over the UMNO. However, the huge victory at 1995 General 
Election helped Mahathir play some balancing act and increase his hold over party 
organization. Doubtless, the UMNO remains the most vital vibrant and democratic 
organization in Malaysia. 
The sustained economic growth, weak opposition and balancing of ethnic 
demands disposed the public opinion highly in favour of government in 1995 General 
Election. Malaysia was hit hard by the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Most of 
the UMNO-linked conglomerates, which have flourished with the government 
backing and constitute the core support base of funding of UMNO were at great risk. 
Many of them were bailed-out by the government. Later, over policy differences with 
the government and his part of ego-conflict with the Prime Minister, Anwar was 
dismissed. In the following weeks Mahathir systematically dismantled Anwar's 
power-base. A contagion effect from the political development in neighbouring states 
of Indonesia and Thailand definitely shaped reformasi. The PAS won twenty seven 
seats to the Parliament and ninety eight seats to the state assemblies in 1999 - a 
milestone in its evolution as a political force in Malaysia. 
Islam has always been used for political purposes by both the UMNO and the 
PAS. The PAS has espoused its hardcore brand of political Islam. The federal 
government is also committed to Islam. The UMNO often resorts to championing the 
cause of Islam for political purposes. 
The opposition is very week and a dividend house in Malaysia. The opposition 
political parties have great difficulty developing a coherent programmatic alternative 
to the ruling regime. The state has a powerful ability to absorb diverse ideological 
orientations and ethnics interests in society. 
Much of political change in Malaysia is elite-directed. The constitutional-legal 
development has direct bearing over the process of political development in Malaysia. 
The Parliament under its power of amending the Constitution can amend the 
Fundamental Liberties like its other provisions. The rights are limited by the terms 
and conditions that are ingrained in the constitution itself. The right to the freedom of 
speech, association, and assembly come within the complete discretion of Parliament. 
The right to association can be restricted on grounds of security, public order or 
morality. The right to freedom of speech was curtailed whereby Parliament was 
empowered to pass laws prohibiting the questioning of any matter or right established 
or protected by the provisions of Part III (pertaining to citizenship). Article 152 
(pertaining to Malay language as the national and official language). Article 153 
(reservation of seats for the Malays in government jobs and educational institutions) 
and Article 181 (related to the prerogatives and powers of the Rulers), otherwise than 
in relation to the implementation of policies or laws pertaining to such constitutional 
provisions. These exceptions were made entrenched part of the constitution. 
The right to free speech, assembly and association along with other 
fundamental rights are further subjected to the emergency provisions of the 
Constitution. Under Articles, 149, 150 and 151, rights can be taken away just by an 
ordinary process of law making if any Act is enacted by the Parliament under these 
Articles. An extremely problematic and wide-ranging in its impact upon the 
fundamental rights as well as other provisions of the Constitution is Article 150 that 
provides for proclamation of Emergency. It enables the Goverrmient with the widest 
range of extraordinary legislative as well as executive powers, which might 
contravene any provision of the Constitution except provisions relating to religion, 
citizenship, language. Islamic law or the customary law of the Malays and native law 
of indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak. Thus, Article 150 originally, had some 
limiting grounds, which were removed by subsequent amendments to this Article. 
However, it must be conceded that the Fundamental Liberties have not been 
encroached by the Goverrmient by taking recourse to emergency powers under this 
Article. 
Instead of operating as a check upon arbitrary misuse of emergency powers 
under Articles 149 and 150, the Article 151 providing for preventive detention has 
become an instrument or an adjunct of those Articles. Although, Article 151 was 
designed as a check upon preventive detention and it envisaged restrictions upon 
executive povv'er but those restrictions have been gradually removed or diluted. The 
citizens' need for security against misuse of government authority was ignored. 
Unless punishment is prescribed against the detaining authorities for misuse of 
preventive detention laws, human rights regime and a fuller democracy can't usher in 
Malaysia. 
Media in some fundamental respects in Malaysia is as free as the government 
allows it to be. Instead of tightening the laws like the Official Secrets Act, thus, 
curtailing further the right to free expression, the government should recognize the 
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citizens' right to information in a democracy. The Government prohibited public sales 
of PAS newspaper, Harakah, in early 1990s. The ruling parties' propaganda is 
unabashedly pedaled to the public through government-controlled media. Although 
there are national level unions like Malaysian Trade Union Congress, in-house unions^ 
are encouraged by the government. The right to strike is highly restricted. The 
Amnesty International has criticised the government on its poor record in protecting 
the rights of citizens in its various reports. Malaysia has not even signed the six basic 
international conventions on human rights. Yet the rights of the citizens to peace and 
development in context of developing and plural society are fairly protected. 
The constitution of Malaysia ensures "equality before law and equal protection 
of law." In fundamental respects, rule of law prevails in Malaysia. When Malaysia 
became independent, the Malays constituted majority but they were the most 
backward community. The poverty was mainly concentrated among the Malays. 
The new Economic Policy was envisaged as a response to 1969-riots to rectify 
the economic imbalance between the Malays and the Chinese. To increase the Malay 
percentage of share capital in limited companies, the government set targets of nine 
percent by 1975, sixteen percent by 1980, twenty three percent by 1985 and thirty 
percent by 1990. 
Malaysia has witnessed reduction in inter-ethnic inequalities on account of 
successful completion of National Economic Policy in 1990. It has not only 
considerably eased inter-ethnic tensions but also predisposed the government towards 
undertaking various minority-friendly steps in the last decade, like liberalization of 
economic and education policies. However, the intra-group disparities are growing, 
which portends ill for the Malaysian democracy on the equity scale. What is 
problematic with the course of political change is that serious curbs on civil and 
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political rights remain intact; despite the tremendous political and economic stability 
the system has witnessed posl-reformasi. Granting full civil and political rights to the 
citizens might enhance the responsivity of the state towards people, particularly the 
disadvantageous classes who have not so far benefited from the economic growth. It 
will provide the state with opportunity to reduce the equity deficit by getting to the 
pulse of the ordinary masses. However, the elite led by Abdullah Badawi prefer to 
continue their rule within the elitist framev*?ork of democracy meaning support for the 
status quo, in other words, crony capitalism. 
The persistence of democratic apparatus, stability, peace and equity are very 
important links in the political development of Malaysia. The institutionalization of 
political structures and processes, and rule of law are no mean achievement. Further, 
the strong civil society, educated middle class and pluralism coupled with 
consociational model, check the state from crossing the threshold of authoritarianism. 
As crouch pointed out, "Malaysia's social structure provides substantial barriers to the 
adoption of a fiilly-fledged authoritarian system in that economic and social 
development has produced social groups with distinct interests which they seek to 
protect and advance." 
There was no particular external power whose model could be copied or which 
could induce political changes in the political system of Thailand, unlike Malaysia or 
Philippines, which decisively modelled their political systems on the British and 
American patterns, respectively. The political process and political culture of the 
country is constantly evolving and maturing on the path of democratization, though, 
with occasional setbacks. The process of political development in the country is not 
unilinear or unidirectional. The absolute monarchy was turn into a constitutional 
monarchy after a military coup in 1932. By 1938, the military firmly established its 
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control. The military had tasted the political power and now, was in search of directly 
controlling the political system. The military regime started introducing policies 
which smacked of increasing authoritarianism. In 1950s, a fully authoritarian regime 
by Sarit was established accompanied by persecution of political opponents and 
communists, and curbs on all sorts of political activism. Thus, while the Thai public 
was pressing for more responsible government what it got, finally, as a result of yet 
another military coup was absolute authoritarian government. Tremendous changes 
took place in Thai politics and economy during Sarit's regime, but not certainly in the 
direction of democratization of public policy or political culture. A combination of 
Military and bureaucrats dominated the political system completely during the 1950's. 
People had openly started demanding the widening of democratic space and 
responsible government. The campaign for increased political participation continued. 
Much of the increased political activism involved students and academics not the 
political parties as such. In 1973 a civilian government was established. Political 
parties were given the freedom to organize and contest the elections. The 1975 
elections were contested by as many as forty two political parties. This period 
witnessed intense political competition, rivalry, conflict and instability. The 
governments changed frequently, resulting in the failure to maintain effective 
controls. A military coup was staged in October 1976. Because of democratization of 
political culture during the brief three-year democratic interregnum. Thai politics 
quite opened up. Under the democratic constitution of 1974, the government and 
military officials were for the first time excluded from politics unless they resigned 
their positions. Political parties operated freely and the Press was also free in 
publishing conflicting viewpoints. During 1978-1991, under semi-authoritarian 
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military regime the country witnessed four general elections as well as tremendous 
political stability. 
The 'People's Power' in 1992 successfully overthrew the authoritarian 
military regime, which paved way for democratic transition. The military leaders 
sponsored their own political party. Enough money was pumped in. The March 1992 
elections were notable for vote-buying, party switching and horse-trading. The pro-
military political parties won the elections while the pro-democracy parties fared 
poorly, mainly because of the narrowed political space, excessive use of money in the 
elections and the rigging of elections. The democratic ideals had taken strong roots in 
the political culture of Thailand by that time. The pro-democracy parties won the 
elections next time. The Leekpai government started with great promises and started 
deepening the political reforms, and made some progress towards liberal democracy. 
The balance of power started gradually shifting from previous military-bureaucratic 
elite towards business elite. It provides a partial explanation for the loosening of 
military's hold over tlie political system and the growing clout of the elected 
representatives and the business class. 
The July 1995 elections were vigorously contested among twelve political 
parties for 391 parliamentary seats. Again, no political party won the absolute 
majority. The largest number of seats were won by Chart Thai (Thai Nation) Party 
and its leader Banham Silapa-Chara headed the coalition of seven political parties. 
The opposition parties and some ruling coalition partners formed an alternative 
government. Later, a People's Constitution was drafted by this Assembly aiming at 
durability of parliamentary govermiients, the decentralization of political power and 
eradicating the ills of vote-buying as well as party defections. The new Democrats-led 
government matched its political performance with the reforms in the financial sector. 
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It brought sweeping changes to the political system. The elections under the new 
constitution took place in January 2001. In order to hasten the extinction of smaller 
parties to ensure political stability, the Election Commission had relaxed anti-
defection provisions for a brief period that benefited Thaksin's party. Thaksin formed 
the government with absolute majority but started ruling arbitrarily in certain respects. 
To overcome his growing criticism he held snap-polls in 2006. The position boycotted 
these polls. The Constitutional Court's Ruling declared the parliamentary elections 
unconstitutional and asked for fresh elections. These developments precipitated a 
crisis situation and military usurped political power in yet another coup. 
The political development is occurring but not exactly along western lines. 
Thailand is no exception to broad pattern of political development in Southeast Asia. 
At the same time, it has experienced sixteen constitutions and twenty elections in its 
chequered history of political development. Its political development has been 
described as a "vicious circle" patterned by a coup d'etat, military rule, public unrest, 
constitutional reform, general elections, parliamentary governance, corruption, 
instability, another coup d'etat, resumption of military rule, and so forth, as a general 
rule. No military coup occurred for twelve years. In the early 1990s, the competition 
was between pro-military and pro-democracy parties but later significant changes 
occurred in the composition of political actors. 
Once the elections are announced, former members of Parliament and other 
prospective candidates are offered financial incentives to switchover their political 
parties. Multi-party system prevailed but in highly disorganized and disarrayed form 
with candidates as well as parties kept on changing sides. Regionalization and 
proliferation of political parties occurred. The 1992-elections saw sixteen parties in 
the fray, 1995 elections twelve parties and the 2001-elections saw as many as thirty 
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seven parties in the fray. The regionahzation and fragmentation miHtates against the 
emergence of pan-national political parties as well as ideologically inspired broad 
based two-coalition system or healthy two-party system. 
The role of the Press in the political development process can't be ignored. 
Though the strongest bulwark against the continuance of military rule in Thailand is 
civil society, the very institution assertion by which led to-political chaos, propelling 
the militar\- to intervene. However, people didn't invite the military. 
In Indonesia, there was mushrooming of political parties after the 
independence and no political party gained majority in the first elections in 1955. The 
political parties were weakened, but retained their independent social bases. Sukarno 
abrogated liberal democratic structures and replaced them with his own conception of 
'Guided Democracy.' However, his position also got weakened in the light of 
military's growing assertion and he was eased out of office by his Army Chief, 
Suharto. The New Order Regime was declared and the Army took control over all the 
political and social forces of the country. 
The New Order brought political stability, stabilized the economy, crushed 
opposition, established military control over the civilian and annihilated the 
communist threat. As a result, the authoritarian trends and the state's control 
increased. Applying the Pancasila to reduce the opposition and friction in society, the 
government forced nine political parties to amalgate into two after the General 
Elections of 1971. The electoral opposition to the government assumed state-licensed 
forms represented by the Islamic United Development Pariy (???) under which four 
Muslim parties were clubbed together, and the Indonesian Democratic Party which 
united the five nationalist and other moderate parties. The amalgamated political 
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parties were forced to work within the ideological framework as determined by the 
military regime. No third opposition party could be established. 
The military increasingly assumed political role. Suharto backed the military to 
promote his own interest. The military officials held the key positions in Golkar. By 
the time of 1995, the relative decline of military personnel in political and official 
positions was discernible. There was no right to free association, particularly at the 
political level. The financial crisis brought the downfall of Suharto. The military as 
well as Golkar leadership deserted Suharto at this critical juncture. The MPR session 
held in November 1998 agreed to a mid-term election in 1999 under new rules that 
included reduction in military appointments in the DPR, multi-party system, open 
election for presidency along with reduced powers of the president and promises to 
investigate the corruption charges against Suharto's family. 
The democratic elections have been held since then for the popularly elected 
House of People's Representatives with open competition for political power. The 
provision of pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates chosen by political 
parties for direct popular contest is slightly complex. Given the multi-party system in 
Indonesia, there are remote chances of any pair elected in the first ballot unless the 
political parties enter into electoral arrangements. 
It impinges upon free choice of the voter as well as contestant, when the 
internal democracy is lacking among political parties. Although, presidential and vice-
presidential nominees are elected by the members of the respective political parties at 
their national conventions, yet, the organizational structures of the parties are not 
democratic. 
Philippines has experienced a very different trajectory of political development 
than the rest of southeast Asia. Philippines adopted a democratic constitution inspired 
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by the U.S. constitution. It provided for presidential form of government, unitary 
structure of state, separation of powers, a bill of rights and independent judiciary. The 
plurality vote system was adopted for the presidential election. A distinctive feature of 
the political system of early era that contributed a lot towards stabilizing the system 
v/as the growth and persistence of two-party system. The political power revolved 
between the two political parties, namely, the Nationalists and the Liberals. With the 
democratization of the governmental structures, the economic and political elite fused 
together. The political democracy did not lead, significantly, to the erosion of 
traditional pattern of class divisions. The civilian control over the military was well 
established. 
While strengthening the structural roots of democracy from above, Aquino 
government failed to strengthen the socio-economic roots of democracy from below. 
The divisions in society are reflected in party-system. Ramos was successful in 
consolidating the civilian control over the military. The military was not allowed any 
role in civilian matters. The party system is very weak in Philippines. When 
corruption charges were alleged against the popularly elected president, Estrada, extra 
institutional process unfolded and the former presidents, opposition political parties. 
Church and business leaders made a covert lobbying even to the military, police and 
allies to withdraw their support from Estrada. The money politics and the elite 
character of the democracy dilutes, rather, impedes the process of political 
development in Philippines. The political and economic power gets fused and 
perpetuated in the process. 
1 he single dominant political party, the UMNO has never sought power alone. 
Consequently, the ruling coalition, the UMNO being its patron, has never been 
displaced from political power. The most remarkable feature of the ruling regime in 
18 
Malaysia from the economic as well as political development perspective is that it has 
been able to continuously deliver. This has become possible due to consociational 
form of democracy practiced in Malaysia. What is problematic with the course of 
political change is that serious curbs on civil and political rights remain intact; despite 
the tremendous political and economic stability the system has witnessed post-
refonnasi A very strong middle class autonomous of state control has emerged in 
Malaysia due to uninterrupted economic development and continuously rising living 
standards. The biggest obstacle in the liberalization of the political system is the 
absence of strong opposition. The Malay vis-a-vis the Chinese interests divide the 
ci\il society, too. The persistence of democratic apparatus, stability, peace and equity 
are very important links in the political development of Malaysia. 
At deeper level, the isolated democratic transitions in Southeast Asia show a 
systematic pattern of political development viz. the emergence of a strong middle 
class, the strengthening of institutions of civil society, increased political 
consciousness, secularization of political culture, advanced means of 
communications, the spread of education and the inherent contradictions of an 
authoritarian regime pushing the political system towards democratization. The 
evidence across the developing world shows a clear trend towards democratization of 
political culture in the wake of modernization independent of the political initiative. 
The general perception is that economic growth strengthens the causative forces of 
democracy. The economic conditions in terms of development as well as deterioration 
do have profound impact upon the political development. But the economic 
development pursued during the authoritarian years cannot lend legitimacy to the 
argument that people liked or even willingly tolerated the authoritarian regimes. It is 
not to suggest that economic crisis is a precondition or that economic crisis 
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necessarily results in democratization of institutional apparatus. No uniform model of 
political development can be discerned or delineated in Southeast Asia. Malaysia and 
Singapore stand out unique cases of political development for they can be classified 
as hegemonic-consociational models of democracy. It is very difficult to classify the 
political systems of Southeast Asia in the ever changing context into some generalized 
model of political development. 
A very loose pattern o[ political development can be deciphered in Southeast 
Asia as it is characterized by absence of liberal elements in general and the 
authoritarian practices even within procedural- democratic frameworks. All these 
polities are more or less characterized by strong values traditionally attached to 
clientelism, communitarianism, deference towards authority, strong state, and even 
personality cult. Still, the differences remain. Unlike rest of Southeast Asia, the 
military has never been able to exert supremacy over civilian institutions in Malaysia 
and Singapore. Likewise, both these systems unlike other Southeast Asian polities, 
have not generally experienced a breakdown with formal procedural democratic 
apparatus. It proves the resilience of democratic experience in Malaysia. 
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PREFACE 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The fust chapter is introductory. It 
provides a background to the study of poHtical development in Southeast Asia. The 
problems associated with the process of political development in context of 
developing nations have been discussed. A brief geo-political, historical and cultural 
sketch of Southeast Asian countries has been constructed in order to comprehend the 
setting and the context in which political development has taken place in different 
polities of the region. The geographical, racial, cultural, historical, economic and 
political similarities among the states have been pointed out and Southeast Asia has 
shown to be a unit of analysis for the purposes of the present study. The marked 
differences, too, have been pointed out to account for the differences in the 
developmental experiences of these counties. The society, history and economy of 
Malaysia has been discussed in greater detail. 
The second chapter conceptualizes political development. The concept of 
political development is in a confused rather chaotic state of affairs, because it has 
been used by a number of political scientists having different ideological 
considerations and motivations to suit their specific purposes. The concept is stretched 
to mean anything from some vague idea of political change to westernization in its 
plethora of uses. Some political scientists equate it with economic development or 
market economy or even industrialization. It means order and stability to some, while 
intense political mobilization and participation to others. It all depends upon what one 
wants to prove or achieve. A part of the difficulty lies in the lack of tendency to define 
the concept before applying it to a study. 
n 
Therefore, an attempt has been made in the chapter to conceptuahze the term 
and arrive at a working definition of poHtical development. The western and the 
empiricists' bias in pohtical development studies" has been exposed. The concept has 
been fine-tuned to be appHcd to the developing countries which are in a slate of 
constant fiux. The concept has also been distinguished very clearly from the allied 
concepts such as economic development, political modernizafion, political 
mobilization, capabilities, performance, or democracy. A number of definitions 
evolved by various political scientists have been picked up and their shortcomings 
have been exposed. At last, by picking up the elements as logically appear more 
relevant to us, we have evolved our own generalized working definition of the 
concept, which can be fruitfully applied to the area under study. 
The third and fourth chapters deal with the process of political development in 
Malaysia. The former chapter covers political development in Malaysia in structural -
functional perspective. Some structural aspects of the constitution in the light of their 
bearing over the political development of the country have been studied. The 
problems of state building and national integration and their role in the maintenance 
of order, stability and cohesiveness of the political system have been looked into. A 
peculiar aspect of political development in Malaysia is the manner in which the 
remotely situated (divided by thousand miles of sea-distance) territories of Borneo 
have been incorporated and integrated with the Peninsular Malaysia despite the inbuilt 
tensions at etlinic and political levels between the two entifies. The imposition of 
emergency in the wake of 1969-riots the breakdown of parliamentary democracy, the 
restoration of peace and democratic process within a couple of years, and the 
accompanied structural as well as informal changes in the rules of democratic process 
have been analyzed in terms of their bearing over the process of political 
I l l 
development. The main political themes at the national level, the elections, and the 
electoral system have been investigated in order to understand how they contribute to 
the sustenance of the same ruling coalition dominated by the same political party. 
United Malays National Organization. How the sound economic policies and strong 
leadership have contributed to the political stability and persistence of the same 
coalition in the ruling position has also been probed. 
The fourth chapter carries out an in-depth and detailed analysis of evolution of 
civil and political rights, rule of law and egalitarian measures to reduce inter-ethnic 
disparities and poverty in Malaysia. The notions of liberty and equity have been 
applied at great length to understand the political change in last fifty years. The 
philosophical basis of the constitution has been delineated. The process of 
constitutional changes effected by the incumbent authorities in order to consolidate 
their hold over the political system have also been discussed. The basic rights 
available to the citizens and hollowness of some specific rights and safeguards has 
been laid tliread-bare. Various Acts, their enforcement, and bearing over the rights of 
the citizens and opposition's freedom of action have been thoroughly analyzed. The 
role of judiciary in the enforcement of rule of law and fundamental rights has also 
been discussed. Finally, the role played by various protective discrimination measures 
undertaken by the government to reduce the inter-ethnic disparities as well as poverty 
in achieving the egalitarian goals has been analyzed. 
The fifth chapter deals with the political development in Southeast Asia in 
general. All the important elements, causes and agents of political development in 
different polities have been delineated and discussed in terms of their significance. 
How the colonial powers and traditional elites during transition towards autonomy 
and democracy, the colonial legacy, the hierarchical and clienfist social structures. 
IV 
problems of nation building and leadership styles and rapid economic development 
have shaped the process of political development in Southeast Asia has been probed 
in this chapter. The interface between military, bureaucracy, political parties and 
political process has been revealed. The process of strengthening of the civil society 
has been delineated alongwith its significance for the political development, 
particularly, in terms of rationalization and secularization of political culture and civil 
society pressures for the democratization of the political apparatuses. An in-depth 
analysis of developmental experiences of some important political systems has been 
undertaken in accordance with their significance. 
The last chapter sums up the key findings of the research in terms of broad 
generalizations. The overall attempt is to understand the political dynamics and 
change in Southeast Asia in general and Malaysia in particular in a theoretical 
perspective. 
CHAPTER -1 
THE CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES OF POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Political development is the hallmark of the modernizing polities. Tremendous 
political development has taken place in the twentieth century. Democracy and human 
rights have become the watchwords at the turn of the century. Worldwide, the trend is 
towards liberal political development. The process of industrialization and 
urbanization, the improved means of communications and transportation, the 
application of technology resulting in higher levels of productivity, the spread of 
education leading to increased awareness, and the weakening of traditional 
hierarchized social bonds being replaced by secular-rational bonds ha\e induced 
political changes toward democratization of political culture and institutionalization 
of political structures and processes in liberal directions. There has been logical 
extension of civil and political rights and socio-economic welfare activities by the 
state. There is close relationship between the quality of lile and democracy. The top 
twenty countries on the Human Development Index of the Human Development 
reports of the United Nations Development Programme since 1992 ha\'e consistently 
been political democracies. These are all flourishing libera! democracies with 
emphasis upon formal equality, rule of law. open competition for political power, 
independent judiciary and periodic elections, which keep the rulers, more or less, 
accountable to the electorate in terms of preserving and promoting its interests. 
However, all is not well with the western democracies. Many of those lag 
behind in equity standard. There is a great deal of debate still going on whether the 
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notion of democracy should include just procedural aspects,' or should it also include 
socio-economic framework to enhance the intensity, penetration, appeal and defence 
of democracy . The elite character of the western representative democracies is well 
documented.^ The economic as well as political power is concentrated in the elite that 
often undergo change from one set of elite to another through open competition for 
political power. The people exercise free choice in a given polity, yet, the political 
development occurs within a liberal-capitalist framework as the media is controlled 
by corporate interests remain, and the electoral process is not free from money-
politics.^ The transparency in governance still remains a distant goal for many 
advanced democracies. Those lack the real deliberative and participatory character as 
institutional mechanisms are not strengthened. People are relatively indifferent to 
The procedural democracy is best articulated by Roben Dahl that includes regular elections, free 
electoral process, right to vote, contest and organize freely along with a fair degree of tolerance 
towards opposition. See, R. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1971. 
The socio-economic component of democracy is articulated by C.B. Makpherson, Democratic 
Theory: Essays in Retrieval, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977; F. Vandenbroucke, Globalization, 
Inequality and Social Democracy, Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 1988; A. Wolf 
"Has Social Democracy a Future?" Comparative Politics, 1978, No. 11, pp. 102-212; P. Gould, 
The Unfinished Revolution, Little Brown, London, 1998; John Callaghan and S. Tunney, "The 
End of Social Democracy," Politics, 2001, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 63-72. A stimulating examination 
of rival models of democracy is given in David Held, Models of Democracy, Polity Press, 
Oxford, 1996. 
See, J.A. Shumpeter, Capitalist}!, Socialism and Democracy, Harper and Row, New York, 1950; 
C.W. Mills, The Power Elite. Oxford University Press, New York, 1956; T.B. Bottomore, Elites 
and Society, Penguin, London, 1964; R. Dahl, "Further Retlections on the Elitist Theory of 
Democracy," American Political Science Review, 1966, Vol. LX, No. 2, pp. 296-306; J.R. 
Lucas, Democracy and Participation, Penguin, London, 1977. 
E Herman and N. Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Muss 
Media, Pantheon, New York, 1988. 
See, John Plamenatz, Democracy and Illusion, London, 1973; R.A. Dahl, IVIio Governs? 
Democracy and Power in an American City, New Haven, 1961. 
The deliberative and participatory character of democracy is emphasized by C. Pateman, 
Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970; D. 
Miller, "Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice," in D. Held, ed. Prospects for Democracy, 
Polity Press, Cambridge, 1993; B. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New 
Age, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984; J, Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, 
Complexity and Democracy. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1996; A. Gutmann and T. Thompson, 
Democracy and Disagreement. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1996; J. Bohman and W. 
Rehg, eds. Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Rea:,on and Politics, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
1997. 
political issues and even the voters' turnout in elections is very low7 The political 
decision-making power remains centralized depriving the ordinary citizens to 
participate directly and intimately in the decision-making process. Another drawback 
often emphasized is that the majoritarian character of representative democracy 
impinges upon the social solidarity and minority interests, particularly in the context 
of third world plural societies. However, the negative impact of these drawbacks is 
diluted in the western polities by high standards of living, infrastructure, the absence 
of severe deprivations in terms of food, health and education, maintenance of high 
level of tolerance for opposition, extensive civil and political rights with focus upon 
individual protection, and the freedom of action available to the innumerable interest 
groups alongwith state's sensitivity towards civil society.^ 
Political development has occurred in third world countries too, but the 
context, form, pace and direction is very different. The colonial legacy has a distinct 
sway over the political development of these countries. In fact, the process was first 
externally induced by the colonial powers. In most of the countries mature conditions 
did not prevail to sustain open competition and democratic institutions. Nor the 
governmental institutions and political processes were designed or strengthened 
enough to cope with the traditional political culture, underdeveloped economy or the 
plural character of these societies. Democratic apparatuses were adopted or imposed 
upon the decolonized people without preparing adequate groundwork for democratic 
7. Political apathy is justified in the name of order and stability. See, Morris .lones, 'in Defence of 
Apatny," Political Studies, 1959, No. 2, pp. 25-37; l^ .F^ . Bereison et al. Volini^, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1954; J.R. Lucas, Democracy ap.cit.\ G.A. Almond and S. Verba, eds. 
The Civic Culture Revisited, Little Brown, Boston, 1980; Nina Eliasoph, Avoidini^ Politics: flow 
Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
8. For political development process in the West and the challenges faced and overcome by it, see, 
R. Grew, ed. Crises of Political development in Europe and the United States, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1978 
participation and governance.'^  Hence within sliort period of time, the flimsy and 
hastily-erected political structures started crumbling down. In the absence of 
detraditionized and secular mass political culture, strong leaders typically supported 
by armies manipulated the political discourse and established authoritarian rules. The 
switchovers were craftily managed by them with the help of new ideological tools 
namely, the doctrines of "Asian democracy," "Guided Democracy," "Asian values." 
"strong state," "corruption-free government," "public interest," or "stability" etc. The 
new authoritarian or soft-authoritarian regimes were tolerated because, the civil 
society was weak and. partly, these regimes were able to deliver and restore a 
semblance of socio-economic and political order and stability in some countries.'" 
Southeast Asian countries t>pically symbolized this state of affairs. It is against this 
background that the political development in Southeast Asia has to be delineated, 
analysed and understood. 
Be that as it may, there are contextual variables that set Southeast Asia apart 
from the rest of the developing world. These contextual variables have immensely 
contributed to their transition from colonial to independent status, tlien from 
rudimentary democratic predicament to soft authoritarian disposition. Recently, a set 
of common factors has pushed the political process in these countries towards some 
level of genuine democratization. Of these variables, some are common while others 
are unique to each country. Hence, there are commonalities in their developmental 
experiences and there are variations too. The variations are as marked, as the 
commonalities. Malaysia stands out as a unique case of political development, yet it 
9 See J. Juan and A. Stepan, eds. The Breakdown of DemocruUe Regimes, John Mopkins 
Universitv, Baltimore, 197S , 
in See Lar.-v Diamond. J. Linz and S.M. l.ipset^  eds. De>uocracy m Developing Counmes.Asiu^ 
Vol. 3, Lynne Reinner, Boulder, 1989; S.P. Huntington, Authonianan I'oliUcs in Modem 
Societv, Basic Books, New York, 1970 
shares a number of features with the other poUtical systems of the region. All except 
Thailand have been ex-colonies; still, the colonial experiences have been too varied as 
the nine countries were shared by as many as six colonial powers during the course of 
period extending from less than a century in case of Burma and Indo-China to over 
three centuries in case of Philippines and Indonesia." Besides, they commonly faced 
the Japanese interregnum during the Second World War.'^ Some were ruled more 
ruthlessly than the others. Some achieved independence markedly as a result of 
revolutionary struggle against the colonial authorities, like Indonesia or Vietnam, 
while some got it largely as a gift from the imperial powers, like Philippines. All 
became independent after the Second World War, but at different times and under 
different circumstances.''' Each country got independence at different level of political 
development. 
The political development was marked in Philippines where the Americans 
well over a period of forty years had introduced gradually some institutions of 
democratic governance preceding the Second World War.'^ The democratic 
constitution which was to guide the polity after Independence had been well in place 
since 1934. The constitution was prepared on the pattern of American presidential 
system with checks and balances. Though, the legacy of U.S. colonialism was 
considerable oligarchy-building, but little state-building.'^ The Malaysians did not 
have long experience; still, they had been initiated into representative parliamentary 
11 C. Fasseur, The Politics of Colonial Exploitation. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 
19 W H ' Elsbree Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts,' 1953; B. Collier, The War in The Far East 19-11-1945: A Military History, New 
York, 1969. , , , , , j ,o«i 
] 3, j .M. Pluvier, Southeast Asia from Colonialism to Independence, London, \)h\. 
14 Nicholas Tarling, yVa//on5. o/J.c;7., pp. 21-6. , , . , „, ... . ., ,, 
15. Paul Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism: The PolUics oj Bankm^ ,n the FInhppmes, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1998, p. 26. 
svstem before the British left. The same was true of Singapore. The Indonesians were 
not initiated into the practices of political participation. The parliamentary form of 
government was entirely new to the soil, superimposed by the retreating Dutch. Hence 
it could not function with any measure of smoothness and, therefore, after a while, it 
was discarded in favour of presidential system, which the Indonesians had digenously 
built during the phase of revolutionary struggle. The successful violent 
revolutionary struggles in Indonesian and Vietnam had clear effect on the future 
development of these countries, although both adopted entirely different courses of 
political development. After becoming independent, all nations came under strong 
nationalist or revolutionary charismatic leaders. These were all men of exceptional 
qualities but they greatly differed in their leadership styles. Tunku Rahman of 
Malaysia and Magsaysay of Philippines proved to have far better democratic 
credentials than Sukarno of Indonesia or Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore (they, too, were 
brilliant and visionary leaders, otherwise). 
The power was gradually usurped either directly by the military generals or by 
the strong leaders with the backing of military. The period of personal rule outside the 
democratic framework ushered in Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 70s. Thailand 
after a brief period of democratic rule after the Second World War reverted back to 
military dictatorship. In Indonesia, the experiment in liberal democracy was given up 
and Sukarno established his personal rule under the misconstrued conception of 
"Guided Democracy," soon to be displaced by more authoritarian military-backed 
Suharto regime that ruled for thirty years with tine grip. In Philippines, democratically 
elected Marcos usurped political power at the end of his second term (as the 
16. A..I.S. Reid, The Indonesia National Revolution, 1945-1950, Camberwell, Victoria, 1974; 
Nicholas Tariing, Nations, op.cit., p. 10, 92. 
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constitution of Philippines prohibited third term for presidency) with the backing of 
military. In Bunna too, the military generals captured political power after a decade of 
democratic experience in 1962. The story of Indo-China is entirely different. They 
went under the influence of communists as a result of communist-guerrilla 
revolutionary struggle and adopted authoritarian-Leninist structures of governance. 
However, the winds of progressive change are blowing in these countries.''' 
The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia have recently been formally democratized.'^ 
Democracy ushered in, not as a resuh of voluntary addition of political power by 
authoritarian leaders. All the three countries experienced mass-protest movements in 
favour of democracy, extending well over a period of decade. The middle classes, 
especially the students, workers, peasant and NGOs participated a great deal in 
spearheading and organizing these movements. The increased strength and autonomy 
of civil society, thus, augurs well for the democracy. 
Only two countries, Malaysia and Singapore were able to maintain total 
civilian control over the military and their political systems have shown tremendous 
resilience. Malaysia has proved to be the only country in Southeast Asia, or perhaps in 
the world, which has been able to retain consistent semi-democratic status for nearly 
half a century without substantially democratizing either, nor giving up democratic 
apparatus, altogether. The unique aspect is that the same coalition dominated by the 
same party is ruling the country since Independence. It has brought various 
classificatory labels to the Malaysian political system such as "semi-democracy," 
"quasi-democracy," "illiberal democracy," "democracy without turnover." or even, 
17. CD. Neher and Ross Marley, Democracy, op.cit.; M. Vatikiolis i'uliiica!, op.cit. 
18. However, fresh trouble in Thailand has again recently blown up. 
"semi-authoritarian" state."' However, the process is extremely complex. It can't be 
explained or endorsed merely by looking at 'democratic model" or 'authoritarian 
model.- The process of political development is intimately connected to the precarious 
etlinic composition of the country. The political debate is guided as well as 
constrained by ethnic considerations in the country. Malaysia is a strange example 
wherein extensive protections in terms of reservations in jobs, scholarships and 
educational facilities have been granted to the numerically majority community. The 
interface between authoritarian state practices and communal politics injects a very 
special element in the process of political development particularly in the context of 
maintenance of political stability, peace and continuous economic growth. It is in 
spite of the fact that tensions and communal feelings are ever present on both sides of 
the communal divide between the majority Malays and the minority Chinese but are 
not allowed to spill over into any sort of bloodbath or open connict. 
Political development in a country can only be fairly gauged only over a long 
period of time. Small setbacks and occasional hiccups do not permit a pattern to be 
clearly discernible. Political development just does not take place at the structural 
level. The attitudinal and behavioural changes are equally important and prove to be 
strong catalyst in the overall process of political development. The changes in terms 
of evolving political culture are shaped by the interplay of various subtle and 
intangible factors like people's psychological orientations towards politics in terms of 
motivations, perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and values, the level of education and 
political debate in a society, the democratic space available to the media and 
19 William Case, "Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures lor Regime Change," 
Pacifif Affairs, 1993, Vol. 66, pp. 183-205 (183-4) 
opposition coupled with the availabihty of modern means of communications.^ *^ 
Hundreds of contingent elements work for brief periods and than subside. Generally, 
institutional development takes place at two levels ~ elite directed as well as thai 
necessitated by socio-economic changes. The process and the direction can be a 
replica of the West or it can be built upon indigenous foundations and sources. Or it 
may harmoniously combine the indigenous elements with the borrowed elements. It is 
no easy task to delineate the model of political development pursued by a gi\en 
polity, its pattern, stages, causes, and implications. 
When political development is studied, compared, differentiated and 
generalized in the context of a region as a whole consisting of several polities, the task 
can be much more challenging and daunting, at the same time, fruitful and rewarding. 
When the process of political development in Southeast Asia is studied and analyzed 
in its varied aspects, whatever broad similarities we may find - for instance, 
commonality of political and socio-economic problems, authoritarian streaks in 
traditional political culture, the military's political role, the ethnic pluralism, the 
influence of religion, outward-looking economies, emergent middle class, patron-
client relationships, personalism, multi-party fragmented system, controlled 
opposition, curbs on civil and political rights or resurgent democratic trends -
generalizations still elude us. It is still more difficult, nay, impossible to generalize the 
pattern of political development or to discover a model of political development for a 
set often polities. Their levels of economic development, social engineering, national 
integration, institutionalization, protection and enforcement of civil rights, political 
culture and political socialization differ. In short, the historical background and 
20. The import of communications and political culture for political development is 
comprehensively brought out in two volumes edited by Lucian Pye, namely, Communicuiious 
and Political Development and, Political Culture and Political Development, both published by 
Princeton University Press, New Jersey in 1963 and 1965 respectively. 
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democratic experience vary from country to country. Nevertheless, the need for 
recognizing the general features remains. Therefore, an attempt has been made to 
explore some broad pattern or trend into which Southeast Asian nations in general 
chime in with, particularly, in the light of recent democratic transitions in some of 
them. While delineating the pattern, minor deviations or exceptions need to be 
ignored. As we know that differences are as marked as the similarities, therefore, the 
construction or suggestion of any closed and terse model or pattern of political 
development will prove to be futile. The different backgrounds, creative and visionary 
leadership, contingent elements and an interplay of hundreds of factors are always 
capable of evading any generalized conceptual framework to determine political 
development, if such framework is possible at all. 
The diversities as well as the different paths traversed by the Southeast Asian nations 
in their developmental courses need to be understood in the contextual perspective. It 
is also the purpose of the present study to account for the difference in the courses of 
political development followed by Southeast Asian polities. Even the differences are 
significant from the point of view of explaining and comparing their developmental 
experiences. Interestingly, the same factors like culture, religion, geography, 
economy, trade, history, colonial legacy, leadership styles foster linkages as well as 
variations in their developmental experiences. Still, the linkages appear to be more 
pronounced than the divisions at the subtle level, which make Southeast Asia a unit 
for analytical purposes. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has 
reinforced the cultural, economic and political linkages. It is a formal orgimization 
encompassing all the countries of the region meant to facilitate and promote economic 
cooperation and trade among them. The close economic ties and enhanced trade and 
dialogue make them more susceptible to political influences across each other's 
11 
frontiers. The ASEAN experience makes the study of the region more relevant and 
interesting. 
The Southeast Asia comprises of ten states. The upper (northern) mainland 
consists of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (the three states collectively known as Indo-
China), Thailand and Burma (Myanmar). The archipelago states are Indonesia in the 
South and Philippines in the West. The mainland is joined with the archipelago by the 
centrally located state of Malaysia. The two tiny states of Singapore and Brunei adjoin 
Malaysia at the tips. Malaysia is, geographically, further divided into distantly located 
East Malaysia (Peninsula) and West Malaysia (Borneo territories). The peninsula is 
attached to the mainland by just a narrow strip of land. Around ninety-five percent of 
its frontier touches the sea. The South Eastern coastline of the Malaysian Peninsula 
runs parallel to the Island Sumatra of Indonesia. A narrow passage, which is known as 
the Strait of Malacca passes between Malaysia and Sumatra. This strait traditionally 
occupies the most important place as it links the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean 
and has always been used as a gate-pass in the maritime world trading system. The 
territories of Sarawak and Sabah (at the northern end of the Island Borneo of 
Indonesia) are known as East Malaysia and these states along with peninsular states 
form the federation, i.e. Malaysia. Malaysia's historical, cultural, ethnic, religious, 
economic and political links with the southern islands fits it better with those than 
with the countries of the Mainland. It is not argued here to discount the historical and 
cultural relationship of Malaysia with the mainland but to emphasize its relative 
closeness to the archipelago. 
Southeast Asia is geographically large and scattered, demographically, mobile 
and densely populated (in pockets), ecologically bountiful and fragile, ethnically 
12 
diffused and precarious, culturally rich and sophisticated, economically diversified 
and outward looking, politically distinct and inward looking and historically, sharing 
the colonial legacy and well connected to the great civilizations of India and China. 
The Region as a Viable Unit 
Malaysia acquires special significance and role in the region as it unites 
northern and southern parts of Southeast Asia so that the region appears as a natural 
unit in geographical, cultural, ethnic, economic and political terms. Malaysia stands 
out, occupying a unique place in the region. There is a debate over Southeast Asia's 
qualification to be considered as a coherent or natural regional unit. In fact, before the 
Second World War, the region was not generally considered as a closely-knit unit. 
Although, the region has been for centuries recognized in political and geographic 
terms, more or less, as a unit by merchants, travellers, navigators and writers from 
India, Ajrabia and China.^' However, these people did not mean by Southeast Asia the 
same countries as it is constituted of, today. The region was, generally, understood as 
the Islands, not the mainland. When the term Southeast Asia, or Southeastern Asia 
began to be used by the authors in the West in the later half of the nineteenth century 
and the first half of the twentieth century, they also did not include exactly the sam.e 
countries in the region as are included today. Indo-China and Philippines were 
generally excluded, while some included even India or China while categorizing 
Southeast Asia. 
The region shot into the consciousness of the world with the establishment of 
the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC). the military command that was created by the 
21. Donald G, McCloud, System and Process in Southeast Asia: The Evolution of a Region, 
Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1986, p. 9. 
22. See Donald K. Emmerson, "Southeast Asia: What's in a Name," Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, March 1984, Vol. XV, No. 1, pp. 5-6. 
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British during the Second World War in 1943 at the Anglo-American Quebec 
conference to counter the Japanese aggression. " It omitted Philippines and included 
four regions which are not part of the region. World War II affected the idea of 
"Southeast Asia" in three important ways. The region was made visible. In 1945, a 
Division of Southeast Asian Affairs was created in the U.S. Department of State, and 
in 1946 and 1947, Southeast Asian Studies units were established at the University of 
London's School of Oriental and African studies and Yale University."'' More than 
diversities, the similarities across the region began to be emphasized by the scholars. 
A very important work of D.G.E. Hall did not include Philippines in the region on the 
plea that it stood "outside the mainstream of historical developments" in the region.^ ^ 
However, Hall included Philippines as part of the region in the second edition of his 
book in 1964, bowing down to the increasing tendency and near unanimity among the 
scholars on Southeast Asia to treat it as part of the region. Otherwise too, Philippines 
neither fits in with the Far East nor with Australia. It stands, geographically and 
ethnically, much closer to Malaysia and Indonesia than to any other part of the world. 
The debate about the feasibility of the region as a viable unit came to an end 
with the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A 
regional organization, aimed primarily at economic cooperation among the member 
countries, ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore 
and Philippines. Today it covers all the countries of the region. The success of 
23. Ibid. pp. 6-1. 
24. Ibid. p. 8. 
25. D.G.E. Hall, History of Southeast Asia, Macmillan, London, 1955, p. 3. 
26. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in July 1997 and Cambodia in 
1999. Some earlier attempts at regional unity could not succeed as those were based on narrow 
vision and did not take into account the geopolitics of the region. For instance. Association of 
Southeast Asia (ASA) established in 1961 included only Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand and 
lasted until 1967 when ASEAN was founded. The ASEAN has proved to be extremely crucial 
for the survival and well being of member countries in the context of competitive global system 
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ASEAN has, more forcefully than any other idea or effort, imprinted the 
distinctiveness of Southeast Asia region on the psyche of the world leaders and 
scholars apart from bringing the inhabitants of the region closer. 
Ecolog>' and Demography 
The total area of Southeast Asia is around 4,369,290 and it inhabits a 
population of 5.8 million (in 2001), which amounts to eight percent of the total world 
population, approximately." Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim-populated 
country. Two religions are dominant, Islam and Buddhism, throughout the region. 
Philippines has predominantly Christian population. The region attracts a good 
rainfall and it is extremely resource-rich. Recently, the region has become the hub of 
export- oriented manufacturing units, particularly the electronic goods. The region has 
not knovvn the extremes of poverty as is experienced in South Asia and Africa. All the 
countries of the region touch the sea, except Laos, which is land-locked. The states of 
the region are not in the habit of severe and irreconcilable conflicts with each other. 
Boundary disputes though existent but do not surface in their dealings on a consistent 
basis.'** Indonesia is a giant in terms of size and population but the relative weight of 
economies of other states offsets its engrossing predominance over the region. The 
region has cordial relations with all the great powers of the world. It has successfully 
managed its power relations in the competitive global system with great diplomacy 
and cohesive-collective bargaining. The region is the envy of many powers but did 
to chalk out their independent course of development based on high levels of interdependence 
and cooperation. 
27. These figures have been worked out from The World Guide: An Alternative Reference to the 
Countries of Our Planet, 2003/2004, ITDG Publishing, London, 2003. 
28. Spratly Islands in the South China Sea have been a bone of contention among Philippines, 
Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam. More alarmingly, China also claims these islands and so does 
Taiwan. However, no serious conflict or war has erupted over these claims. In mid 1999, 
ASEAN established a special committee to formulate a code of conduct to be observed by all 
claimants to the Spratly Islands. A draft code of conduct was approved in November 1999. 
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not become a theatre of cold war rivalry or post-cold war upheavals.^^ The region is 
nuclear-free." '^' All these factors make Southeast Asia, potentially, a zone of peace and 
prosperity. 
Southeast Asia, like South Asia is a region of great diversity and contrast. Each 
of the ten countries of the region represent distinct culture, tradition, history, 
language, religion, ethnicity, and stage of economic and political development. Still, a 
thread of unity pervades the whole region, which Southeast Asia, unlike South Asia, 
has been able to recognize and realize to a great extent. The sheer size, which 
stretches over more than thirty-five degrees of latitudes and nearly fifty degrees of 
longitudes, makes it a region of geographical contrasts. Indonesia alone consists of 
around thirteen thousand islands, while Philippines has around seven thousand 
islands. Indonesia has slightly less than half the total area as well as population of 
Southeast Asia. However, the combined share of just Malaysia and Singapore 
outweighs the share of Indonesia in terms of Gross National Income (GNI). The 
density in Singapore is 6726 persons per square kilometre, while Brunei has density 
of 23. Four countries of the region have a population of more than six crores each. 
Indonesia with a population of more than twenty crores is the fourth largest country of 
the world, while Brunei sustains just three lakhs people. 
29. Though, lately the region is becoming a theatre of Muslim terrorists. The terrorist attack in the 
Bah' island of Indonesia on October 12, 2001, which killed around ISO and injured around 300 
people, is a case in point. 
30. In December 1995 ASEAN heads of government signed a treaty in Bangkok establishing a 
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The treaty was also signed by 
Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos. It was extended to cover the offshore economic exclusion zones 
of each country It prohibits the manufacture or storage of nuclear weapons within the region. On 
ratification by all the parties, the treaty entered into force on 27 March 1997. In July 1999, 
China and India agreed to observe the terms of the treaty. 
31. Ibid.; The World Bank, World Development Report, 2003, Oxford University Press, New York, 
2004. 
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However, the points of unity in geographical terms are many. All the countries 
are situated adjacent to one another. Except Laos, all countries have coastal lines 
along the sea. The population of the region is mainly clustered around fertile coastal 
sea-belts and around the river valleys in the mainland. The tropical Monsoon weather 
prevails and the rice is the basic crop of the region. The commercialization of 
agriculture along with the industrialization has freed the harvests from weather 
fluctuations. Huge dams have been built along the great rivers. There is a great deal of 
intra-regional cooperation in building dams and canals, whose full potential has yet to 
be tapped for irrigation and electricity. 
Southeast is separated in the West from the Indian subcontinent and in the 
North from the Chinese mainland. It can be said that area East of Indian subcontinent 
and South of China may be loosely categorized as Southeast Asia. The location of two 
giants on the West and the North of the region and the ocean cover surrounding the 
region except in the North, makes it a coherent unit at least geographically, how much 
diverse its terrain might be. All these countries fit within a triangle.'" 
Ethnicity 
The ethnic divisions are sharp across the region - outside as well as inside the 
frontiers of each nation. Broadly, there are four major ethnic or racial groups in the 
region - Malayo-Polynesians, commonly known as Malayas or Malays, inhabit 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Philippines and they also include the Chams in the 
mainland; the Sino-Tibetan group, which includes the Burmese, the Karens and the 
Chinese; the Austro-Asiatic group, which includes the Khmers and the Vietnamese; 
32. Donald G. McCloud, System, op.cit., p. 4. 
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and the Thais, including Laotians and Shams as well.^ ^ However these groups are 
further divided into hundreds of sub-groups or ethnic communities. For example, 
Burmese, Karens and Chinese, belong to the same racial group, but in Burma there 
are sharp ethnic differences and conflicts between these three groups/"* Burmese are 
in majority in Burma but it also contains ethnic communities of Shams, Karens, 
Chinese, Arakans, Indians, Mons and Kachins, each minority having a population of 
more than half a million."'^  Besides, there are hundreds of indigenous hill tribes. 
The problem of ethnic minorities is very precarious in Malaysia. Sixty six 
percent people are Malays who include the indigenous natives of Sabah and Sarawak. 
A quarter of the population is Chinese and there are nearly eight percent people of 
Indian origin."^ ^ The Chinese and Indians are mainly concentrated in the urban areas, 
while Malays chiefly inhabit the rural areas. Further complicating the balance, the 
Chinese' hold upon the economy is nearly double than that of Malays. The difference 
v/as manifold at the time of Independence, but has been bridged to such extent due to 
the socio-economic policies of the government, which were undertaken to restructure 
economy so as to correct the economic imbalance and eventually eliminate the 
identification of class with race.''^ The ethnic restructuring programme has introduced 
some tension and ill-will between the communities, yet it has also facilitated 
33. Ibid. p.7. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Clark D. Neher and Ross Marlay, Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: The Winds of 
Change, Western Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1995, p. 112. 
36. Government of Malaysia, Eighth Malaysian Plan 2001-2005, Economic Planning Unit, Prime 
Minister's department, Kuala Lumpur, 2001, p. 89 
37. Government of Malaysia, Second .Malaysian Plan 1971-1975, Government Press, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1971, pp. 1-4 
communal peace as politically dominant Malays no longer feel deprived or threatened 
by the preponderance of Chinese in the economic field.""^ 
The Indonesian Malayas inhabiting different islands have acquired distinct 
ethnic identity over a long period of time. They are today known as Javanese. 
Balinese, Acehese, Sudanese, Madurese etc. The differences exist within the 
respective islands, too. For instance, the Javanese are concentrated in the Eastern and 
Central parts of Java island while the people inhabiting the Western pan of Java are 
known as Sundanese. Similarly within the large island of Sumatra three ethnic groups 
are concentrated, namely, Minangkabau, Batak and Acehese.'' The Acehese are 
demanding a separate state. Fierce violence has erupted between the different island 
communities after the overthrow of authoritarian centralist regime of Suharto. The 
interesting feature is that most of these islanders are Muslim-populated and belong to 
the same racial group. 
The Filipinos of Philippines are also of Malaya origin but due to the long 
colonial association with different imperial powers, adoption of Christianit\- by almost 
ninety percent of the people and separate geographical location, they ha\"e developed 
their distinct ethnic identity. As a consequence, huge similarities as well as 
dissimilarities can be found between these people and the Malayas of otlier parts of 
the region. Singapore has two-third majority of the Chinese but significant numbers of 
Malayas as well as people of Indian origin also reside there. Thailand is also inhabited 
by a number of minority ethnic communities such as Khmers, Malayas, Karens and 
38. The share of Malays in the corporate wealth increased from the meagre two percent at the 
beginning of the 1970s to around twenty percent at the close of the 90s as a result of the 
protective discrimination policies further intensified by the Government through New Economic 
Policy 1971. See, James Puthucheary, Ownership and Control in the Malaya Economy, Oxford 
University Press, Singapore, 1960; G.P. Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Gencruiion, 
Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1991. 
39. Lucian W. Pye, Southeast, op.cit., p. 43 
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Chinese but Thais have preponderant presence over them. Cambodia is predominantly 
Khmer while Vietnam predominantly Annamese but both communities cut across the 
frontiers of these states. Indo-China is also inhabited by a sizable number of 
Chinese. 
Thus, we see that nearly all the countries of the region are besotted with the 
problem of accommodating ethnic minorities. The Chinese are usually dispersed in 
the mainland countries and are found in significant numbers in Singapore and 
Malaysia, partly, due to imperial policies of the British."" Although, the problem is 
starker in Malaysia and Singapore but their record in maintaining communal peace is 
better than any other country of the region, hidians are also found in substantial 
numbers in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Burma. The complex pattern of 
movement and migration of people has been characteristic of Southeast Asia starting 
from the Indian and Chinese influences, way back two millennia. The practice 
continued through the voyages of Arabs in medieval times, to the imperialist 
infiltration of the western colonial powers culminating in the transportation of Indians 
and Chinese by the British to work as labourers in rubber plantations and tin-
manufacturing units in Malaya. D.G.E. Hall has described the region as a veritable 
"chaos of races and languages." 
The ethnic or communal politics engulfs all the polities of Southeast Asia.''^  
This feature has significantly moulded the political development process of these 
40. Jbid. 
41. See, Milton Osborne, Southeast, op.cit., pp. 104-7 
42. D.G.E. Hall, o;?.c;/. p. 5. 
43. David Brown. The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, Routledge, London, 1996; Joel 
S. Kahn, ed. Southeast Asia Identities: Culture and The Politics of Representation in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, ISEAS, Singapore, 1998; David Brown, "The State of 
ethnicity and the ethnicity of the state; ethnic politics in Southeast Asia," Ethnic and Racial 
Relations, 1989, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 47-62. 
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polities. Indonesia suffers from it even to a greater extent and at much more complex 
level than any other country of Southeast Asia. The ethnic polarization is sharper 
there because different ethnic communities inhabit different regions or islands. 
Therefore, some of them are continuously embarking upon the pursuit of secessionism 
while the decentralization or devolution of power is the central theme of political 
debate today. Singapore too faces the problem but its small city size puts the problem 
within manageable limits. The problem is present in Philippines and Thailand, more 
or less, on a similar scale and pattern. It is much more severe in the former where the 
Southern parts dominated by Muslims have waged a long armed struggle against the 
centralization efforts of the Filipino authorities to extend their control over the areas. 
Hundreds of thousand of people have died as a result of brutal conflict. On a lesser 
magnitude, Thailand also has to cope with Muslim Malay minorhies on its southern 
borders. Burma is besotted with numerous big and small ethnic minority groups. The 
repressive military regime may well be exacerbating the potential unrest among these 
groups in the absence of democratic channels to release the tensions. 
Malaysia and Singapore have tackled the problem of ethnic minorities better by 
preserving the precarious balance between the competing claims of various groups 
through accommodation, strict law enforcement and continuously rising standards of 
living. However, the record of other states in preserving inter-communal peace has 
not been equally tenable, Philippines, Myanmar and Thailand have been unable to 
resolve their problems with ethnic groups, particularly in their southern parts, 
respectively. Indonesia has recently faced a lot of discontent, violence and separatist 
uprisings in a number of islands, particularly Aceh, Irian Jaya, Maluku (Spice Islands) 
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etc.'*'' The unrest in these places is simmering partly because of the legacy of 
corruption, neglect and authoritarian tactics of the old Suharto regime and partly due 
to the hangover of the Southeast Asian economic crisis of the late 1990's, and also 
due to the absence of federal structure of government in such a diverse and large 
country. The problem of ethnicity is further compounded in the light of the fact that 
the frontiers of these states were carved out by the colonial powers, keeping in mind 
their own economic and strategic interests as well as mutual obligations and relations 
toward each other.''^ This meant an additional challenge to the ruling elite of the 
independent countries. They had to manage the difficult tasks of penetration, 
integration and participation, simultaneously. 
The linguistic diversity also coincides very often with the ethnic-cultural diversities. 
No single language is spoken, predominantly, in any two states except the Malay, 
which is the predominant and official language of Malaysia as well as Brunei. 
Nevertheless, there are marked similarities in the languages of Southern islands as 
well as of the mainland. Each state has its own language which is spoken by the 
majority of the people of the state, at the same time, each state is multi-lingual in the 
sense that nearly all states are besotted with ethnic minorities, and a number of local 
languages are spoken. There are thousands of dialects of the principal languages 
across the region. For example, it is believed by the linguists that throughout the 
southern islands, the dialects or the offshoots of the principal Malay language are 
spoken, which have become indigenized and acquired disfinct identity and quality 
apart from the parent language."*^ Bahasa, the language predominantly spoken in 
Indonesia in hundreds of variegated dialects has common origin with the Malay 
44. See, Daniel Lynn, The Far, op.cit., pp. 504-6. 
45. See, Nicholas Tarling, Nations, op.cit., pp. 47-56 
46. M. Osborne, Southeast, op.cit., p. 8 
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language spoken in Malaysia. Moreover, Malay is also spoken in different dialectical 
forms in the southern parts of, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
respectively.'*'' The Thai (Tai) language is not only spoken in Thailand but with 
considerable dialectical variations in the northern parts of Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Malaysia, by the Shams of Burma as well as in the lowland of Laos.'*^ 
Religion and Culture 
Religion is the strongest cohesive force throughout Southeast. It is the basic 
ingredient that goes into forming the national identity of these societies.'*^ The region 
represents diversity and contrast in religion, too. Islam is dominant religion in the 
southern states of Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, while mainland population is 
Buddhist. At the same time, the followers of Islam are found in some pockets of 
mainland as well as Philippines, while Buddhists in significant numbers also inhabit 
the maritime states of Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. Some states have problems in 
dealing with the Muslim minorities within their territorial jurisdictions.^'^ 
The Malays practice Islam, while the Chinese are followers of Buddhism-
Taoism. The Hindus are also found in good numbers in Malaysia, Singapore, Burma 
and in some pockets of Indonesia. Islam has proved to be problematic as not only 
separatist movements and terrorist activities are waged in the name of Islam in some 
areas, but its role in politics is also significant. Some sort of polarization has arisen 
between the modernists and traditionalists - those who want to adapt Islam to the 
modern conditions and those who adhere strictly to the traditional version. "This split 
47. Ibid. p. 8. 
48. Ibid. p. 7, 
49. Lucian Pye, Southeast, op.cit., pp. 42-3 
50. The problem is more acute in the Southern parts of Thailand and Philippines where armed 
resistance from the Muslim separatist groups is brewing for decades. See, 
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between modernism and conservatism has flared up in various forms and has 
influenced the organization of political parties and social associations."^' 
The cultural diversities are acute across Southeast Asia yet a thread of unity is 
found among different cultures. The boundaries of cultural diversity often coincide 
with distinct ethnic groups. The Chinese influence can be seen in the northern 
mainland while the Indian and the Arab influences can be seen largely throughout the 
southern parts. The Indian influence came along with the spread of Hinduism and 
Buddhism, beginning with the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. By introducing new 
concepts of the nature of authority and of man's relationship to his universe, 
Hinduism and Buddhism had decisive influence upon the political culture of 
Southeast Asia.'^ The ruling classes found support and patronage in these religions. 
Recognizing the Hindu influence, Pye says. 
The concept that the legitimacy of the government has a divine 
basis spurred attempts at creating empires, and in this fashion 
the diffusion of religion carried with it the diffusion of political 
power. ... Indianized empires were spawned in Burma, 
Cambodia, and Indonesia, all having many characteristics in 
common. ... The symbols of the monarchy were mainly derived 
from India, and the law was largely based on the early Indian 
legal code or the code ofManu.^^ 
All the countries of Southeast Asia, except Thailand, have a colonial past. They 
remained colonies of one or the other western imperial powers. An interesting feature 
of colonialism in the region is that it experienced the presence of six western powers. 
The Indonesian islands were colonized by the Dutch, East Timor remained under 
Portuguese, Philippines was colonized by the Spanish and, after two hundred and a 
half years of their rule, it was occupied by the US for the next half a century. 
51. Lucian Pye, Southeast, op.cit., p. 44 
52. Ibid. p. 20 
53. Ihid. 
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Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Burma were occupied by the British and the Indo-
China was colonized by the French.^ All these colonial powers pursued their aims in 
the colonies for significantly different reasons, sometimes, even to check each other 
or maintain global balance of power. However, the factor, which was common to the 
aspirations of all the colonial powers was the exploitation of the human and natural 
resources of the subjugated territories in pursuit of their commercial and strategic 
interests.'" Indonesian islands, Philippines and East Timor remained colonies for 
around three centuries, while some other countries experienced effective imperial 
control for even less than a century. Thus, the different countries of the region had 
quite \aried and distinct experience with colonial rule. Almost all the western 
colonies v/ere attacked and annexed over by Japan for a very brief period during the 
Second World War. Japanese reign was ruthless, particularly, for the Chinese.""^ The 
impact of Japanese occupation was great. It sharpened the nationalist consciousness 
and quickened the process towards independence of all the countries."' 
The western colonial powers not only changed the political landscape, but also 
had profound impact upon the local culture. However, the influence of foreign 
cultures upon the region has not been all-pervasive. The foreign influences were 
received but reconciled with the indigenous cultures of the region. Herein lies the 
beauty and the richness of various streams of indigenised cultures throughout 
Southeast Asia. People have blended the alien cultures including the western ways of 
life with the local customs, mores and cultural forms. The importance of indigenous 
54. On colonial advance, see, M. Osborne, Southeast, op.cit., pp. 62-81 
55. See, Pye, Southeast, op.cit.. pp. 26-32 
56. See, Milton Osborne, Southeast, op.cit., pp. 137-57 
57. See, Ibid. pp. 158-78; N. Tariing, Nations, op.cit., pp. 79-89 
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cultural traditions in giving strength to the society and providing meaningful 
framework for social interaction can't be underestimated.^^ 
The importance of Indian religious concepts, for instance, 
must be recognized for a broad area of Southeast Asia. But one of 
the most essential features of Hinduism, the caste system, was 
never adopted in the countries outside India. ... Even in Vietnam 
where dependence upon an external Chinese cultural tradition has 
clearly been more significant than elsewhere in Southeast Asia, 
the strength of non-Chinese cultural life, particularly below the 
level of the court, belies any picture of that country as a mere 
receiver of ideas, unable to offer traditions of its own.^ 
Social Structure 
Huge gaps in income between the rich and the poor classes exist. The extreme 
poverty also persists, at least, in some pockets. Communism had its appeal, 
particularly during the anti-colonial struggle, but afterwards found limited followers 
and it could not succeed anywhere except in Indo-China and there, too, the foreign 
influence in shaping the turn of the events could be clearly discerned. The society in 
much of Southeast Asia is organized around paternalistic relationships. Very often, 
these assume the form of an extensive network of patron-client relationships 
organized around mutual obligations. These kind of relationships are entrenched in 
the social structure of the region. 
'b^ 
... In Southeast Asia, "exchange bonds" determine power, status, 
authority relations, and the citizen's role in society. Powerful 
people in all walks of life ("patrons"), who control scarce 
resources, accumulate as many followers ("clients") as possible. 
... although these transactions are between a superior and a 
subordinate, dealings are personal, face-to-face, reciprocal, and 
mutually beneficial.' 
58. For a discussion on Southeast Asian cultural identities and their interface with modernity, see, 
Joel S. Kahn, ed. Southeast Asian Identities: Culture and the Politics of Representation in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore & Thailand, ISEAS, Singapore, 1998. 
59. Milton Osborne, Southeast op.cit., pp. 5-6. 
60. Clark D. Neher and Ross Mariay, op.cit., p. 15. 
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However, old patterns of relationships and bonds of obligation are changing in 
a changing socio-economic profile of the region. As the modernization takes place, 
patron-client relationships diminish in importance. The new wealth and the 
penetrative state have helped the people to bypass traditional channels of patronage 
and protection. With new forms of entrepreneurial activity such as financing, trading 
and industrialization, universalisation of education, social mobility, ever-expanding 
choice of the people and formation of mass-based political parties, traditional bonds 
and habits along with the old system of patronage are breaking down. A strong middle 
class is emerging which has high stakes in gradual but consistent change. The change 
is slow in rural-agricultural areas. There, the family position and networks still 
provide a framework for social status and exchange. 
Traditionally, a schism has always existed between the culture of the elite (as it 
always had strains of imported culture and the trappings of relative sophistication) and 
the culture of the ordinary folk, the peasant culture, more precisely. The peasants had 
indigenized culture with the trappings of relatively rough and more vulgarized forms 
of imported cultures. The gap in outlook the two cultures represent, remains, 
although bridging is under way in the wake of the process of modernization and the 
empowerment of the marginalized along with a great deal of socio-economic 
mobility. 
Political Systems 
The party system is not properly institutionalized. The political parties lack 
ideological basis. Most of the political parties particularly the opposition ones are 
61. Lucian Pye, Southeast, op.cit., pp. 38-41. 
62. Ibid. 
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fragmented and disorganized. This in partly due to the fact that the principled 
opposition has not been fairly tolerated. It is projected as an anomaly or as a threat to 
national ethos or ideology clothed in some very generalized terms such as 'public 
interest,' 'national unity' or 'communal peace.' 
The party system ranges from single-party communist systems in Laos and 
Vietnam and single party (bourgeoisie-civilian) monopoly system of Singapore to the 
transitional open multi-party systems of Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia.^"' 
Malaysia is a unique example of single dominant party-coalition system, which is 
often referred to as hegemonic-consociational model of democracy. Burma is directly 
ruled by military-junta. In none of the countries, healthy bi-party system prevails. 
Only Philippines has experienced bi-party system but that was way far back in its first 
two decades of democratic experience (1946-65) when political power alternated 
between the two main parties. ^ The dictatorial regime of Marcos later sponsored its 
own political party, KBL in the manipulated electoral system to legitimize the 
monopoly of authority. Another authoritarian leader, Suharto also adopted the same 
kind of tactics in Indonesia by sponsoring his own his Golkar party to stuff the 
parliament with his own men to perpetuate his personal rule. 
Some states have seen relative political stability, while some others have 
experienced acute political instability. Malaysia has been ruled by the same coalition 
dominated by the Malay party, United Malays National Organization (UMNO) since 
independence. It has seen tremendous amount of stability, but not without severe 
curbs on civil rights and opposition activities. However, the country is ruled within 
63. See, Political Party Systems and Democratic Development in East and Southeast Asia, Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, 1998. 
64. See Juiigtig Choi, "Philippines Democracies Old and New; Elections, lY r^m Limits and Party 
Systems," Asian Survey, 2001, vol. XLl, No. 3; Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The 
Structure of Philippine Politics, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1965. 
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the mould of constitutional-legal framework. A single political party, People's Action 
Party (PAP), has ruled Singapore, with authoritarian measures curbing the growth of 
opposition political parties, since 1965. "^  Indonesia has also seen two long bouts of 
political stability, but under authoritarian regimes. From 1945 to 1998, Indonesia 
witnessed only two presidents, Sukarno and Suharto. With the overthrow of the New-
Order regime of Suharto in 1998 and its replacement by democratic regime, a degree 
of instability has been introduced in the archipelago. Violence has erupted at many 
places. However, it is not democracy that is responsible for this instability but the 
suppression of regional aspirations and the accumulated discontent of the past, which 
was simmering against the old dictatorial regime. Brunei, since independence, is ruled 
by an absolute monarchy.^^ Vietnam is also experiencing recently a great deal of 
political and economic stability under absolutist communist regime, which is opening 
up. The democracy is lately flourishing in Thailand and Philippines but they have 
never experienced the kind of political stability which is generally associated with the 
mature models of representative democracy found in the west. Thailand experienced 
on an average one coup every five years since 1932 to 1979, but experienced only one 
coup since then and that too was for a brief period of two years in the early 1990's.''^ 
The military has directly ruled Thailand over longer periods than the civilian 
governments have ruled, since the establishment of constitutional monarchy in 1932. 
The military has also directly ruled Burma while the military's involvement in the 
communist party regime of Vietnam is also direct. Suharto, himself an ex-Army 
65. See. Thomas Bellow, The People's Action Party of Singapore: Emergence of a Dominant Parly 
System, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970; Raj Vasii, Governing Singapore, Mandarin, 
Singapore, 1992. 
66. See, D. Leake Jr., Brunei: The Modern Southeast-Asian Islamic Sultanate, McFarland, 
Jefferson, N.C., 1989. 
67. See, D. Morel! and C.A. Samudavanija, Political Conflict in Thailand: Reform, Reaction, 
Revolution, Gunn and Hain, Cambridge, 1981 
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General and Chief of Armed Forces captured power with the strong backing of 
mihtary and continued to rule with the direct co-optation of military in civilian-cum-
governance role under the concept of dwi-fungsi, the concept which was found 
appealing by the Burmese military junta too. This concept emphasizes military's 
dual role viz. the custodian of the defence of the country as well as the guardians of 
the internal peace, social harmony and political order. The dual function of the 
military according to the advocates of the doctrine becomes important in the context 
of developing countries' priorities in state-building and nation-building. 
Doubtless the military has played its role in the politics of most of Southeast 
Asian countries. It has proved to be the catalyst as the modernized institution in the 
process of political development. But, it has also arrested the process, being a check 
on the free expression of democratic urges and its repressive role as an authoritarian 
institution involved in the process of governance. However, the military's role is 
receding as the civil society and political culture are maturing and secularizing, and 
also, more and more countries are embarking on the path of political liberalization. 
The military continues to be one of the most important institution in terms of its 
bearing upon political stability in countries like Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines 
etc. However, the military has been deactivated from its direct political role and 
seems to be contended in barracks for the time being. The de-militarization of 
political institutions has taken place at a rapid pace since the last decade. The vibrant 
civil society may prove to be the biggest bulwark against military's re-entry into the 
politics in future. The military regime is holding power in Burma, but its isolation 
can't keep the regime continue for long. The Vietnamese Communist Party dominated 
by military elements is facing the contradiction of its own making viz., pursuing 
68. Daniel, The Far, op.cit., p. 
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capitalist development and developing market economy under the statist-communist 
political framework.''^ The contradiction is real. The moment the growth rates of 
economy dip or prices rise due to fluctuations of volatile international market any 
time, there is bound to be backlash from the civil society as has been experienced in 
many parts of the world. 
Malaysia has parliamentary form of government, representatives elected 
directly in the regular elections based on universal adult franchise hood.''° The system 
has shown resilience since Independence but on a closer look, limited democracy 
prevails.^' There are substantial curbs upon civil liberties. The opposition functions 
within constraints as the democratic rights of freedom of expression, assembly and 
association are restricted. Media is also controlled by government. The opposition is 
intimidated and law is selectively used to curb the activities of the opposition. Still, 
the opposition is free to organize itself and to criticize the performance of the 
government (but not in terms of certain well defined policies which are considered by 
the authorities to be essential ingredients in the maintenance of social order and 
communal harmony and balanced economic development).^' 
Monarchy has been modified to suit the modern conditions and democratic 
spirit. The king in chosen by the traditional hereditary rulers of states from amongst 
69. See, Adam Fforde and S. Vylder, From Plan lo Market, Boulder, Colorado, 1996; David G. 
Marr and C.P. White, eds. Postwar Veitnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1988. 
70. On Malaysian government and political process, see, H. Crouch, Government and Politics in 
Malaysia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1996; Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics, 
London, 1970 and, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, OUP, Singapore, 1991; R.S. 
Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, Federal Publications, Singapore, 
1960, and Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, Routledge, London, 1999 
71. See, William Case, "Semi-democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the pressures for Regime 
change," Pacific Affairs, 1993, Vol. 66, No. 2, pp. 183-205 
72. On Government-Opposition interface, see, J.V. Jesudason, "The Syncratic State and The 
Structure of Oppositional Politics in Malaysia," in G. Rodan, ed. Political Oppositions in 
Industrializing Asia, Routledge, London, 1997. 
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themselves for five years on a rotational basis. The same coaHtion of political parties 
(with numbers fluctuating) known as Barisan Nasional (BN; it was known as Alliance 
in earlier phase) is uninterruptedly ruling at the centre. The politics revolve around its 
dominant partner, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). In successive 
elections, its controls around half of the seats won by the BN. The UMNO and its 
leadership have a decisive sway over managing the affairs of the country. The 
opposition is generally a divided House. In the face of such massive inter-communal 
coalition of political parties ruling at the centre, opposition has ne\er been able to 
pose any formidable challenge to the incumbent government. Thus, political system 
maintains the predominance of Malays in political sphere with continuity, yet with 
enough scope for multiracial peaceful coexistence. The consistent economic growth 
has ensured a great deal of support and acquiescence from the people of all 
communities to the government, despite its autocratic style of functioning and 
repressive measures occasionally used to deal with dissent and opposition." 
Indonesia has just recently been democratized. With the adoption of unique 
form a government viz. the mixture of parliamentary and presidentiaL a 
consociational form of democracy is emerging there.^'' However, Indonesia 
government is besotted with a number of regional separatist movements unleashed in 
the wake of collapse of highly centralized and authoritarian regime of Suharto in 
1998. Suharto ruled for three decades with the direct backing of military that found 
73. On authoritarian politics see, M.K. Anne, Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia, St. Martin's 
Press, New York, 1997; J. Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition, 
Zed Books, London, 2001 
74. See, A. Rosser, K. Roesad and D. Edwin, "Indonesia: The Politics of Inclusion," Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 2005, Vol. 35, No. I, pp. 53-77; S. Sherlock, The 2004 Indonesian 
Elections: How the System Works and What the Parties Stand For, Centre for Democratic 
Institutions, Canberra, 2004 
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official representation in the central legislature. ' The central legislature was also 
manipulated through legal curbs on the participation and growth of opposition parties. 
Suharto's ruling party, the Golkar had monopoly over the electoral process, therefore, 
always got majority in the legislature. The central legislature with heavy official 
representation in it, used to elect the president. It was always a formality given the 
iron grip of Suharto and military over the system. The consistent economic growth 
during those years helped Suharto to rule with impunity. However, the moment 
people experienced break with prosperity and faced hardship, unrest and discontent 
developed against the regime. Suharto was forced to step down and pave way for 
democratic transition in the face of mass upsurge, symbolized as reformasi. 
Democracy has been gradually strengthened since then. The unitary constitution of 
1945 has been restored. However, a series of amendments have been incorporated to 
suit the requirements of transitional phase. Given the highly diverse ethnic 
configuration of the country accentuated further by its geography, the federal form of 
govemraent appears to be imperative in a democratic set up. Increasing the autonomy 
of the regions may be a temporary solution. The regional autonomy can be better 
reconciled with the national unity under a federal set up. 
The last one and a half decade saw a great deal of flux and movement towards 
democracy in the region. It started with the pro-democracy mass protests in 
Philippines in 1986 resulting in the overthrow of the dictatorial regime of Marcos and 
77 
establishment of democracy. Marcos had usurped political power by overthrowing 
75. See, H. Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1978; H. 
Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rules in Indonesia," IVorldPolitics, 1979, Vol. 31, No. 4 
76. See, M.R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure 
for Change, Routledge, London, 1993 
77. See, J.F. Bresnan, ed. Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond, Princeton 
University Press, 1986; R. de Guzman and M. Reforma, Foundation and Dynamics of 
Philippines Government and Politics, OUP, Singapore, 1988. 
democratic system. He came to power democratically, but imposed Emergency in 
1972 and became a de facto dictator. Democracy evolved amidst illiberal mould in 
Philippines since 1986-upheaval under the presidentialist republican system.^ ** The 
procedural anomalies persist in the system. The system of checks and balances has not 
been properly streamlined. The cronyism and corruption remain the biggest challenge. 
The political and economic power is concentrated in a few dominant families, which 
number just a few hundreds. The kin ties govern the political behaviour. A strong 
.middle class is emerging independent of the patron-client relationships. It may prove 
to be bulwark against favouritism, cronyism and corrupt ways of the political elites. 
Thailand witnessed civilian-military clashes in 1992 resulting in army 
crackdown on protesting students and masses, eventually paving the way for the fall 
of military-led government. A civil parliamentary government has functioned since 
then. The military's presence in politics and policymaking has substantially declined 
and no attempt by the military to capture political power has been witnessed since 
then. However, the political system has been characterized by political instability and 
frequent changes in governments under parliamentary system.''^ Amidst hung 
parliaments, snap elections, scandals, devastating economic crisis of late 1990's, 
corruption, electoral manipulations and elitism, the democracy is under strains to find 
roots under the new Constitution introduced in the late 1990's. The autocratic style of 
functioning of democratically elected prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, further 
compounded the democratization process. The civil society and judiciary have 
78. See, R. de Guzman and M. Reforma, Foundation and Dynamics of Philippines Government and 
Politics, OUP, Singapore, 1988; J.L. Linatud, "The 2004 Philippine Elections: Political Change 
in an Illiberal Democracy," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2005, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 80-101; J. 
Franco, Elections and Democratization in the Philippines, Routiedge, New York, 2001. 
79. See, K. Hewison, Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, Routiedge, 
London, 1997. 
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asserted independence and acted as checks upon authoritarian impulses re-emerging 
in the system. 
Cambodia also witnessed democratization since mid-1990s under the auspices 
of the United Nations. However, as the country has been ravaged by the decades of 
intervention by the foreign powers, civil war and the accompanied bloodbath, 
disruption and dislocation, its transition is not smooth, and not without setbacks. Its 
Prime Minister Hun Sen, although democratically elected, uses authoritarian measures 
with impunity. The nation is torn between various local leaders, military cliques, 
militiamen and political parties. Primordial loyalties are more important than the 
national identity. The political culture is not respectful towards democratic procedures 
nor the political leadership is sensitive towards promoting democratic values.'*'' 
Singapore is ruled by single-party system. The citizens have a right to elect 
their representatives but the ruling party, the PAP decides who is eligible or fit to 
contest the elections.^' The activity of the opposition parties is restricted as the ruling 
party screens the candidates proposed by them to contest the elections. People have a 
right to choose but ruling party decides whom they should choose. However, a 
constitutional amendment of 1984 enables the government to offer up to three non-
constituency seats to the opposition parties. Another legislation approved in 1990 and 
amended in 1997 enables the Government to nominate up to nine additional 
politically neutral members for a term of two years. These members have restricted 
80. See, D.B. Ablin and M. Hood, eds. The Cambodian Agony, M.E. Sharpe Inc., New York, 1987; 
Ben Kiernan, ed. Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United 
Nations and the International Community, Yale University Council for Southeast Asian Studies, 
New Haven, 1993; T. Duffy, "Cambodia since the Election: Peace Democracy and Human 
Rights," Contemporary Southeast Asia, March 1994, vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 407-32; J. Ojendal, 
"Democracy Lost! The Fate of the U.N.-lmplanted Democracy in Cambodia," Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Sep. 1996, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 193-218 
81. Hussin Mutalib, "Illiberal democracy and the future of opposition in Singapore," Third World 
Quarterly, 2000, vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 313-42 
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voting rights.^^ However, these peripheral steps are not adequate to usher in 
democracy. Severe limitations on certain freedoms in the name of discipline, unity, 
order and security persist.**^  The ruling party's vote-share is gradually declining, yet it 
has been able to secure two-thirds majority in all the elections conducted so far. 
Singapore has steered its way towards economic development extremely well by 
providing abundant opportunities to the citizens, but limited political participation to 
the masses.**"* Both Singapore and Malaysian leaders glorify "Asian values" or the 
"Asian democracy" which demand a measure of authoritarian policies as well as some 
curbs on the freedoms to check the disruptive tendencies in the society. Former Prime 
Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew championed that cause vociferously.^^ 
Burma's long isolation puts it at the different pedastal of development than the 
mainstream Southeast Asia. The largest country in the mainland continues to be 
governed by the military in one form or the other, since 1962. Earlier, it was military 
dominated socialist regime from 1962 to 1988 and since 1988-coup, it is more direct 
and complete military rule. The military-junta forestalled democracy in 1992 when 
the pro-democracy party. National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San 
Suu Kyi won 325 out of 485 seats for the national legislature.^^ The State Law and 
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) as the junta was known at that time set aside the 
results and disqualified, arrested and drove into exile many of the elected candidates. 
82. Lynn Daniel, The Far, up.cil., p. 1235, 
83. Chua Beng-Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, Routledge, London, 
1995. 
84. Peng Er Lam, "Singapore; rich state, illiberal regime," in J.W. Morley, ed. Driven, op.cil., pp. 
255-74; C. Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, Macmillan, 
London, 1994 
85. Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Democracy, op.cit., p. 15. 
86. See, J. Silverstein, Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1977; Robert Taylor, The State in Burma, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 
1987; Jalal Alamgir, "Against the Current: The Survival of Authoritarianism in Burma," Pacific 
Affairs, Fall 1997, vol. 70, No. 3, pp. 333-50 
87. Lynn Daniel, The Far East, op.cit., pp. 843-4 
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A National Convention to draft a new Constitution was convened in 1993. However 
no progress could take place and the convention was adjourned in March 1996 and 
remains in suspension. In November 1997, SLORC was dissolved and it was replaced 
oo 
by State Peace and Development Council (SDPC). This was an exercise in changing 
the nomenclature only but not the nature of the government. 
Vietnam has experimented with economic liberalization with success in the last 
two decades, but it has not attempted political democratization so far. It is the second 
largest communist state today. Vietnam is governed by single political party, the 
Vietnam Communist Party with the help of military-bureaucratic complex.^^ Despite 
having the communist agenda, the party favours the liberalization of economy and 
emphasizes meritocracy in economic dealings as well as in administration. The 
growth is taking place and living standards of the people are rising continuously.^^ 
The same principle applies here as in other parts of Southeast Asia viz., as long as a 
regime delivers, the people acquiesce and do not protest. Laos is also governed by a 
single communist political party. ' Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) which 
directed a revolutionary movement first against the French colonial domination, and 
afterwards against the former monarchy. It got nd of monarchy and established its 
rule in 1975. The Vietnam communists have always supported the communist party of 
Laos. In December 1997, elections were held for the 99-seat National Assembly. Of 
88. Ihid. p. 844 
89. See, G. Porter, Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism, Cornell University Press, New 
York, 1993 
90. M. Beresford, Vietnam: Politics, Economics and Society, Pinter, London, 1988; A. Fforde and 
S. Vylder, From Plan to Market, Colorado, Boulder, 1996 
91. See M. Stuart-Fox, Laos: Politics, Economics and Society, Frances Pinter, London, 1986 
92. See, M. Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997 
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those elected, seventeen of the candidates were army officers while only one was not 
a member of the ruling party. 
Despite so much diversity in the organization as well as functioning of the 
political systems of Southeast Asia, some common characteristics are also found. The 
strains of authoritarianism, in a more or less degree are found in all the political 
systems of the region. The region is known for formalizing the concept of 'Asian 
Democracy." or 'Guided Democracy' as Sukarno called it. In this system, the 
oovernment decides what is good for the people, the opposition is relatively less 
tolerated as opposition to the government is, perceived, or shown as opposition to the 
state. Freedoms are curbed in the name of security and public order. The so-called 
emphasis on "Asian Values" as well as the distinct quality of Asian culture and 
environment bring tolerance towards authority. A kind of ideology is created around 
realism that Asians need not copy the West as their own culture and conditions are so 
different.^ ^ 
However, the remarkable thing is that the governments in the region have been 
able to provide a wide range of choices in the economic field but the range of choice 
is limited in the political sphere. The effective governance is valued much more than 
democracy, still the attitude of the leaders is generally not totalitarian or repressive 
even in non-democratic polities. The paternalistic attitude is common. However, the 
paternalistic or semi-authoritarian attitude of the rulers can also be explained, partly in 
context of precarious ethnic composition of these societies. Furthermore, it can be 
93. Lynn Daniel, op.c/7., p. 702. 
94. See, Mark R. Thompson, "Pacific Asia after 'Asian Values': authoritarianism, democracy and 
good governance," Third World Quarterly, 2004, Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 1079-95; F. Zakaria, 
"Culture is destiny: a conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," Foreign Affairs, 1994, Vol. 73, pp. 
109-26; Kim D-J. "Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's anti-democratic values," 1994, Vol 
73; pp. 189-94. 
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explained, partly, in terms of acquiescence bred by the continuously rising wealth and 
living standards, and the stable conditions under which people hope to advance their 
material pursuits. However, the winds of change are blowing. Five nations have 
democratized, to a greater or lesser degree, since 1986. The region is better integrated 
toda\^  through the instrumentality of the ASEAN. They have learnt to build on the 
points of agreements and similarities, whereas to ignore the points of disagreements 
and dissimilarities. 
Economic Conditions 
Fhe economic problems being faced and tackled by Southeast Asian countries 
are extremely formidable and challenging, particularly when seen within the frame of 
half a century, while the West took centuries to resolve the same kind of problems. 
The\^  have to work within the constraints of colonial legacy and neo-colonial 
experiences too. The achievement, so far, has been tremendous. Development in 
Human Resources is remarkable. Illiteracy has been wiped out. The countries excel in 
providing technical education to their populace. Health facilities at the basic level are 
adequate. Unemployment and poverty rates are also low if compared to the other 
developing countries. However, the same is not true with all the countries of 
Southeast Asia. Numerous problems at the economic front pertaining to providing 
even basic amenities are yet to be addressed. ^ 
The experience with economic development is also variegated across the 
region. Thailand and Malaysia, though hit hardest by the currency crisis of late I990's 
quickly overcame that, while Indonesia is still recovering from its after-shocks. No 
doubt, the crisis brought steep downward trends in the economies of the region, but 
95. See, Asian Development Bank, Emerging Asia: Changes and Challenges, ADB, Manila, 1997. 
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the recovery within a short period of time reflects their inner strength. Manufacturing 
is the bactcbone of these economies. Recently the share of intra-regional trade has 
increased manifold, which pro\'ides stability to the region- as a whole. The share of 
indo-China and Myanmar in the trade is too small as compared to the other countries. 
Vietnam is expanding and liberalizing its industry and trade. Its per capita income was 
half than that of Indonesia in 1992, but today it appears to be fast catching up with 
Indonesia. The combined national income of Singapore and Malaysia equals 
Indonesia's national income, although the size and population of these two countries 
is less than even one-sixth of Indonesia's. Singapore with just an area of 224 sq miles 
and population of four million has gross national income greater than the incomes of 
Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam combined together [Table 2]. 
Singapore and Brunei have been adjudged as High Income countries by the 
World Development Report. No other country of the region has per capita even half 
than that of either Singapore or Brunei. On the other hand, five countries of the region 
occupy the status of low income countries (LICs). They are Indonesia, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Thailand and Philippines are lower middle-income 
countries (LMCs), while Malaysia alone comes in the upper middle income (UMC) 
96 
group. 
The countries can be di\"ided into two groups in terms of Human Development 
Index (HDI) ranking. AH the LICs have ranks above hundred while the rest rank 
below hundred. The HDI ranking is consistent with the level of per capita income in 
these countries. The High Income countries of Singapore and Brunei have the highest 
96. On the basis of average Gross National Income per capita in 2001, the countries with per capita 
of less than $745 or less were considered as LICs; with $746-$2975 as LMCs; with $2,976-
$9205 as UMCs and with $9206 or above were called High Income countries. World Bank, 
World Development Report, 2002 
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rankinc. followed by Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines [Table 3]. Except Cambodia, 
Laos and Myanmar, all the others have nearly ninety percent or above literary rates. 
The contrast is starkest in terms of infant mortality rates. While Singapore and 
Malaysia have infant mortality rates of three and eight, in Cambodia and Laos, ninety 
seven and eighty seven children die per thousand live births [Table 3]. 
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CHAPTER - 2 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Conceptualization must precede operationalization. Before we proceed to 
operationalize the concept of political development in the context of Southeast Asia in 
general and Malaysia in particular, its meaning, dimensions and implications should 
be clear to us. Despite its abundant usage and relevance, the concept of political 
development has long been in a state of confusion and defies general agreement over 
its meaning. No doubt, any value-loaded term will lack commonly agreed definition 
but what makes this concept unique is its innumerable applications by the political 
scientists to suit the different, often diverse objectives. Sometimes, it is identified with 
its causes, sometimes with its consequences, at others with the correlates or even 
some peripheral aspects of the general process of development. Is the concept 
grounded in normative reasoning or just empirical, or both? Whether political 
development is dependent or independent variable, viz., is it upon development in 
some other spheres of society or having some momentum of its own? Can some 
definable universal patterns or stages of the process be identified? Is it unilinear or 
muUilinear process? 
The state of confusion was so high and agreement elusive that it led to call for 
an abandonment of the concept of political development by Huntington, one of the 
best known authorities in the field. He argued that the concept neither integrated a 
body of related concepts nor disfinguished one aspect of political reality from 
another.' His recent work. Understanding Political Development begins with an 
1 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and 
Politics", Comparative Politics, April 1971, III, pp. 283-322; 304. 
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acknowledgement of the variety of definitions of political development, which have 
confused the state of aftairs. However, he himself fails to attempt a precise definition 
of political development. Eckstein, while unable de\'elop the refined framework 
himself, admits that the present literature on political development simply does not 
represent "developmental inquiry properly."-" Ann Ruth Willner argues that political 
development studies ha\e failed to throw a clear light on the nature of traditional 
polities and these also fail to relate the theories of politics in the third world to the 
established traditions of scholarship in comparative government in the west. 
Therefore, the concept of political development is in a state of underdevelopment.'* 
However, the confusion and the difficulties associated with the diversity of definitions 
and applications and the underdevelopment of the 'development' framework do not 
call for abandonment, but the refinement of the concept. Even the best known 
authority on the concept. Lucian Pye, before evolving the characteristics of political 
development, which came to occupy a central place in the succeeding literature on 
political development, surveyed a number of definitions and pointed out their 
deficiencies to clear the confusion and generate an agreement behind his 
conceptualizafion.' He surveyed the following themes with which the concept is 
occasionally idenfified: Political development as tlie prerequisite of economic 
development; polifical development as the poliUcs typical of industrial societies-
Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. Uuderslariding Political 
Development, Little Brown, Boston, 1987. 
Harry Eckstein, "The Idea of Political Development: From Dignity to Efficiency," 
/T(;/-W/'o////ci-, 1982, 34, pp. 451-486; 454. 
Ann Ruth Willner, "The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development," World 
Politics, April 1964, XVI, No. 3, pp. 468-482. 
Lucian W. Pye, "The Concept of Political Development," The Annals of The 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 1965, 358, pp. 1-13; 
reproduced in Lucian \V. Pye, Aspects of Political Development. Little Brown, 
Boston, 1966. 
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political development as political modernization; as the operations of a nation-state-
as administrative and legal development; as mass mobilization and participation; as 
the building of democracy; as stability and orderly change; as mobilization and 
power; and, as one aspect of a multidimensional process of social chanoe.^ 
The difficulty in conceptualizing development is partly due to the obsession of the 
western scholars with fact-value dichotomy to circumvent or disguise the normative 
aspects of political development. The failure to recognize adequately its normative 
grounding has only blurred the proper understanding of the concept and stifled its 
growth. As '^development" itself is a value-loaded term, the social scientists disagree 
over what development is or what does it entail. Is it economic development in terms 
of growth of output per head of population or economic development in terms of 
reduction in inequalities and benefits to the marginal and dispossessed? Is it r^ovvlh 
first or equity first? Is it merely the application of modern technology or adoption of 
essentially rational and secular ways of thought and action? 
Before studying development in any human sphere in its empirical aspects, 
there should be some clear-cut conception of what development entails in that field 
how is it related with the idea of "good" and "progress" in that field? While 
considering "good" or "progress," the criteria of relevance and judgement necessarily 
creep in, which emanates from the values of the researcher viz. what he holds as 
morally more desirable under the given set of circumstances. Such idea of "good" or 
"progress" may be arrived at through the empirical generalizations, too. However, it 
still involves the preference of certain values over others. Whether we mean by 
development higher energy consumption levels or higher per-capita income growth or 
Ibid. pp. 33-45. 
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reduction in inequalities or the satisfaction of basic needs or increase in choice, it is 
clear that we prefer some values as more desirable over others and we do it in 
accordance with our conception of "good" viz. what is morally desirable or relevant in 
a given set of circumstances. Any concept of development necessarily involves some 
normati\e choice. 
.Anv change occurring in a polity can be considered political development only 
when we add some idea of increase in value accompanying that change. Now, 
increase m value towards what? This brings us to the question of goals of political 
development.^ Without having some conception of the goals toward which the 
political svstem is supposed to move, how can we relate the direction of change or 
rate of change to the political development? Still, the concept of political development 
as a process is distinguishable from its goals. Here we do not confuse goals with some 
absolute end-state or fixed-state or a fully developed state towards which the political 
system should move. By doing so, we hereby clear the concept of political 
development - as it has been used for specific and limited purpose and scope in the 
western empirical traditions of last four decades - from the philosophical traditions in 
search for ideal types .^  The scope of present study is limited and it is theoretically 
untenable, too, as it focuses upon political change in its empirical aspects. 
Bv goals we mean just the operafion and realization of certain principles or 
values that have been found to be conducive to the ends of collective life or organized 
human living, such as order, liberty, equity, stability, justice, harmony, unity etc. The 
7. For a discussion on goals, see, S.P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," 
in Myron Weiner and S.P. Huntington, ed. Undersianding, op.cil. 
8. The philosophers like Plato, Rousseau etc. were not concerned with the process in its 
empirical aspects. They constructed the blueprints of 'models' on the basis of 
deductive reasoning which may be classified as 'politically developed' by applying 
relevant standards, but the concept of political development, as a tool to study the 
process of positive or desired change, can't be applied to these models. 
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concept of political development in its application must be able to locate precisely the 
development of some conceptually specific thing, which for analytic purposes we 
identify as goals of political development in the present study. Thus, it can be 
conclusively said that political development as a concept is normative as well as 
empirical. It is normative in answering the question as to 'what should develop?' The 
concept is empirical in the sense of dealing with the question Ts it developing?" or 
'How/why is it developing?' 
Western bias 
By taking the position of value-neutrality, the western scholars either eschew 
values or put a premium on the practices and culture of the western democracies as 
those models provide an immediate background to select, focus and judge upon the 
relevant variables. Under the influence of the systems analysis, they do not take 
position on values, thus, fail to develop some notion of goals before undertaking the 
study of change.' While justification and advocacy of the formal governmental 
processes and institutions of the west is implicit in their writings, they remain, 
sometimes, oblivious of the significance and efficacy of traditional or local 
institutions and values associated with developing countries in pursuit of creative 
realization of their developmental goals. We have to keep into account the peculiar 
cultural and historical traditions of each country along with its stage of development 
and its capacity for absorption, while looking at its developmental process under a 
normative framework. 
9 This approach is discernible in G.A. Almond and G.B. Powell, Comparative Politics: 
A Developmental Approach, Little Brown, Boston, 1966; Daxid Easton, A 
Framework for Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 
1965; E. Shils, Political Development in New States, Moiinton & Co, Hague, 1962. 
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When 'area specialization studies' were undertaken by some political 
scientists, those were not grounded well enough in normative theorizing on the basis 
of which the direction and the pattern of change could be suggested for transitional 
societies.'" Instead the efforts were concentrated on the stabilization of the 
governmental processes in these countries so as to keep them safe from radical 
threats, like communism. Political development came to mean as Robert Packenham 
puts it. an "anti-communist pro-American political stability." Wiarda argues that 
political development approach was set forth to counter the Marxist appeal to the 
developing countries.'' Ihey were even prepared to accept the authoritarian w a^ys of 
the government and curtailment of freedoms, if strong governments were needed to 
maintain stability and order, and stave off communism. ' 
The concept of political development is extremely useful and holds great 
promise. Not only it is capable of bringing normative political theory into closer 
relation with empirical political theory, but also opening up new vistas which have 
perplexed the minds of political thinkers from Plato and Aristotle to Pye and 
Huntington. However, no denying the fact that the concept has been generally used 
for narrow objectives. 
10. For instance, see, G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman, ed. The Politics of Developing 
Areas, Princeton, New Jersey, 1960. 
11 Robert Packenham, "Political Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid 
Programme," World Politics, January 1966, XVlll, p. 213. 
12 Howard J. Wiarda, "Comparative Politics: Past and Present", in H.J. Wiarda ed. New 
Directions in Comparative Politics, Westview Press, Boulder, Columbia, 1985, pp. 3-
25. 
13. The authoritarian regimes in southeast Asia except Indo-China were tacitly supported 
by the United States and the West just because they proclaimed to be fighting against 
the communists on their home turfs. The authoritarian regimes in Thailand, 
Philippines and Indonesia which had usurped political power after scuttling the 
democratic process were supported on this count. In Indonesia, even the massacre of 
neariy half a million communists and their allies by the Armed Forces under 
Suharto's de facto rule was alleged to be carried with the diplomatic support of the 
United States. 
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Confusion between Political Development and Economic Development 
As we scan through the h'terature, we find tliat political development is often 
confused with economic development. It is interesting that frequent references are 
found as to the criteria by which a politically developed system can be identified but 
not enough consideration of the process or the stages by which a traditional or 
transitional society can achieve the conditions necessary for a fairly developed polity. 
The literature does not throw enough light on the dynamics of political change from 
less to more developed polity. And when the efforts to identify such dynamics or 
stages were made, they pointed in the direction of economic development, not 
political development. 
W.W. Rostow made one of the earliest efforts in this direction. He identified 
three stages of economic growth and certain political preconditions in terms of 
institutions as well as culture for the economy to take off. J.J. Spengler talked about 
the political preconditions of economic development and then showed their 
interrelations by extending his analysis to the political consequences of economic 
development.'^ He identified what he regarded as the minimum political 
preconditions of economic development and proceeded to show the changes that take 
place in these precondifions as economic development occurs. Later, Ward and 
Rustow dealt with the problem of stages of political development. What is required, 
according to them, is 
...a large measure of understanding of how societies which are, 
in a relative sense at least, considered advanced came to achieve 
their present levels of economic social and political 
"development. " Are there regularities to be found among their 
14. W.W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, New York, 1952. 
15 J.J. Spengler, "Economic Development: Political Preconditions and Political Consequences," 
Journal of Politics, August 1960, 22, pp. 387-416. 

several developmental experiences? Are there discernible stages 
or sequences of change through wliich all or some tend to pass? 
Or at least do they face similar problems or crises and do these 
occur in some regular sort of sequoice? 
Ward & Rustow delineated the sequence of political modernization in Japan and 
Turkey but did not conceptualize the process nor did they try to understand their 
developmental sequence under some conceptual framework. How it could be applied 
to the other polities. At the most, they specified some of the crises, which these 
countries overcame and vvhich other countries also have to overcome in the process of 
development. Pye describes these crises as crises of identity, legitimacy, penetration, 
participation, integration and distribution. ' He suggests that in England these crises 
occurred in the sequence of their listing above, but that in other countries, they may 
occur in a different order. These crises are easier to solve if they come one at a time, 
but become more difficult to cope with if several come together as being experienced 
by the developing countries. 
The argument is further advanced by Kenneth Organski's book. Stages of 
Political Development}^ Despite the promise of its title, Organski fails to provide a 
foolproof theory of stages in political development as he is concerned with a set of 
economic problems (crises) faced by developing polities. Starting with a theory of 
stages of economic growth, drawn from the work of Rostow, Organski focuses upon 
political preconditions that are required for the solution of the problems that occur at 
each of the stages of political unification, industrialization, national welfare, and 
abundance. During the first stage, national government gains effective political and 
16 Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964, p. 11. 
17 Lucian Pye, Aspects, Op.cit, pp. 62-67. 
18 A.F.K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development, Knopf, New York, 1965. 
administrative control over its population and resources. Without such control, 
economic development on modern lines is impossible. Organski argues that all 
policies designed to encourage economic growth tlirough industrialization are bound 
to fail in the absence of adequate level of integration and penetration in the polity.'^ 
Pre-modern European states were able to achieve such unification, but contemporary 
non-western plural societies are still struggling with this stage of development. It, 
thus, appears that the first three crises discussed by Pye also involve this stage of 
political unification, namely the crises of identity, legitimacy, and penetration. 
During the second stage of development, according to Organski. the 
governments have to make possible the accumulation of capital, which may inxolve 
great social cost. He believes that historically speaking three different patterns of 
government have proved successful in solving the problems of industrialization: the 
bourgeois (i.e., Western democratic), the Stalinist (i.e., communist rule in the USSR 
in 1930s), and the "syncrafic" (i.e., fascist polities, as in Germany. Italy and Spain).^" 
Organski suggests that quite different political systems may be able to solve a crucial 
economic crisis of development. Therefore, his analysis appears to show his concern 
towards economic development, not towards political development. The stage of 
national welfare arises only after the industrial revolution, and involves problems of 
wider distribution of power as well as consumer goods and services. The crisis of 
distribution and welfare in Organski's scheme have corresponding relation with the 
crises of participation, integration, and distribution as listed by Pye. However, by 
linking political development with industrialization and national welfare, he shows his 
western bias and scant disregard for the resilience and capacity of the developing 
19. Ibid. pp. 
20 Ibid. pp. 
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polities in chalking out their independent course of political development. Organski's 
final stage is that of abundance where people begin to achieve high standards of 
material affluence. This is the standard towards which the western societies are 
ushering in. 
No doubt, political development and economic development are mutually 
reinforcing in most cases. Political development is precursor as vv^ ell as consequence 
of economic development. Both the processes are required to sustain each other in the 
long run. However, at initial stage political development may take place with low 
level of economic development or economic development may take place without 
political development.^' It must be pointed out that political development is not 
entirely a dependent variable and it can take its own course irrespective of the level of 
the changes occurring in other spheres of society but in the long run the processes of 
socio-economic development certainly go a long way in sustaining the process of 
political development. For example, in the United States in a single stroke, the polity 
was democratized and changes in other spheres followed in a gradual manner but later 
both the processes of political and economic development supported and reinforced 
each other. While in the Western European countries, particularly in England, the 
political changes were primarily induced by the socio-economic development, which 
took place in the wake of industrial revolution. Still, for analytical purposes, at least, 
the two are independent variables to an extent, and distinguishable from each other. 
21. As the research will prove later particularly in case of Southeast Asia that economic 
development may take place in the absence of political development. On the other hand the 
United States is the classic case of political development preceding economic development, 
while India in nearer the case of political development preceding economic development. 
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Political Modernization 
Writers like Rustovv, Ward and Organski also contuse political modernization 
with political development. Even refined writers like Pye, Almond and Huntington 
have contributed to this confusion. And modernization by them is easily identified 
with Westernization or the application of teclinology. When Ward and Rustow^^ 
enumerate the features like differentiated and specific system of government, high 
degree of integration with governmental system; rational and secular procedures for 
making political decisions; popular identification with national identity of state; mass 
participation etc., these characterisfics can be associated with any modernized polity 
but not exhaustively with politically developed system. Organski does not have any 
conception of the goals of political development still he uses the concept non-
discriminately to account for pursuing goals of economic development. He should 
have instead use the term political modemizafion if he was just merely concerned 
about certain political preconditions necessary to achieve the tasks of economic 
development. 
Before we proceed further, let us get a clear picture of what we mean by 
political modernization. As modernization is a process of direcfing and controlling the 
social consequences of change, utilizafion of resources on a large scale, increased role 
differentiation and organizational complexity in a society, political modernization 
would stand for transformation and adaptation of political institutions, processes and 
roles in response to the changes in socio-economic and physical environment. Or we 
can say that the political system is just tuned or adapted to the changes in society. 
Modernization, in its historical sense is, in the words of Eisenstadt, "the process of 
22 Ward and Rustow, o/p.c/7. pp. 6-7. 
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change towards those types of social, economic and poHtical systems that have 
developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South American, Asian and African 
continents.""^ Cyril Black would regard a society as modern when it is capable of 
adapting its "historically evolved institutions to the rapidly changing functions that 
reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his 
environment that accompanied the scientific revolution."'" 
The advanced industrial nations of the West have set the pace and pattern of 
modernization and for many the goal before the developing societies is just to emula), 
the West. As Pye puts it. 
...almost all conscious attempts to further political development 
have focused on strengthening the formal organs of government: 
Under colonization the common test of political development., 
centred on precisely the advancement of administrative rule, and 
since the end of the colonial period American foreign aid 
assistance has also largely concentrated on this same aspect of 
political development.' 
David Apter presents a complex but intriguing theory of stages and alternate paths of 
political development in the larger framework of modernization.^'' In the West, 
modernization occurred as a result of the twin processes of industrialization and 
commercialization, but in many non-western areas modernization has been a result of 
commercialization and bureaucracy, rather than industrialization. 
Political modernization is a relatively technical process. The political scientists 
commit error in using the two concepts interchangeably and often they use the 
23 S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernization, Protest and Change, Englewood_Cliffs, N.J., 1966, p. 1. 
24 Cyril Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, Harper and Row, New York, 1966, p.7, 
25 Lucian Pye, "Introduction" in Lucian Pye, ed. Communications and Political Development, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1963, p. 17. 
26. David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965. 
27 /hid, pp. 43-44. 
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concept of political development for political change without first conceiving properly 
the goals in direction of which change should be measured. They should instead use 
the term 'political modernization' in such case. This argument is simply suggested as 
a plea for more conscious as well as cautious use and application of the concept of 
political development. 
Capabilities Approach 
Another narrow conceptualization of political development can be discerned 
in its identification with the capabilities or the performance of specific functions by 
the political system and therefore with the effectiveness and the dominance of the 
ruling elite and mechanisms. Some writers are just content with illustrating a list of 
functions, which a political system has to perform satisfactorily to be considered as 
developed.^^ This kind of model is useless from the point of view application of the 
concept of political development to the transitional societies. To what degree and rate, 
a transitional society should perform these functions the model is unable to answer. 
Political development can't be defined in terms of functions of the state, which any 
well-functioning polity, otherwise also will perform. Our concern is with change, the 
process of positive change - its rate, pace, stages, patterns, dimensions, direction and 
goals. Mehden listed thirteen criteria of a developed political system but quite 
reasonably rejected this line of argument as a useful basis for the study of 
development politics. 
28 Howard Wriggins in a paper presented at a conference on the theme "Research Needs for 
Development Assistance Programmes," undertook to spell out some of the functions performed 
by governments in the more developed polities. He suggested that to the extent that any state 
was unable to fulfill these functions, it was politically underdeveloped. The paper entitled 
"Foreign Assistance and Political Development" was published in Robert E. Asher et al., 
Development of the Emerging Countries: An Agenda for Research, Brookings Institution, 
Washington, 1962, pp. 39-44; 41. 
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A very comprehensive and sophisticated scheme of functions and capabilities 
was suggested by Almond. In 1963, he proposed a new theoretical framework 
designed to relate the concept of political system as studied under structural-
functional framework to the problems of political change. The transitional societies 
could not be studied fruitfully in the absence of such framework. All political 
systems. Almond argues, must acquire the capability to solve four sets of problems: 
(1) integrative capability - the creation of national unity and centralized bureaucracy, 
(2) international accommodative capability, (3) participation capability - creation of a 
political culture of civic obligation and of a democratic political structure, (4) welfare 
or distribution capability - widespread dissemination of welfare standards and 
accommodation between political and social structures. 
Two years later. Almond wrote another essay^' in which he came out with a 
comprehensive developmental framework for the study of political systems, which in 
his opinion could sufficiently account for the changes in a political system. Almond 
heavily borrowed from sociology and anthropology. He talked of three types of broad 
categories of functions, which in a more or less degree every political system 
performs, namely, conversion functions (a modified version of input - output analysis 
of David Easton), capabilities (extractive, regulative, distributive, symbolic and 
responsive functions) and system-maintenance and adaptation functions. The concept 
of capabilities is relevant political development. Almond applies this concept as a way 
of characterizing the performance of the political system and of changes in 
29 Fred R. von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., 1964, p. 6. 
30 Gabriel A. xMmond, "Political System and Political Change," American Behavioural Scientist, 
June 1963, Vol. VI, No. 10; reproduced in Gabriel A. Almond, Political Development: Essays in 
Heuristic Theory, Little Brown, Boston, 1970, pp. 159-179. 
31 Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics, January 
1965, Vol. XVII; reproduced in Gabriel A. Almond, ibid. pp. 181-220. 
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performance and of comparing political systems according to their performance."'"^ He 
hopes that it can help measure the development of a political system. To the extent 
that these capabilities are the functional requisites of any system i.e. to say every 
system has to possess these capabilities in a more or less degree to keep moving, they 
appear merely classification of functions. But to characterize the development of a 
political system, Almond makes the point, 
...capability refers to performance and has to be separated from 
the institutions and agencies involved in the performance. To 
relate the institutions and structures to performance is one of the 
centred problems of political analysis, and we ought not to confuse 
rates of performance with the means or instruments of 
performance^^ 
His Capabilities' analysis may be very useful from the point of view of 
knowing the actual working of any political system but not from the point of view of 
gauging full scope of political development. The analysis is very useful from the point 
of view of maintenance and stability of the system, but it is narrow from the angle of 
developmental analysis. It seems that Almond introduced Capabilities" analysis in his 
scheme mainly to offset the criticism of his structural-functional approach that was 
criticized as too static and status quoist treating political system as a dependent 
variable whose contours were determined by social, psychological, cultural and 
economic factors. It just processed inputs generated by these forces converting them 
into governmental outputs. Therefore some additional intrinsic capabilities were 
needed by the political system to meet the challenges of development. 
32. Ibid. pp. \S2-5. 
33 Ibid., p.m. 
59 
The Development Syndrome 
The notion of capacity of the poHtical system is also introduced by Pye in 
conceptualizing political development but in a much more inclusive sense. Although 
Pye does not indulge in any philosophical construct, he reaches his conclusions by 
generalizing the different viewpoints on the subject. Nonetheless, he comes closer to 
the goal. Therefore, his ideas require a careful and detailed analysis. In an article in 
1965''"' Pye articulated three themes which he concluded run across the literature on 
political development as (1) a general spirit or attitude towards equality which 
involves equality before law, achievement standards of performance and popular 
involvement in political activities, (2) an increase in the capacity and capability of 
political system to manage and control its affairs which means the magnitude, 
effectiveness and efficiency of the governmental performance, and (3) increased 
differentiation and specialization, and integration of political structures. In the 
Introduction to his volume on political culture, the same year, Pye elucidates. 
The key elements of political development involve, first, Mith 
respect to the population as a whole, a change from widespread 
subject status to an increasing number of contributing citizens, 
with an accompanying spread oj mass participation, a greater 
sensitivity to the principles of equality, and a wider acceptance of 
universalistic laws. Second, with respect to governmental and 
general systemic performance, political development involves an 
increase in the capacity of the political system to manage public 
affairs, control controversy, and cope with popular demands. 
Finally, with respect to the organization of the polity, political 
development implies greater structural differentiation, greater 
Junctional specificity, and greater integration of all the 
participating institutions and organizations. 
34 Lucian Pye, A.spects, op.clt. pp. 45-8. 
35 Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1965. 
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Pye's advice was to search for the characteristics of equality, capacity and 
differentiation in a poHtical system under study and measure the degree of 
advancement of these characteristics to gauge the level of political development. He 
recognizes the problem of harmonizing these characteristics as all three may not 
advance simultaneously or at the sam e^ rate. At particular stages of their realization, 
they may come into conflict with each other. For instance demands for equality may 
undermine the capacity of the system or the use of authority may impair the levels of 
equality."''' The problem is more characterized of the developing societies, particularly 
at their intermediate levels of development. Pye concludes. 
... development is clearly not unilinear nor is it governed by 
sharp and distinct stages, but rather by a range of problems 
that may arise separately or concurrently. In seeking to pattern 
these different courses of development and to analyze the 
different types of problems it is useful to note that the problems 
of equality are generally related to the political culture and 
sentiments about legitimacy and commitment to the system; the 
problems of capacity are generally related to the performance 
of the authoritative structures of government; and the questions 
of differentiation touch mainly on the performance of the non-
authoritative structures and the general political process in the 
society at large. This suggests that in the last analysis the 
problems of political development revolve around the 
relationships between the political culture, the authoritative 
structures, and the general political process. 
Pye's generalization had such a tremendous impact upon the later 
developments in the field of political development literature that his views were 
generally adopted by the members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the 
Social Science Research Council (SSRC) consisting of some prominent political 
scientists of the day. The committee embarked on an extensive and ambitious 
programme bringing together existing knowledge, researches and developments on 
36. Lucian Pye, Aspects, op.cit., p. 47. 
37 Lucian W. Pye. Aspects, op.cit. pp. 47-48. 
the problems and patterns of political development particularly with reference to the 
third world countries. The committee sponsored a set of nine volumes^ ** exploring 
various aspects of political development in developing as well as developed world. 
Coleman adopted the Pye's criteria in his introduction to the volume on education, 
where he states that the efforts of the committee to arrive at a clearer conception of 
the political development process have introduced the notion of a "development 
syndrome" including the characteristics of differentiation, equality and capacity.^ *^ 
The elements suggested by Pye serve a very useful purpose but on closer 
analysis they appear to fail to account for full dimensions of the process of political 
development. Although Pye does not attempt a definition of political development but 
he clearly speaks as to what he mean by political development. It is an increase in the 
levels of these three variables of equality, capacity and differentiation. While 
elucidating the concept of equality, Pye appears to be holding the formal view of 
equality. He fails to look into the problem of equity, which can't be dissociated from 
political development, as Huntington was later to include it as one of the central 
goals of development, though, half-heartedly. The problem of equity can be dealt 
within the broader concept of equality but the point is that Pye does not throw any 
light upon this problem. He is content with just achieving equality before law and 
38 Lucian ['ye, ed. Communications, op.cit., Joseph LaPalombara, ed. Bureaucracy and Political 
Development, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963; Robert E. Ward and Dani<wart 
A.Rustow, Political Modernization, op.cit; James S. Coleman, ed. Education and Political 
Development,, Princeton. 1965; Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture, op.cit; 
Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton, 
1966; Leonard Binder, James S. Coleman, Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian W. Pye, and Myron 
Weiner, Crises in Political Development, Princeton, 1971, Charles Tilly, ed. The Formation of 
National States in Western Europe, , Princeton, 1975; Raymond Grew, ed. Crises of Political 
Development in Europe and the United States, Princeton, 1978. 
39 Co\emdiX\, Education, op.cit.,'(>. 15. 
40 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Myron Weiner & S.P. Huntington, cd. 
Understanding, op. cit. 
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replacement of ascriptive status by achievement standards. And when he touches upon 
the problem of equity, it is at the very superficial and general level."" 
Nevertheless, the problem of equity impinges upon the capacity when the 
political system has to engage in the difficult tasks of redistribution and targeting 
socio-economic inequalities. If we associate political development with the process of 
democratization, then, creation of a viable democratic framework depends ultimately 
on achieving the conditions of equity. Major inequalities in income and wealth 
resulting in severe deprivations and poor control of masses over the system persist in 
democratic" societies, particularly, of the third world. Yet equity is not discussed as 
one of the central problems in achieving political development. Despite the high per 
capita output growth in some democratic societies - the growth that is often the 
handiwork of state - the condition of millions of poor people is not improving. 
"Higher rates of industrialization, faster increases in agricultural productivity, and 
higher rates of growth, all tend to shift income distribution in favour of the higher 
income groups and against the low income groups. The dynamics of the process of 
economic development tend to work relatively against the poor, the major recipients 
of the rewards of economic development are consistently the middle class and the 
highest income groups." 
If growth follows in the absence of effective redistribution policies in favour 
of poor, the gap between the income of the rich and the poor will not just persist but 
increase. The economic growth will simply amount to reinforce and increase 
inequality instead of reducing it. The maxim of 'growth first and equity second' or 
41. Lucin Pye, Aspects, op. cit. pp. 188-200. 
42 Irma Adelman, "Summary Conclusion and Recommendations," Part I, Final Report, Grant Aid / 
csd, Northwestern University, Evanston, 12 February 1971, p. 6; cited in. Samuel P. Huntington, 
"The Goals" op. cit. 
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'trickle down' theory no longer holds ground. It appears, more the economic growth 
takes place in a highly unequal society, more the familiar patterns of inequality get 
entrenched, which necessitates affirmative action to achieve equality in some cases. If 
the 'trickle down' theory would be valid, by now the economic benefits of the Green 
Revolution of 60s and 70s in India could be percolating down to the poor by now, 
while the marginal and small farmers would not have been committing suicide forced 
by poverty and indebtedness. In few of the developing democratic polities high 
growth has been reconciled with equity to the sufficient degree. Where in some 
measure it was achieved like in Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore etc., we find along 
authoritarian strands. Reconciling the conflict between growth, equity and democracy 
remain the biggest challenge before the developing countries. It is the central problem 
of political development. 
While talking about capacity of the political system, Pye is concerned about 
routine functions of government, like maintenance of law and order, extraction of 
resources, allocation of goods, management of controversies and popular demands 
etc. He does not relate the capacity of the political system to promote the capabilities 
and the choices of the citizens. He does not bring in any notion of enforcement of 
human rights, social security and accountability. The performance of the political 
system is intimately fied up with its impact upon the environment in which it 
performs. It does not suffice to say that government has such and such effective 
powers at its disposal unless we conceive those powers in relation to the ends toward 
which those are used. When we talk about the performance of the political system we 
can't be oblivious to the goals of political development. Otherwise, even a totalitarian 
regime at a given point of time might possess enough capacity to manage its affairs, to 
mobilize the energies of the people or to carry out its tasks effectively. The notion of 
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capacity, as meant by Pye, is a way of characterizing the performance or the rate of 
change in the performance of a poHtical system Hke Almond's capabilities analysis. 
We can't dissociate the range and the level of performance from the means and 
instruments of performance. It is quite probable that political system performs more 
with coercion and less with consensus and still achieves its tasks. The development of 
the capacity is just one dimension, rather a means, howsoever important, in the 
direction of political development. It must further lead to the increase in some other 
variables such as capabilities and choice of the people, legitimacy, integration and 
participation variables. Legitimacy generates consensus about the ends and means of 
the political system. And consensus is required for democratization. 
The third element is differentiation. No doubt, differentiation is an essential 
attribute of a developed political system. The process of modernization brings in its 
wake increase in the human needs and demands that impinge upon the political 
system. These challenges can't be met by traditional type of government inherited 
from a pre-commercial and pre-industrial age, based on a simplistic pattern of 
governmental functioning. The increase in needs and demands of the people along 
with the increased complexity of the organizational structures in socio-economic 
sphere entail an increase in governmental personnel, offices, institutions, roles and 
processes, and their integration. 
From the developmental point of view, differentiation is significant as it 
involves the delimitation of spheres of governmental authority, systematization and 
pruning of the governmental process and fixation of accountability in the system. The 
concept of separation of powers is meant towards achieving these goals whereby the 
governmental power is divided among the Executive, the Legislature and the 
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Judician'. For smooth functioning and coordination in the governmental process, Pye 
brings in the notion of integration as differentiation presupposes integration. The 
concepts like 'separation of powers,' 'division of powers' and 'decentralization' are 
fully consistent with the notion of integration. 
The failure to combine normative standards with the empirical inquiry may be 
noticed in Pye's scheme wherein he does not include the notion of liberty and equity 
in explicit terms. Growth has to be accelerated, institutions have to be strengthened, 
stability has to be preserved, integration has to be achieved, bureaucracy has to be 
modernized, elites have to be trained, people have to be mobilized, national autonomy 
has to be realized - but what about the autonomy and the capabilities of the people? 
Liberty is not included probably because of three reasons - (1) liberty is an extremely 
value-loaded concept, therefore, indicates value-preference, which western political 
scientists trained in behaviouralism, structural-functional analysis and empirical 
traditions of fact-value dichotomy would not undertake, (2) The element of liberty 
stands in conflictual relationship with the elements of stability and capacity and some 
writers even challenge the efficacy of liberal-capitalistic framework for its realization, 
and (3) as an indicator of political development, it is not easily identifiable, nor 
amenable to accurate measurement. 
It is very important to know as how the balance is maintained between the 
authority of the government and the freedom of the people. In transitional societies, 
where the resources are scarce, stability uncertain, and integration incomplete, the 
government needs authority. However, the predicament is that we can have more of 
authority at the cost of liberty and vice-versa. And both are central goals of political 
development. Without improving the choices and the capabilities of the people, the 
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government can't increase its capacity. In essence, both the goals are mutually 
reinforcing. Authority is needed by the government to establish order, however, it can 
also be misused by the government. "There can be integrated, perfectly functional 
systems of tyranny or inequality or exploitation."''^ 
Problem of Irreconcilability of Goals 
Huntington does not include liberty in his list of five goals of development.'*'* There is 
no reason why order should precede liberty or why authority should be allov/ed to 
consolidate sufficiently before we talk about liberty? hi fact the problem of political 
development has always been that of maintaining a precarious balance between the 
two and of finding the ways and means to increase both simultaneously, particularly, 
in the context of third world countries. Huntington would argue in favour of capacity 
over liberty with the logic that authority should exist before it can be curtailed. In one 
of his earlier works, he defined political development as "the institutionalization of 
political organizations and procedures." It is characterized by the increasing levels 
of, adaptability, marked by leadership adapting successfully to new challenges; 
complexity, marked by a large number of institutions performing specialized 
functions; autonomy, indicative of external independence and territorial jurisdiction; 
and coherence, entailing consensus and unity in the system. As long as the political 
system is moving towards these variables, it is developing. However, if it is moving 
towards the opposite poles of rigidity simplicity, subordination and disunity, it is 
43 Hugh Stretton, The Political Sciences, London, 1969, pp. 177-78. 
44. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals", op.cit. 
45 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, 1965, 
XVlfp. 393. 
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under political decay.''^ These variables suggest the preference he accords to authority 
and order over liberty and redistributive justice. 
However, in his later work"*' Huntington attempts the analysis of the problems, 
challenges and goals of political development at much more sophisticated level. He 
includes democracy as a goal wherein liberty can be considered as one of the 
components, the problem is that many scholars including Huntington are just content 
with the elitist conception of democracy. Huntington states five goals of development: 
orowth, equity, democracy, stability and autonomy. The former two pertain to 
economic development in fact, while the latter three he means as goals of political 
development. However, for comprehensive development of the system to take place, 
all these five goals need to be satisfied, either simultaneously or sequentially. 
According to Huntington, acute conflictual relationship prevails among these five 
goals. The reconciliation among these goals appears more difficult for developing 
countries as they are faced with the challenge of achieving them more or less 
concurrently and within a short span of time. The West took two centuries to 
overcome this challenge. However, he hopes that the conflicts are resolvable and the 
goals are achievable. But, how? He doesn't have firm answers or strategies. He raises 
very important questions and issues concerning the problems involved in the process 
of development. 
If simultaneous progress toward several development goals is 
difficult or impossible, conceivably progress could be made toward 
them sequentially by first emphasizing one goal and then another. 
...Beyond this, however, there is the question from a 
developmental viewpoint as to whether progress toward all goals 
will be affected by the sequence in which goals are pursued. Some 
sequences, conceivably, may be more productive than others and, 
46 Ibid. 
47 Samuel P. Huntington, "The goals" op.cit. 
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conversely, giving early priority to one goal could conceivably 
preclude subsequent progress toward other goals. 
He doesn't have enough clue as to under a given set of circumstances what 
type of sequence or pattern of development is fruitful? Why can't all goals be pursued 
simultaneously with the equal intensity? Does the conflict between growth and equity 
or equity and democracy pertains to the goals, or the governmental strategies 
preferring one goal above another? Isn't the problem related to the system failure 
rather than incompatibility between the goals? Huntington would not look into these 
aspects. 
Political development can't be conceived in terms of merely selected aspects 
of political development. When Huntington defines political development as 
'institutionalization of political organizations and procedure,' he is emphasizing 
technical aspects of capacity and state building, not substantive aspects like liberty 
and equality. Later, when he conceives development in terms of goals, he is 
concerned with the general process of development. It is true that political 
development should be conceived within the context of the overall process of 
development, at the same time, we should be able to conceptualize political 
development and also answer as how the different goals can be reconciled to account 
for political development. 
Defining Political Development 
Apter is merely interested in the problems of modernization and how the 
developing countries overcome these problems. He is merely talking about the causes 
and the consequences of development not of development itself Organski is 
interested in securing some political preconditions needed for economic development. 
48 Jbidp.18. 
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Some would just talk about the functions of a well-developed polity but not about 
how developing societies reach that stage. Almond is too preoccupied with the 
capabilities of government to talk about the changes in the secular and rational 
orientations of people towards the political process. Karl Deutsch would define 
political development in terms of increased social mobilization, and social 
mobilization as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and 
psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for 
new patterns of socialization and behaviour." Social mobilization may be a correlate 
or even a cause as well as a consequence of political development, but it is not 
political development. Political development as a process has to be located in the 
political sphere, and that too in terms of certain clear-cut objectives. 
Alfred Diamant defines political development as "a process by which a 
political system acquires an increased capacity to sustain successfully and 
continuously new types of goals and demands and the creation of new types of 
organizations."^*^ What are those new types of goals and organizations? The definition 
appears to be very accurate one of political modernization but not of political 
development. Goulet defines political development as "a crucial means o[ obtaining a 
good life."'' Of course, true, but what is political development, indeed? What are its 
consUtuents or variables? It can't be defined in so general terms. It must be clearly 
defined as distinct from its causes, consequences or co-relates. 
49 Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science 
Review, September 1961, 55, pp. 493-514; 494. 
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On the whole, the variables suggested by Pye appear to be most closely related 
with the concept of political development. Political development, indeed, means the 
increase in the variables of equality, capacity and differentiation. However, as we 
have earlier shown the inadequacy of these variables - as Pye has used them in a very 
confined manner - we would enlarge their meaning and scope. The concept of 
political development must clearly show how citizenship building and institution 
building should go together in the process of development. The political culture and 
the political process should be oriented towards increased levels of popular 
participation and popular control. The change should occur at the level of individual 
as well as institutions in pursuit of overall development of the society. 
We expand the list to four variables viz. equality, liberty, capacity and 
differentiation. By equality, we mean substantive equality and we include the notions 
of equity and social security in it. Incorporating these notions in the variable of 
equality points a shift from elite democracy towards social democracy. By liberty, we 
mean the maintenance of a comprehensive system of civil liberties including Free 
Press and Right to Information, effective enforcement and adjudication of human 
rights, decentralization of powers and the refined means of accountability. By 
capacity, we mean the capabilities of the polifical system, including the notions of 
integration, autonomy, social mobilization and legitimacy. By differentiation, we 
mean institution-building, functional specialization and means of coordination and 
integration. 
If the development is taking place in all these variables, albeit in a spiral form, 
we can say that the political development is ensuing. The increase in these variables 
leads to the rationalization, secularization and democratization of political institutions 
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and political culture. It can be identified with the process of democratization but not 
in the narrow context of western elitist models of democracy. 
We define political development as a process by which a political system 
moves towards increased levels of equality, liberty, capacity and differentiafion. 
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C H A P T E R - I I I 
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL PROCESS IN 
MALAYSIA: STATE AND NATION BUILDING 
The extreme plural character of the Malaya society helped the British to 
maintain effective control over the Pemnsula.' National feelings could not easily 
develop amidst such divisions. Still, the common consciousness in the Malaya world 
grew in response to the exploitative character of the British rule, and the cross-border 
influences. Yet it could not find political expression, remaining largely dormant, till 
the Malayan Union was established in 1948. The British united the whole of Malayan 
Peninsula except Singapore as one political unit and brought it under direct rule. The 
sultam were brought under direct control of the British Crown represented by a 
British Governor for the whole territory." The British also made certain concessions to 
non-Malays regarding government jobs and relaxation in citizenship laws. 
Consequently, the Malays were shaken out of their apathy, inertia and state 
particularism. The Union was strongly opposed by the newly created United Malays 
National Organization (UMNO) under the leadership of Dato Onn bin Ja'afar.^ fhe 
concerted and continuous Malay opposition to the Union forced the British to 
The large-scale immigration of the Chinese and the Indian communities to Malaya encouraged 
by the British compounded the problem of ethnic balance. The divisions got sharpened in the 
pre-independence phase along racial, religious and linguistic lines coterminous with 
occupational and rural-urban divide. The British recruited Malay aristocrats into the state 
bureaucracy while confining Malay masses to peasant agriculture. The Chinese entrepreneurs 
were permitted to gain control over the domestic capital along with the British interests. The 
Chinese and Indian immigrant workers were channelised into tin-mining and rubber plantations. 
This colonial strategies fostered grave contradictions in Malaysian Society which could 
potentially reflect in a range of political, social and economic conflicts. See, Collin Abraham, 
"Manipulation and Management of Racial and Ethnic Groups in Colonial Malaysia; A ca.se 
study of Ideological Domination and Control," in Raymond Lee, ed. Ethnicity and Ethnic 
Relations in Malaysia, Northern Illinois University, De Kalb, 1986, pp. 1-27. 
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abandon it in favour of the Federation. The sultam were restored their earlier powers 
with certain modifications. The citizenship laws were relatively made stricter as 
compared to the earlier union terms and conditions.^ 
A restricted electoral process was started in early 1950's. The UMNO joined 
hands with the Malayan Chinese Association, (representative of the Chinese) and, 
later, with the Malayan Indian Congress, (representative of the Indians). The Alliance, 
as it came to be known, accommodated the three major communities of Malaya, 
thereby gradually gaining in strength. Meanwhile, the leadership of UMNO had come 
into the hands of Tunku Abdul Rahman, brother of the Sultan of Kedah. The first 
General Elections were held in 1955 for the Central Legislative Council. The Alliance 
won all the seats except one, securing 81.7 percent of the electoral votes.^ ^ One seat 
was won by Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PAS). Tunku Abdul Rahman formed the 
Cabinet. 
The Bargain: Framing of the Constitution 
A Constitutional Conference took place in London in early 1956 to hold 
discussion over future constitutional status of Malaya. The Alliance representatives 
and the representatives of the respective state rulers participated in the discussions. A 
Constitutional Commission was envisaged to draw up the draft Constitution of free 
Malaya. The independence was assured by the British by August 1957. The 
Constitutional Commission consisted of Lord Reid, an English .ludge as Chairman 
and one member each from Britain, Australia, India and Pakistan. Its report was 
4 Federation of Malaya Agreement, Kuala Lumpur 1948, Paras 5, 8 and 19; cited in R.S. Milne & 
D.K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, Times Books International, Singapore, 
1978, pp. 29-30. 
5 Gordon P Means, Malaysian, op.cit. pp. 147-50; Karl Von Vorys, Democracy Without 
Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia, Prmceton University Press, 
Princeton, 1975, pp. 113-20. 
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published in early 1957. The views and the memorandum submitted by the Alliance 
was given great weightage logically as sovereignty was supposed to be transferred by 
the British to the Alliance government at the centre. Although, there were differences 
between the UMNO and the MCA over the issues of Malay privileges and the 
citizenship provisions for the non-Malays, yet, a "bargain" over the relative 
constitutional position of the Malays as well as the Chinese was worked out and the 
Alliance collectively submitted a Joint memorandum to the Constitutional 
Commission. However, significant changes were made in the Commission's Report to 
accommodate the wishes of the UMNO. 
Malaya was granted independence on August 31. 1957. It is known and 
celebrated as merdeka (Independence) day. Broadly speaking, parliamentary 
democracy was adopted following the British pattern. It was made a constitutional 
monarchy but significantly different from the British. The Head of State (monarch), 
though, bound by the advice of cabinet in all the important matters as far as 
governance and general administration is concerned, yet, he has been assigned some 
real and discretionary powers by the Constitution. The Conference of Rulers** has 
been given some real powers independent of the popular cabinet. This body elects the 
Head of State each five years on rotational basis from members amongst itself'^  
Another significant aspect of the powers of this body is that some entrenched 
provisions of the Constitution can't be amended, finally, without its approval.'" The 
real executive wing viz. Cabinet, in principle, is fully accountable to popularly elected 
6. Report of the Federation of Malaya Consiitutional Commission, Government Printer, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1957, para 9; cited in R.S. Milne & D.K. Mauzy, Polilics, ap.cil.. p. 36. 
7. Karl Von Vorys, Democracy op.cit,. pp. 134-39; R.S. Milne & D.K. Mauzy, Polilics, op.cil., pp. 
38-40. 
8. This institution consists of the nine hereditary rulers of the nine states 
namely Johore, Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Kedah, Perils, Kelantan, 
Trengganu and Perak. 
9 . Federal Constitution, Article 32, Part I of the Third Schedule. 
10. Ibid. Article 159, Clause 5. 
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lower House of the Parliament, which is known as dewan Rakyat. The parliamentary 
system is also guaranteed in each state by the Constitution." 
Another important feature of the Constitution is federal form of government 
based on a combination of features of the Indian and Australian constitutions. The 
central government has been given preponderant power in the federal scheme, like 
India. However, territorial inviolability of the states is, relatively, protected .by the 
Constitution. Residuary powers also lie with the states. The states, as such, are not 
given the right over the amendment process. The Conference of Rulers, however. 
exercises it with regard to certain provisions of the Constitution, symbolically, on 
behalf of the states (the rulers being the representatives of their respective states). The 
centre has kept all the important taxes. The Constitution is rigid with two-third 
majority required in each House of Parliament for amendment of most of its 
provisions. The judiciary has been granted autonomy in its functioning from the 
executive and legislative control. It is the guardian and the interpreter of the 
Constitution and enjoys the power of judicial review. 
The most distinctive feature of the Constitution is the special status and 
position accorded to the native community, the Malays. ^ The Malay traditions have 
also been accorded special place - their religion, Islam being the state religion, their 
language, Malay being the National and the official language and Malay sultans 
accorded privileged constitutional status as Conference of Rulers. All this was part of 
the "bargain" between the UMNO and the MCA representing the \\\o dominant 
communities, the Malays (the majority but economically backward) and the Chinese 
(the minority, but backed up by overpowering economic might). In exchange for 
Malays' constitutional privileges, the citizenship laws were relaxed for the Chinese to 
11. Ibid. Schedule 8. 
12. /A/6/. Article 8. 
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accommodate them as equal and full citizens. They were also assured protection of 
their economic activities and assets. An interesting feature of Malaysia's political 
development is that the "'bargain" effected at the time of independence, partly as a 
matter of expediency and partly as a vision for complex multi-ethnic and backward 
society, has worked well, despite various kinds of strains, pulls and pressures from 
both sides. This also provides a clue to the Malaysia's political and economic 
development since independence. The "bargain," however, was not merely a trade-
off. It was also needed for maintaining peace and communal harmony. This fact was 
underscored by the communal riots of 1969, which, finally, changed the entire course 
of political and economic development in Malaysia and also set in motion the creative 
redefinition and efforts toward new goals and directions to rectify the ethnic disparity 
in terms of economic power relations. 
Setting Electoral Process 
The first elections after Independence for central and state legislatures were 
held in 1959. These elections led to entirely elected legislatures for both centre and 
states. They were also the first elections to be held under the supervision of 
independent Election Commission established under Articles 113-120 of the 
Constitution of Federation of Malaya. As a result of the liberalization of citizenship 
rules, the electorate was double in 1959 as compared to 1955 elections. There were 
now seven times as many Chinese eligible to vote. Around twenty one lakh voters 
cast their vote for the Dewan Rakyat. The elections took place in a peaceful and calm 
manner. Just before the elections, a crisis in the MCA had broken out endangering its 
alliance with the UMNO as some leaders in the MCA pushed for more liberal policies 
on language and education and asked for more seats to the MCA. However, the 
13. G.P. Means, Politics, op.cit., p. 252. The percentage of voters, by community was now: Malays 
- 56.8 percent; Chinese - 35.6 percent: Indians - 7.4 percent; and others - 0.2 percent. 
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Alliance was saved when the MCA split and the moderate section went:^nj;witia the 
UMNO accepting Tunku's terms and conditions.''' N^  ' \J 
The Alliance emerged a clear victor setting pace for future political 
de\elopment by winning seventy four seats out of 104 seats. The UMNO contested 
seventy seats and won fifty two seats. However, the vote percentage of the Alliance 
dropped from 81,7 percent in 1955 to 51.5 percent in 1959. The opposition cut a sorry 
figure. Yet, the PAS showed impressive gains winning thirteen seats out of the fifty-
eight it contested, embarking upon Malay Chauvinism. The state elections were 
conducted earlier. The Alliance had won in all the states except Kelantan and 
Trengganu where the PAS captured power. ' Thus, the main threat to the Alliance at 
first General Elections came from the PAS, a Muslim-dominated Malay party, not 
from Non-Malays-based opposition parties. This factor has to be kept in view while 
analyzing the pro-Malay tilt of the UMNO that has always been presented as a fail 
accompli to the ruling alliance. 
A New Federation: The Merger of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak 
Singapore wanted to be a part of Malaya when Malaya was granted 
Independence, partly, because it could not conceive its status as a tiny state apart from 
the adjacent large entity and, partly, because joining Malaya held a promise for its 
own early Independence. However, neither the UMNO was interested in joining with 
Singapore (Singapore had two-third Chinese majority that could tilt the balance in 
favour of Chinese in the Malaya as a whole), nor the British were quite interested to 
part with their stakes in a free port city and their naval base. Singapore, meanwhile, 
had become self-governing territory in 1959 with a wholly elected legislature but its 
14. R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Politics, op.cit, pp. 137-38. 
15. /6iUp. 155. 
16. Ibid., pp. 26-27; J.P. Ongkili, Nation-building, op.cit., pp. 151-60. 
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defence, foreign affairs and some allied aspects still remained in the hands of the 
British. In May 1959 elections for the legislature, left-of-centre People's Action Party 
(PAP) led by Lee Kuan Yew scored heavy victory. However, the PAP later on split 
into two factions - one taking radical stand on communist lines and the other 
moderate faction led by Lee Kuan, which was now reduced to just one-seat majority 
in the legislature.'^ Thus, it was threat of communism which propelled both Lee Kuan 
and Malaya leadership towards exploring the possibilities of the merger of the two 
countries. Singapore could realize the natural geographical unity with the Peninsula as 
well as find a far bigger market for its manufactured products. Its Chinese community 
could integrate with the adjacent larger Chinese community, adding strength to each 
other, and at the same time staving off the radical communist threat. The Peninsula 
could derive economic benefits from a far more advanced and industrialized 
economy, while also expanding its frontiers to the logical point. It could also keep 
away communist threat from emerging at its doorsteps. 
The fear of Chinese outnumbering the Malays was overcome when the 
Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed a Federation of Malaysia 
consisting of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei.'^ The last three 
territories are located along the northern coast of Borneo Island, which is part of 
Indonesia. The Chinese population was in minority there, and since the majority 
population was made of indigenous non-Muslim people, generally known as natives 
of Sabah and Sarawak, the addition of these territories with the Peninsula would 
imperil the threat of increase in Chinese population in the country after the merger 
17. Richard Butwell, Southeast Asia Today - and Tomorrow: Problems of Political Development, 
Praeger Publishers, N.Y. 1969, p. 98. 
18. Ibid pp. 9S-99 
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with Singapore.''' The Malayan leadership visualized that the Borneo people would 
align with the Peninsular Malays as they, too, faced economic preponderance of 
Chinese minority in their territories. 
The Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak were extremely backward at the 
beginning of 1960s, in all respects. Their economy was in bad shape. Industrialization 
process had yet to begin. The literacy rate was just half that of Malaya. The condition 
of natives was, still, worse.^ "^  The political development of the region was at very low 
ebb at that time. Both were direct British colonies since 1946. The locals were not 
trained in the task of administration. Till the advent of 1960s there were not any kind 
of self-governing institutions initiated by the British. Both the territories did not have 
any sort of elected legislature or elected government. Sabah did not have even a single 
political party. 
Sabah and Sarawak were not ready for independence on their own. The British 
feared that gradually either the Chinese would get in an unassailable position there or 
Indonesia would start claiming these territories as part of the larger Borneo Island. 
Philippines, too, was harbouring designs to lay its claims over the territories as soon 
as the British left. So, it was in the interest of the British that the territories should be 
joined with friendly ex-colony, Malaya. That would maintain power balance not only 
within Malaysia (after merger) but also in the region. It would also ensure better 
cordial relations with Malaysia in which the British, still, had high economic stakes, 
particularly, the huge investments their companies had made in finance, trade and 
industry. 
19. Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: Political Unification 
in the Malaysian Region 1945-1965, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, pp. 137; 144. 
20. R.S. Milne & D.K. Mauzy, Politics, op.cit., p. 45. 
80 
A Commission of Enquiry under the chairmanship of Lord Cobbaid was 
instituted to ascertain the wishes of the people of Sabah and Sarawak, which reported 
favourably. Finally, a round of negotiations was held in London in July 1963 on the 
final terms of merger of the territories. Brunei opted to stay out. The formation of 
Federation of Malaysia was a great political and economic advance for all the 
territories concerned.^' It had the potential for greater stability and democratization in 
the region. The Borneo territories were, together, bigger than Malaya, territory-wise, 
but had less population even than Singapore. The Federation of Malaysia came into 
being vvith the passage of Malaysia Act, 1963. Instead of adopting a new constitution, 
the existing Constitution of Malaya was amended to incorporate the new territories. 
The terms of the Agreement, were quite unusual. The status of the newly incorporated 
territories was going to be different from the existing states of Malaya. 
Special Position of the Borneo Territories and Singapore 
The position of Borneo states was made very special and unique vis-a-vis other 
states. The Immigration Act, 1963 made the immigration into the Federation, in 
general, except Borneo states, a federal matter. Whereas, the immigration into the 
Borneo states was made subject to the jurisdiction of state governments of those 
territories. Another very important concession made to the Borneo states was the 
amendment of Article 153. The reservations for the Malays were extended to the 
natives of Borneo states.^^ The undue weightage was given to the Borneo states in 
assigning large number of seats in the Federal Parliament far beyond their numerical 
strength (twenty four seats to Sarawak and sixteen to Sabah, in total forty, as 
compared to 104 for the Peninsular Malaya and just fifteen seats to Singapore, which 
21. See, G.P. Means, "Malaysia - A New Federation in Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, Summer 
1963, Vol. 63, No. 2. 
22. The Federal Constitution, Articles 153 and 161 A. 
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had more population than the combined population of Sabah and Sarawak). It was 
done to reassure the Borneo natives that on account of their socio-economic 
backwardness, low level of political development and numerical vulnerability, they 
would not be dominated by the Peninsular Malaysia. 
Some additional sources of revenue were assigned to Sabah and Sarawak. For 
example, they are assigned import and excise duties on petroleum goods and export 
duty on timber and other forest products." Both states have also been entitled to 
receive additional grants from the Federal Government. Another fundamental 
difference was with regard to the expanded legislative powers of Sabah and 
Sarawak."^ 
Islam was not accorded official status in Sabah and Sarawak. Restrictions were 
introduced upon the promotional activities in favour of Islam. These states were 
given the ten-year grace period to switch over to Malaya as the sole official language, 
by the Malaysia Act. No central Act affecting the use of English in the courts of either 
of the two states or Legislative Assembly in either of the two states or for any official 
purposes was to come into operation until it was approved by an enactment of the 
legislature of Sabah or Sarwak.^ ^ In September 1973, Sabah made Malay the sole 
official medium of communication. The following year Sarawak adopted Malaya but 
decided to retain English. It was also decided that position of head of state for each 
of the Borneo territories should be open to the members of all communities, but could 
23. Ibid. Tenth Schedule, Part V. 
24. Ibid. Tenth Schedule, Part IV, Para 2 (for Sabah) and para 1 (for Sarawak). 
25. Ibid. Ninth Schedule. Lists II-A and III-A. A supplementary list II-A for Sabah and Sarawak 
was appended to state list. A supplementary list IlIA was appended to the concurrent list. 
26. However, Article 16IC, which entailed such provisions has been deleted from the Constitution. 
So, there are no restrictions, today. 
27. ft/^. Article 161(3). 
28. B.W. Andaya and L.Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia, Macmillan, London, 1982, p. 277. 
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not become Head of Malaysia as that institution is restricted to hereditary rulers of 
nine states of Peninsular Malaysia. 
Singapore occupied no less privileged status than Sabah and Sarawak. Its 
additional powers in the supplementary lists II B and III B of the Ninth Schedule 
were, in certain respects, even more comprehensive. Particularly, it was given control 
over education & labour policies.^" It was allowed to lay down its own conditions for 
citizenship. Singapore citizens could stand for the legislature and vote in Singapore 
only and the federal citizens could stand for the legislature and vote in Peninsular 
Malaysia only. However, citizens of one could campaign in the territory of the other.^' 
These provisions put up severe restrictions upon the sphere of activity and the strategy 
of political parties of both Singapore and Malaya. 
The federation of Malaysia, which was planned to be formed on 31 August 
1963 (the anniversary of Malaysia's Independence Day) was postponed till 16 
September 1963 on account of objections raised by Indonesia and Philippines. 
Surprisingly, Kelantan, one of the states of old Federation, also raised objection. The 
state of Kelantan instituted a legal action to have the Malaysia Act declared null and 
void, or alternatively to get it declared not binding upon the state of Kelantan. It was 
not entirely baseless objection. The principle of equality among the states was going 
to be diluted. Kelantan government pleaded that the Malaysia Act was contrary to the 
1957 Agreement by which proposed changes required the consent of each of the 
constituent states, including Kelantan, and that the Ruler of the State of Kelantan 
should have been a party to the Malaysia Agreement. Kelantan failed in its legal suit 
29. Ibid. Fifth Schedule, Para 7. 
30. R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Politics, op.cit., p. 64. 
31. Ibid. p. 65. 
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and the judiciary sided with the federal power of effecting changes into the 
Constitution over which the Constitution does not specifically prescribe condifions.^^ 
However, the real threat to the concept of larger federation came from outside 
the country. Indonesia was in direct control of much bigger tract of territory of 
Borneo Island adjoining the northern parts of Sabah and Sarawak. Hence, it laid claim 
to the northern territories. Malaysia resisted the move but was drawn into a long 
"'confrontation" with Indonesia that entailed great threat to Malaysia's sovereignty 
over the territories. However, Indonesia gradually realized that it was not the will of 
the people of northern territories to align with it.^ "' Djakarta Agreement was signed 
between the two countries in August 1966 and diplomatic relations were restored. 
However, "confrontation" did have the effect of unifying the Malaysians more than 
any other factor at that time. Philippines, too, claimed Sabah, but Malaysia refused to 
accede to the demand and after a few years the dispute died out.^'' With the 
establishment in August 1967 of the ASEAN, cordial relations developed among 
these nations. The stakes in friendship, regional cooperation and trade proved to be far 
more potent and worthwhile factors in their relationship than the unsubstantiated petty 
claims over each other's territory. 
Separation of Singapore 
From the very inception of the Federation of Malaysia, Singapore posed a 
threat to the Malaya authorities in more than one respects. Some of those v/ere real, 
some imaginary. Disputes arose about the special powers given to Singapore over 
economic matters. ^ More prominently, certain political factors played their role 
32. The Government of State ofKelatan v. The Government of the Federation of Malaya and Tunku 
Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj [1963] M.LJ. 355. 
33. Richard ButweW, Southeast, op.cit., p. 100. 
34. /6;J. p. 101. 
35. R.S. Milne and D.K. Maiizy, Politics, op.cit., p. 69. 
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against unification and ultimately led to the separation of Singapore from the 
Federation, and that too against the wishes of many a people on both sides. The very 
beginning of relationship between the two entities was tarred with political rivalry 
between the UMNO and the PAP. In the parliamentary elections in 1964, the PAP 
decided to field eleven candidates from Malaya. The Malaya leaders criticized this 
move of the PAP arguing that it was against the understanding reached between the 
Malaya Government and the Singapore Government before the Agreement for the 
Federation of Malaysia was signed. Replying to such objections. Dr. Toh Chin Chye, 
the Chairman of the PAP elaborated, "charges have been made that the PAP has 
ambitions to capture power at the centre. Surely any political party, big or small, 
which is worth its salt and receives the support of the people, must have such an 
objective if it is to put into practice its political ideals." 
Thus, the PAP directly contested against the Alliance within its stronghold, 
although, it did not attack the UMNO. Its intention and strategy, in fact, was to 
replace the MCA in the ruling Alliance in the immediate context and to build 
organizational branches throughout Malaysia. Only a place in the central government 
could help it quickly realize its goals and that could be achieved by undermining the 
MCA's claim to speak for the Chinese.^^ The PAP failed to make any inroads into the 
constituencies of the erstwhile Malaya, nor could it make any dent into the MCA's 
position within the Alliance, but the whole exercise soured its relations with the 
Alliance.'*' Thus, deprived of a place in the Alliance, in sheer desperation, the PAP 
took up the gauntlet to fight for a 'Malaysian Malaya' as opposed to a 'Malaya 
Malaysia,' which it claimed, was being imposed by the UMNO-dominated Alliance. 
36. Strait Times, 10 September 1963; cited in J.P. Ongkili, Nation-building, op.cit., p.p 182-83. 
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It entered into an alliance with some opposition parties in Malaya and Sarawak and 
the alliance was called Malaysian Solidarity Convention. 
The leaders of the convention made no attacks on the privileges of the Malays 
or the Malay language, but this could not obscure the logic and unity behind their 
unity efforts, as the move was, after all, meant to challenge Malay hegemony in 
political field. The predominantly Chinese composition of Solidarity Front made 
political struggle between Malays and Non-Malays even sharper. All this soured the 
relationship not only between the UMNO and the PAP but also raised the temperature 
between the two communities'*" The Malaya leaders envisaged separation betvi'een the 
two entities. All talks took place in secrecy and Singapore leaders were made to 
convince that separation vv^ as the right course left. ' On 9 August 1965 the Malaysian 
House of Representatives passed a constitutional Amendment Bill enabling Singapore 
to secede from Malaysia without any sort of bloodbath on either side."*^  
Communalisation of Political Debate 
The political debate persisted along communal lines for the remaining of the 
1960s in Malaysia. It was also characterized by continuous alignments and 
realignments among different political formations in East and West Malaysia. The 
merger and the separatism of Singapore had just given an impetus to the dormant 
fears of the Chinese community of being overwhelmed by the Malays. The 
communally sensitive issues surfaced, particularly, the language and education.'*'' 
Although, there was too much internal haggling over these issues among the three 
main components of the Alliance, it remained intact and well entrenched in power. 
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The national language was the main theme of political debate. At the time of 
Independence, the Constitution included a provision that Malay would be the sole 
official language after ten years, of course, subject to the will of the Parliament.'*'' For 
Peninsular Malaysia, a National Language Bill was passed on 3 March 1967, which 
incurred the displeasure of hardcore Malays even within the UMNO, at the same time, 
the Chinese and Indian communities were unhappy that the Chinese and Tamil were 
not given respectful place in the scheme.'*' However, the Bill was able to avert the 
crisis among the Alliance partners over the issue and, as such, it appeared to be a win-
win formula for its three main components. The Malay became the official language, 
but the Bill also provided for the continued use of English in official capacity.'"' 
Enough scope was left for the protection of cultural interests of other communities. 
However, nothing substantial or significant on that count was done by the national 
government in actual practice. 
It cannot be denied that Malay chauvinism has played its political part, 
vigorously in certain spheres. The fulfillment of genuine cultural demands of 
different communities, in fact, could be used as a catalyst for better national 
integration. Such approach was best described by Chinese-based, but relatively, non-
communal party, Gerakan, the next month after its formation in 1968 in the following 
words. 
We strive for a Malaysian nationhood evolved out of the existing communities 
in Malaysia. The process of formation should be left to historical growth. The 
state participates in its formation by eliminating obstacles to harmony and 
intercommunity acculturation. It should not impose cultural elements or 
indulge in artificial experiments such as introducing a common dress, dance, 
ritual and ceremony without regard to the receptivity of the communities in 
Malaysia. We emphasise common experience and the sense of a common 
44. Federal Constitution, Article 152. 
45. B.W. Andaya and L.Y. Andaya, A History, op.cit, p. 277. 
46. J.P. Ongkili, Nation-Building, op.cit, p. 195. 
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destiny as the decisive essentials of nationhood rather than cultural, religious 
or ethnic uniformity. 
The message was lost on Malay leadership. Shortly after the Language Act, 
there was a huge demand for the Chinese medium Merdeka University from the 
opposition Chinese political parties as well as the ruling partner, MCA.''^ At rejection 
by the UMNO, the MCA dropped its demand that was perceived by the Chinese as a 
sell-out to its interests within the Alliance. Their loyalty, therefore, shifted towards 
two Chinese-dominated opposition parties, the hardcore Democratic Action Party (the 
successor to the PAP that was deregistered concurrently with the separation of 
Singapore) and moderate, the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan). The Democratic 
Action Party (DAP) continued to espouse the 'Malaysian Malaysia' cause of the 
erstwhile PAP. It advocated racial equality and the use of Chinese and Tamil as 
languages for official purposes. It mildly criticized the Malay privileges and 
articulated the minorities' fears on language issue. The most blatant attack on the 
Alliance leadership and Malay privileges was pronounced in the manifesto of smaller 
party, the PPP, 
Special rights and privileges have brought no material benefits to the Malay 
Ra'ayat who after JO years of independence find themselves in the same social 
and economic plight they were in before Merdeka. What has happened is that 
the Alliance has abused its powers cmd under the guise of enforcing the special 
rights, has created a Malay capitalist class which is now exploiting the Malay 
masses. ... it has served as a constant irritant to non-Malays, disrupting the 
unity of the people and perpetuating racial prejudices.^ 
Thus, the 1969 Elections were fought along communal lines. The biggest loser 
was the MCA as its tally was reduced to thirteen from the previous twenty seven. The 
major beneficiaries of its loss were the DAP and the Gerakan getting thirteen and 
47. R.K. Vasil, The Malaysian, General Election of 1969, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, p. 20. 
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eight seats. It is interesting to note that despite communal polarization, the Malay vote 
continued to be divided between the UMNO and the PAS, the UMNO losing nine 
seats over the previous tally of fifty nine while the PAS adding three seats to its 
previous nine seats.^' In this sense, the Alliance was the clear loser as compared to its 
past performance. Its numbers had declined from eighty nine in previous elections to 
sixty six, thus, deprived of two-third majority in the Parliament for the first time (only 
once till date). Its vote share had also declined from 58.4 percent to 48.8 percent, 
below majority mark, again for the first and the only time in its history. The situation 
was more precarious at the level of State assemblies. Kelantan was retained by the 
PAS. Penang was lost to Gerakan. In the states of Perak, Selangor, Kedah and 
Terengganu, the Alliance formed governments by highly reduced margins.^'' 
May 13 Riots and the Suspension of Democratic Process 
The ruling Alliance, still, won comfortable absolute majority of seats, but 
since, "the elections were perceived in referendum-like terms, the opposition felt that 
its gains represented a victory of sorts, and likewise the Alliance.... felt the results to 
be not only a great setback but as virtually threatening its survival."'^ "' Thus, not 
surprisingly, the opposifion parties that lost the 1969 elections were elated and 
jubilant, while the Alliance, though, the clear winner with absolute majority of seats, 
still, showed depressed mood at the reduced margin of victory. The DAP and the 
Gerakan held several "victory processions" in Kuala Lumpur, some of which did not 
even have police permission. It is alleged that some of these processions were 
provocative and raised anti-Malay slogans.^'' The Malays also organised counter-rally 
in the evening, supported by the UMNO, which deteriorated into violence. Racial 
51. R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Politics, op.cit., pp. 163-4. 
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violence took place on the night of 13''' May. It spread so quickly that police failed to 
control the situation and the military was called in/^ "^  Though the riots were confined 
to Kuala Lumpur and some surrounding areas in Selangor, yet their intensity, impact 
and implications were such that it altogether altered the course of political and 
economic development in Malaysia. 
The government took radical and unprecedented steps to control the situation 
and restore normalcy. The Cabinet recommended proclamation of State of Emergency 
under Article 150."'' The meetings of the Parliament and the state legislative 
assemblies were suspended. The elections due in Sarawak and Sabah were also 
suspended. Thus, it is clear that efforts undertaken to deal with the crisis were not 
limited merely to the provisions of the Constitution. Some of those were extra-
constitutional. Thus, it can be argued that the Constitution for practical purposes was 
suspended. A complex extra constitutional feature was the creation of National 
Operations Council (NOC) under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul 
Razak.^ ^ Wide executive and legislative powers (largely security-related but also with 
regard to allied aspects) were delegated to the Director of NOC. Although, Razak had 
to act on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet continued to co-exist alone 
with the NOC (the activities of the two were well coordinated), substantive decisions 
were taken by the NOC, particularly, the stabilization measures and the enunciation of 
institutions and programmes meant to remove the possibility of repeat of May 13. 
55. The official statistics accounted for 196 deaths (172 in Selangor alone) between 13 May-31 July. 
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Muafaqat: The Coalition Building 
In January 1970, the National Consultative Organization was formed to 
achieve consensus. Its purpose was to "establish positive and practical guidelines for 
inter-racial cooperation and social integration for the growth of Malaysian national 
identity."^^ It comprised representatives from a wide spectrum like members of the 
NOC, provincial governments, political parties, representatives from Sabah. and 
Sarawak, religious groups, professional bodies, public services, trade unions, 
employers' associations, the Press, minority groups, etc. All the major political parties 
except the DAP (it refused to join) were represented in it. It is clear that the 
Government did not undertake the dictatorial course, instead, wide consultations took 
place and the means to revert back to the parliamentary democracy were explored in 
right earnest, 
A return to the traditional Malay practice of governing by muafakal 
(consensus) in a general assembly was thus being reintroduced alongside a 
western style parliamentary democracy. The latter institution had proved 
vulnerable to ethnic divisions within the society, and the government's Malay 
leadership was ready to experiment with an earlier governmental device 
which had served Malay well in the past.' 
Another feature aiming at consensual politics was the declaration of a national 
ideology, Rukenegara by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. It was drafted by the 
Department of National Unity (DNU), which was established in July 1969 to 
formulate a consensus-based national ideology aimed at national unity as well as the 
guidelines for new socio-economic programmes to achieve the same purpose.*"" The 
Rukenegara ('Articles of Faith of the State') was proclaimed on Independence Day in 
1970, 
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Our nation, Malaysia, being dedicated to achieving a greater unity of all her peoples; 
to maintaining a democratic way of life; to creating a just society in which the wealth 
of the nation shall be equitably shared; to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and 
diverse cultural traditions; to building a progressive society which shall be oriented to 
modern science and technology; 
We, her people, pledge, our united efforts to attain those ends guided by these 
principles; 
Belief in God 
Loyalty to King and Country 
Upholding the Constitution 
Rule of Law 
Good Behaviour and Morality 
Thus, Rukenegara was couched in very general terms and there was no concrete 
action plan attached to it. Still, it served to emphasize the imperative of consensus in 
society and the direction in which the government intended to move. The action plan 
came in the form of efforts at building and expanding various coalitions at state and 
federal levels. Its another dimension was to effect some significant changes in the 
Constitution so as to deflect the focus of political debate away from certain sensitive 
issues. However, the latter was, to a great extent, was a forced attempt, which 
paradoxically, if on one hand, ensured peace and stability, on the other, it also stifled 
the process of political development. In economic sphere, the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) was formulated, explicitly designed to correct the inter-ethnic economic 
imbalance in society and to improve the economic lot of the Malays with clearly set 
targets. All these innovations and developments together decisively shaped the future 
course of political development. The changes in the constitutional-legal as well as 
economic framework of the country and their implications for the subsequent political 
development have been discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Parliamentary rule was restored in 1971. Earlier, Tunku Abdul Rehman 
resigned as prime minister after his nephew was elected King. It is believed that 
Emergency had to be prolonged perhaps to facilitate smooth succession transition for 
61. Ibid.p.2S\. 
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UMNO leadership.^ •^ Thus, the Parhament was reconvened under the new leadership 
of Abdul Razak to chalk out the future course of development. 
It is worth mentioning that changes to the Constitution through the 
Amendment Act, 1971 were brought about after attaining a wide consensus by the 
government. The government on its own was not having two-third majority in the 
Dewan Rakyat. However, it managed to get the support of opposition parties like the 
Gerakan, the SNAP, the PAS, and the SUPP. Only the DAP and the PPP opposed the 
Bill. It was carried by 125 votes in favour against 17 in March 1971 .^ '' It is a matter of 
debate whether the support for the Bill had become a fait accompli to the various 
political parties under impending threat of extended Emergency. Still, it cannot be 
denied that the individual parties were free to exercise their choice either in support or 
against the Bill, as was proved in case of the DAP and the PPP. If such a substantial 
majority in the Parhament voted for the Bill, it goes to the credit of the government 
that it was able to generate overwhelming consensus over it and convince the 
opposition parties that the deal was not vitally against their mterests. 
By keeping out sensitive issues from the domain of public debate the pressure 
was eased on the government. It also goaded some of the opposition parties to explore 
the possibilities of joining the ruling coalition. However, the real initiative came from 
the ruling Alliance. It was very much in league with the government's efforts to move 
in directions of consensual politics. Under Razak's leadership, a wider coalition 
arrangement surpassing the Alliance was formed that went on scoring impressive 
victories in the subsequent elections. Razak realized that merely constitutional 
changes will not be enough to cement racial harmony and develop consensus around 
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the goals of economic development. Therefore, political consensus in terms of 
broadening the base of the Alliance was sought to strengthen the hands of the 
government. Broad-based alliances were already formed by many local parties in 
Sabah and Sarawak prior to the holding of 1970 elections. Both, the Sabah Alliance 
and the Sarawak Alliance, were part of the "Grand Alliance" ruling the centre. 
Although, the federal AJliance did not directly participate in elections of these two 
states, it actively supported the local alliances. A coalition between the Sarawak 
Alliance and the SUPP in Sarawak was materialized with the active intervention of 
the federal government.^^ The SUPP was a Chinese-based party and its inclusion in 
the government was a sure indication of intention of Kuala Lumpur to move in 
directions of consensual politics. 
The idea of coalition building was directly extended to the Peninsular 
Malaysia with a broad coalition between the Alliance and the Gerakan in February 
1972 in Penang.^^ This coalition allowed the Gerakan to retain control of the State 
Government, while the Gerakan agreed to support the Alliance in the Parliament and 
other state assemblies. It was active statesmanship from Razak who co-opted a 
moderate opposition party that represented predominantly the Chinese and was 
particularly active in the communally polarized state of Penang. Another significant 
development was the pact between the Alliance and the PPP in Perak in May 1972. It 
was quite an interesting development, since, the PPP had opposed the constitutional 
Amendment Bill the previous year and was always at odds with the alliance. 
65. The SUPP fought the elections as an opposition party at both parliamentary and Assembly 
levels. However, it participated in state government as a coalition partner and supported the 
Alliance in Parliament, the factors which were ultimately responsible for the party to join the 
National Front. See R.S. Milne and K.J. Ratnam, Malaysia - New Stales in a New Nation, 
London, 1974, pp. 238-39; 441; For political developments in Sarawak during first decade, see, 
Michael B. Leigh The Rising Moon: Political change in Sarawak, Sydney, 1974. 
66. S.H. Alatas, op.cit., pp. 274-5. 
94 
Surprisingly, it was the Alliance that was in control of the state government in Perak, 
although its majority was precariously thin. '^' 
The real breakthrough in coalition formation came with the PAS joining 
hands with the Alliance. This coalition was quite an achievement in the sense that 
both the PAS and the UMNO, chiefly, relied upon the same support base. The split of 
the Malay votes was averted, thus, strengthening the national government in 
following and implementing the NEP. The PAS was no longer to be deprived of free 
flow of federal funds to the state of Kelantan overcoming the serious financial crunch 
for its objectives and tasks in Kelantan. 
When the coalition with the PAS came into effect on 1^ ' January 1973, the 
Prime Minister announced the great possibility of a much broader ruling alliance at 
the centre.^^ On June 1, 1974, the National Front (NF) was officially registered as a 
confederation of political parties. It comprised all the parties in the Alliance and those 
associated with Alliance in coalition arrangements in various states, including the 
Gerakan, the PAS, the PPP, the Sabah Alliance, the PBB and the SUPP.^" Razak's 
motives in building such a grand alliance of parties centred around his strategy of 
reducing "politicking" i.e. political competition and "outbidding" by political 
opponents, in order to free the energies of the government to achieve the objectives of 
the NEP. He stated. "The socio-economic revolution will fail and come to naught, if 
our socio-political situation is not stable the National Front concept is a positive 
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effort towards reducing political tension so as to allow the Government to concentrate 
71 
on intensifying development." 
The evolution of even larger ruling coalition tremendously shaped the future 
course of political development not only in terms of consolidating political support 
behind the implementation of the NEP but also incapacitating the opposition from 
posing any serious challenge to the increasing authoritarian practices by the state in 
the post-1969 phase. At the same time, the position of the UivINO had been further 
strengthened within the Front. Except the DAP, all other political parties have 
participated in the government process at one time or the other. It is chiefly as a result 
of such kind of strategic partnerships fostered by the UM>]0, the NF (later called the 
Barisan Nasional, or the BN) has won all the succeeding parliamentary elections with 
two-third majority. It has given tremendous leverage to the UMNO to control and 
shape the course and pace of political change in Malaysia. 
As a result of formation of such a broad alliance, the NF was able to win 135 
seats out of a total of 154 in the Dewan Rakyat in 1974 elections. The NF secured 
eighty eight percent of the seats, the feat unmatched by the ruling alliance in any other 
elections except the latest 2004 polls. It polled, however, below sixty percent of the 
total valid votes, which can be explained by the fact that forty seven of its candidates 
won unopposed, their votes not tallied. The NF also won 344 of the 390 seats for 
state assemblies with forty three unopposed." The UMNO, the PAS and the MIC won 
all their allotted seats. Tun Mustapha's Sabah Alliance won all sixteen seats, fifteen 
71. Strait Times, Malaysia, 27 June 1974; cited in R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Politics, op.cit., p. 
190. 
72. R.S. Milne, "Malaysia, op.cit., 169. 
73. Ibid. 
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74 seats unopposed this time. The impact of such a wide coalition of parties could be 
felt all over Malaysia, particularly in the state of Terengganu, where a Malay-based 
moderate party, Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PSRM) captured thirty percent of 
the popular votes but could not manage to win even a single seat. 
Table C: Parliamentary Elections of 1974: Seats Won and Contested by Parties 
Won Contested 
West Malaysia - Total Seats: 114 
National Front 
UMNO 
MCA 
MIC 
PAS 
PPP 
Gerakan 
DAP 
Pekeinas 
PSRM 
Kita 
Ind. PPP 
Ind. 
Sarawak - Total Seats: 24 
National Front 
PBB 
SUPP 
SNAP 
Ind. 
Sabah - Total Seats: 16 
National Front (Sabah Alliance) 
USNO 
SCA 
Pckemas 
104 
61 
19 
4 
14 
1 
5 
9 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
15 
9 
6 
9 
0 
16 
13 
3 
0 
114 
61 
23 
4 
14 
4 
8 
46 
35 
21 
4 
1 
37 
24 
16 
8 
24 
3 
16 
13 
'^ 
J 
Source: R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Politics, op.cit. 
The efforts by the UMNO leadership to broaden the consensus continued even 
after the General Elections. In June 1976 (after the death of Razak earlier on 14"^  
January), the leadership under the new Prime Minister, Datuk Hussein Onn admitted 
the only opposition party in Sarawak (the SNAP) to the National Front. The NF was 
74. However, serious allegations against Mustapha government like arbitrary arrests of opposition 
leaders and preventing the candidates from filing their nominations were made. Far Eastern 
Economic Review^ 2 January 1971, pp. 12-3. 
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now in control of 144 seats out of 154 with only two parties, the DAP (9) and the 
Pekemas (1), outside the ruling Front. ^  
Political Integration of the Borneo Territories 
Socialization in democratic norms took place much later in the Borneo 
territories than the Peninsular Malaysia. Sabah did not have even a political party 
before the merger talks took place. Most of the local political parties, which had 
grown in the territories, joined the federal Alliance. The Alliance, therefore, was able 
to maintain its hold over the territories through its local components without directly 
participating in local politics. The Peninsular parties, ruling as well as opposition, did 
not put up candidates in these territories in the initial years. Politically, both the 
territories followed "trends in the Peninsula and the Alliance pattern of inter-
communal party grouping was adopted in both .... The component parties of the 
Alliance groups in Sarawak and Sabah represented ethnic communities but the ethnic 
spectrum differed, of course from that in the Alliance in the Peninsular."^^ 
A bogey of state autonomy, not exactly separation, was raised in the Borneo 
provinces by Sabah's Chief Minister Donald Stephens, the leader of Kadazans' party, 
the United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO) and the Chief Minister of 
Sarawak, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, the leader of the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) 
representing the largest native group, Ibans. Both tried hard to preserve the 
concessions granted to their states by the Federation Agreement and put pressure on 
the central government to implement those guarantees. Their stands were taken as a 
challenge by the central government in its pursuit to control and extend its sphere of 
influence over these territories. With active intervention by the central government, 
75. R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Politics, op.cil., p. 201 and 209. 
76. J.P. Ongkili, Nation-Building op.cit., p. 198. 
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both Ningkan and Stephens were eased out of chief ministerships in 1966 and 1967, 
respectively, giving way to another Iban, Tawa Sli in Sarawak and the Malay, Datuk 
Tun Mustapha in Sabah. These leaders in the beginning were more amenable to 
directives from Kuala Lumpur. 
An interesting feature having an impact upon the political development of 
Sabah was that all the parties, ruling as well as opposition, formed part of the Sabah 
Alliance, which remained part of the ruling Alliance at the Centre. The central leaders 
remained more or less neutral but their sympathies were with the USNO of Datuk 
Mustapha. Though, Mustapha helped usher political stability in the state, but at the 
cost of annihilating the opposition. It encouraged him to develop dictatorial attitude in 
the coming years that narrowed the democratic space, ultimately, leading to the 
overthrow of Mustapha regime in 1975.'" It was his fierce independence from the 
federal authorities and autonomous economic decision-making which made him 
unappealing to the federal authorities. This led the federal authorities to back a new 
political party the Berjaya, formed by the USNO dissidents and led by Tun Mohd. 
Fuad Stephens (Donald Stephens, before becoming a Muslim). He swung the 
Kadazan vote towards Berjaya as he was ethnically a Kadazan''^ Interestingly, once 
again, both the adversaries - this time, the USNO and the Berjaya - remained part of 
the BN. The federal government ensured free and fair elections in the state. Berjaya 
won the elections and Stephens became the Chief Minister, but, soon he was killed in 
a plane crash. He was followed by his brother, Harris Salleh, whose dictatorial style 
and intense Islamization drive, too, like Mustapha's, led to dissatisfaction and unrest, 
particularly, among the non-Muslim Kadazans. Under the leadership of Kadazan-
77. B.W. Andaya and L.Y. Andaya, A History, op.cit., p. 277. 
78. R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Politics, op.cit, pp. 165-8. 
79. James Chin, "The Sabah State Election of 1994: End of Kadazan Unity" Asian Survey, October 
1994, Vol. XXXIV, No. 10, p. 905. 
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Catholic Pairin Kitingan, a new party, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) was formed that was 
able to replace Berjaya as the ruling party in 1985. Due to its impressive showing in 
the snap elections next year, it was also included in the BN. Once again, it was a 
strange phenomenon of two rival parties viz. the PBS and the USNO in Sabah 
becoming part of the national coalition (nearly defunct Berjaya withdrew from the BN 
at the PBS entry).**" 
Sarawak's initial phase of political development was marked by the imposition 
of Emergency in 1966, which led to the dismissal of not-so friendly chief minister, 
Datuk Ningkan in 1966 and, later, postponement of the elections.^' These 
developments were abhorred by the state people. The amendment of the Constitution 
of Sarawak by the federal government by using the emergency powers in 1966 was, 
particularly, resented. The first direct elections in Sarawak took place in 1970 after a 
long delay. Internal bickerings in the Sarawak Alliance affected the outcome of the 
elections. As a result, the Alliance could hardly get half-way mark in Assembly 
elections, whereas, it had to contend with minority seats in the Parliament. It entered 
into coalition arrangement with the SUPP, which also paved the way for the SUPP to 
join the National Front. With the Bumiputera and Pesaka merging to form Party 
Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB), the PBB was left as the only component of 
Sarawak Alliance in 197. '^' However, with the joining of the SNAP in 1976, the 
National Front controlled all the forty-eight seats in the state Assembly and all the 
80. Ibid 
81. The Governor of Sarawak was adviced by the federal government to sack the chief minister, 
Ningkan, but he was reinstated by a court order. To overcome the court's decision, state of 
emergency was imposed in Sarawak in 1966 and the chief minister was removed via Emergency 
Act, 1966. See, R.S. Milne & K.J. Ratlam, New Stales, op.cil., p. 56. 
82. Ibid. pp. 167-69. 
83. Ibid pp. 195-96. 
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twenty-four seats in the Parliament/'' the feat which was repeated in 1978 
parliamentary elections and 1979 elections tor state assembly. 
Thus, the process of democratization and integration of Borneo territories 
advanced gradually during 1960's and 70's and the process of Malaysianization i.e. a 
sense of common Malaysian national community was even steadier. As the Borneo 
states had a different ethnic mix than Malaya and were a far distant in space from 
Malaya, etiino-nationalism remained strong in these states. Although, the same pattern 
of political alignments among different ethnic parties followed in these states as in 
Malaya, yet the process of political development in these states remained insulated 
from the direct political activity of the mainstream peninsular national political parties 
for a long time. The indigenous political process, rather, helped in the better 
integration of these territories with the peninsula. At the same time, the role and 
impact of federal government and bureaucracy steadily increased and the Malay 
patterns of political culture became more pronounced in these states. Since, all the 
important taxes were controlled by the central government and heavy expenditure was 
borne by it for various developmental projects and activities, the Borneo states 
became dependent upon the centre for funding of loans and projects. The erosion of 
autonomy of state sphere was imminent, but the development process also encouraged 
political integration and centralization. The whole process was aided by two distinct 
but interrelated factors. One, the Peninsular ruling alliance did not directly participate 
in state politics but embraced the local parties in its fold that gave a lot of leverage to 
the federal government to indulge in politics of maneuvering and manipulation yet, 
not causing deep alienation, among the people. Second, the rapid Islamisation drive in 
84. Ibid. 
85. Ismail Kassim, Race, Politics and Moderation: A study of the Malaysian Electoral Process, 
Times Books International, Singapore, 1979, pp. 89-90; Kiran K. Datar, Quest for a Politics of 
Consensus, Vikas Publishing, New Delhi, 1983, p. 197. 
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the two states, though, not forced but aided by the centre, brought better integration 
and helped centre's steady intrusion into the politics of these states. The patronage has 
been extended by the centre to the parties and leaders convenient and loyal to the 
federation, and within states, patronage has been given to the party and business 
loyalists in the form of timber contracts, concessions and licencing etc.**^  
Consolidation of the BN and Mahathir's rise 
Two important political developments could be marked out in the intervening 
period between the 1974 and 1978 General Elections. First, there was a split between 
the Barisan and the PAS. The alliance between the UMNO and the PAS was uneasy 
from the beginning as both the parties had the same support base. The strife came to a 
head in September 1977 when PAS members in the Kelantan Assembly voted no-
confidence motion against their own chief minister Datuk Nasir Asri fearing that he 
was being maneuvered by the UMNO. The UMNO sided vv-ith Nasir and instead 
clamped Emergency in the state. The PAS withdrew from the BN and Assembly was 
dissolved.**^ In the Kelantan Assembly elections held in March 1978, the BN was able 
to decimate the PAS in its stronghold. 
The second development was with regard to the elevation of Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad to the Post of Deputy Prime Minister in 1976 by the new Prime Minister, 
Datuk Hussein Onn. His elevation did not go well with non-Malays, especially, for his 
outspoken comments on the maintenance of a pre-eminent position for the Malays in 
the Malaysian development scheme. The associated development was the power 
86. See, Francis Loh K. Wah ed. Sabah and Sarawak: The Politics of Development and Federalism, 
Penang, Malaysia, 1997. 
87. K.K. Datar, Malaysia, op.cit.. p. 192. 
88. Mahathir had been expelled from the UMNO after 1969 riots for his criticism of Tunku Abdul 
Rahman's laggard policies in favour of Malays. He had been re-admitted in 1972 by Razak and 
made Education Minister in his cabinet. Mahathir had written a book The Malay Dilemma in 
1970 stressing that the cause of 1969-riots was the deprivation of the Malays and advocated 
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struggle within the UMNO represented by the old guard (Datuk Harun bin Idris, Tun 
Mustapha and Syed Jaafar Albar, they being supported by former prime minister 
Tunku Rahman) and the new guard (Mahathir Mohamad, Musa Hitam and Tengku 
Razaleigh, being supported by incumbent Prime Minister, Datuk Onn).^^ The result 
was obvious. The young guard was able to consolidate its hold over the party at the 
UMNO General Assembly Elections in 1978. They were greatly assisted by the 
victory in the General Elections earlier that year, which had consolidated Onn's 
position in the party. 
The main issues in the 1978 General Elections were stability, the implementation of 
Malay as the official language, negligence of Chinese and Tamil languages by the 
government and the issue of Merdeka University, which was boiling for a long time. 
A Chinese medium university was being demanded by the Chinese community (the 
DAP pursued it vigorously), which had consistently been denied by the government 
on the ground that it was against the objective of National Education Policy.^" The 
results were quite reassuring to the government. The BN repeated its performance,^' 
which was impressive against the backdrop of its split with the PAS. No opposition 
party other than the DAP and the PAS got any seat. The most remarkable feature of 
the BN victory was that it won all the parliamentary seats as well as state assem.bly 
strong pro-active schemes of welfare as well as reservation policies and entrenched provisions in 
favour of Malays. The bool< was banned in Malaysia. After his return, his rise was blitzkrieg. In 
1975, he was elected vice-president of UMNO defeating a strong man, Harun Idris. He was 
elected Deputy President in 1977 and returned unopposed in 1978. See, R.S. Milne and D.K. 
Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, RoutJedge, London, 1999, ch. 1. 
89. Hans H. Indorf, "Malaysia in 1978: Communal Coalitions continue, " /Isian Survey, 1979, Vol. 
XIX, No. 2, pp. 115-8. 
90. The Universities and University Colleges Act 1971, forbids the establishment of institutions of 
higher learning against the provisions of the Act (Those must conform to the National Education 
Policy of implementing Bahasa Malaysia as the medium of instruction). K.K. Datar, Race, 
op.cit., p. 205. 
91. Nine members of the SNAP had crossed over to the BN in 1976 taking its tally to 144 but after 
departure of thirteen members of the PAS in December 1977, the BN tally was reduced to 131. 
92. Ismail Kassim, Race, op.cit. 
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seats in the three states of PerHs, Terengganu and Pahang.^'' The DAP and the PAS 
put up resistance in some of the states, but all the state assemblies were comfortably 
retained by the BN. None of the other opposition parties (except two Independents) 
could score for state assemblies, although, there were sixteen opposition parties in the 
fray as compared to the ten parties of the BN. 
The 1982 General Elections were preceded by the ascendancy of Mahathir 
Mohamad to the prime ministership.^^ Dr. Mahathir, unlike his predecessors, was not 
an aristocrat by background. He was a medical professional, a commoner, who was 
widely seen as representing a progressive face of modern Malays viz., a new 
generation of middle class. He favoured a modernization drive based on 
industrialization, education and efficiency but, still, advocated the special interests of 
the Malays as a community. Another "radical" and trusted man of Mahathir, Musa 
Hitam beat Tengku Razaleigh in a hard fought contest for the post of Deputy 
President of the UMNO, and was appointed Deputy Prime Minister. 
The ruling alliance was again going into the elections from the position of 
strength to further consolidate the new leadership. The issues were not far different 
from that of the previous elections. The PAS again raised the bogey of Islam asking 
for alterations in the Federal Constitution to bring it in tune with Syariah for the 
establishment of a truly Islamic State. The UMNO took away the rhetoric from the 
PAS. Just before the elections, Mahathir announced that an International Islamic 
University exempt from the Universities Act and National Education Policy would be 
set up. He also proposed the setting up of an Islamic Bank. The UMNO got the 
93. Ibid. 
94. Hans H. Indorf, "Malaysia in 1978, op.cil. pp. 117-18. 
95. An overview of the political conditions under which Mahathir role to power is given in R.S. 
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major shot in the arm with the resignation of Anwar Ibrahim as President of Islamic 
Youth Movement (ABIM), joining the UMNO just before the elections.^'' Mahathir 
emphasized the imperative of strong government in a developing country to achieve 
rapid and unhindered economic development. The Front's main theme was stability, 
harmony and economic development. The opposition, by contrast, was disorganized 
and lacked credible alternative programmes. 
The Front repeated its performance. Its gain in Peninsular Malaysia was most 
impressive till date. It captured 103 seats out of 114, thus, decimating opposition 
almost completely, there. The interesting feature, once again, was that none of the 
opposition parties other than the DAP and the PAS got any seats, except a few seats 
going to Independents in Sabah and Sarawak. In the state assembly elections, the 
BN repeated its performance, sweeping all the states. Again, except one Independent 
in Selangor, no other opposition party got any seat other than the PAS and the 
Q^p 100 jj^jg trend shows that there is two or three cornered acute polarization among 
voters in peninsular Malaysia. 
Coping with the Recession 
The decade of 1970"s was marked by consensual politics and accommodation 
of diverse ethnic groups and interests followed by steep democratic deficit, Malay 
unity, better integration of Borneo people with the peninsular mainstream, weak 
opposition, success of the New Economic Policy, expanding public sector, rising 
employment opportunities, peace at home and also with neighbours and moderate 
97. The ABIM was a prominent dakwah missionary group in Malaysia led by Anwar Ibrahim. It had 
close links with the PAS providing cadre to the PAS. Mr. Ibrahim had great following in the 
PAS and was widely believed to join the PAS. However, he joined the UMNO citing the reasons 
that PAS was a divided house, while he could be more effective in a government party, given the 
UMNO's commitment to Islam, too. Ibid. pp. 20-21. 
98. Ibid. 5. 
99. Ibid 
100. Ibid 
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leadership. All these factors ensured, on the whole, political stability tremendous 
economic growth and meteoric rise of the Malays almost in every walk of life. These 
trends continued into the next decade. However, the momentum suffered a jolt in the 
mid-80s, as economy experienced a crisis and first-time negative growth in 1985. 
Despite high rates of growth, the economy got in bad shape on account of fiscal 
indiscipline arising out of heavy spending by the state, burgeoning losses incurred by 
the public enterprises and the recessionary effect of slide in prices of major export 
commodities (petroleum, tin, rubber and palm oil). 
The public sector had by now acquired the dominant role in the economy. 
Public sector enterprises had shot up from 109 in 1970 to 656 in 1980 and, further, to 
1014 by 1985. The financial allocafion for these enterprises was growing even faster 
putfing a heavy burden on the exchequer. While a third of the federal budget 
development expenditure (RM 1.4. billion) was allocated to these enterprises in 1966-
70, in the 1976-80 period, these appropriated RM 12 billion, 48 percent of the 
development budget, which more than doubled (RM 27.7 billion) during Fourth 
Malaysian Plan (1981-85), 56 percent of the total development allocation."" In 
contrast, federal revenue growth had come down to 1.1 percent per annum over the 
1980-83 period compared to the 19.2 percent during the previous decade. "^ ^ Thus, in 
the face of insufficient revenues and narrowing domestic savings and investments, 
government expenditure was sustained through extensive foreign borrowings to the 
tune of RM 8.3 billion during two years of 1981 and 1982.'"^ Consequently, the 
101. Ruyayadh Mohamad, "Public Sector Enterprises," in K.S. J omo, ed. Privatizing Malaysia, 
Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, p. 66. 
102. Suresh Narayan, "Fiscal Reforms in Malaysia; Behind a successful Experience," Asian Survey, 
September 1996, Vol. XXXVI, No. 9, p. 873. 
103. It later put a severe restraint on economy of Malaysia on account of debt servicing ratio as total 
external debt of Malaysia rose to 75 percent of its GNP in 1986 which could be contained partly 
due to the pre-payment of RM 13.6 billion debt by both government and private sectors during 
1987-89, bringing it down to 43 percent by 1989. Ibid. pp. 872-73; 876. 
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federal budget deficit increased threefold, from RM 3.7 billion in 1979 to RM 11.2 
billion by 1982, amounting to 18.7 percent of GNP.'"" 
The development expenditure was allowed to burgeon and deficit assumed 
alarming proportions in the face of electoral calculations for impending general 
elections.'°^ However, once the elections were over, corrective measures were needed 
to restore the fiscal discipline. The expenditure allocation was immediately cut after 
the elections. The government gradually started withdrawing subsidy schemes in the 
agriculture sector. Dr. Mahathir in his address to a seminar said it bluntly, 
"Malaysians must realize there is no such thing as a free lunch - it is merely a matter 
of whether you pay now or later."'°^ The government embarked on a privatization 
drive cautiously, in the beginning to sell selected loss-bearing public utilities to the 
private sector. However, all these austerity measures did not go far. The reduced 
development spending by the government, increasing losses of the public sector 
enterprises, mismanagement of government agencies, growing corruption, restraints 
imposed by the ICA, slide in prices of certain export commodities and heavy drain on 
exchequer due to OBA's expenditure led to a grave plunge in the GDP from 7.8 
percent in 1984 to a negative one percent, the next year and, still, slugging at 1.2 
percent in 1986. 
The severity of the recession required rigorous business-like approach and 
further restrictions on government expenditure, direct and visible encouragement to 
private investments as well as domestic savings and reversal or, at least, suspension of 
104. Ibid.p.S73. 
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some popular measures, Including some NEP-related measures. This task was 
attempted by a new Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin, a self-made businessman, 
having no grass-root support base, unlike his predecessor, Razaleigh, therefore, lesser 
stakes in popular support. The first thing Zainuddin did in 1985 budget to encourage 
investments was to reduce the rates of personal income tax. The foreign equity 
holdings of upto 100 percent were allowed in export-oriented projects meeting certain 
conditions. For domestic market-oriented firms, foreign equity of upto 51 percent was 
allowed for "priority" projects. The exemption limit under the ICA was raised.'°'* The 
development expenditure was slashed by twenty five percent and military expenditure 
by thirty seven percent."*^ New incentives were introduced under the Promotion of 
Investment Act (PIA), 1986 that replaced the Investment Incenfives Act (11 A) of a 
decade earlier. 
A major policy shift was high scale privatization of state owned enterprises. 
The Economic Planning Unit (EPU) issued guidelines on privatization. The EPU 
justified the drive on account of heavy losses incurred by the government due to the 
mismanagement of public undertakings. It also involved retreat of the state from 
some of its NEP-related ventures. However, Malay interests were protected by 
reserving a portion of public shares for bumiputeras. The privatization gave a major 
boost to the Malaysian stock market as well as FDI inflows."'' Another logical and 
108. It was raised to one million from the previous RM 0.25 million at the end of 1985, which was 
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positive aspect was that a number of government-owned companies were either 
restructured or privatized reducing the drain on public exchequer."'* 
By the end of the decade coinciding with the successful completion of the 
NEP, the economy was flourishing. From the negative growth in 1985, the real GPD 
growth rate had touched 8.7 percent in 1988, peaking to 9.8 percent in 1990."^ The 
unemployment rate after peaking at 9.5 percent started declining consistently and it 
came down to just six percent in 1990."^ Such high growth was boosted by heavy 
foreign borrowing in earlier years and huge FDl inflows in later years. Also attended 
by bold government initiatives at domestic front, the economy had fully recovered. 
An IMF survey gave high grades to Malaysia for its economic policies and 
performance by commenting that "the Malaysia economy has undergone a sharp 
turnaround... Malaysia's excellent economic performance during recent years is 
testimony to the soundness of the policies it has pursued."' '^  
Erosion oiSultans'' Prerogatives 
The sultans (hereditary rulers), traditionally, had exercised great prestige in 
the Malay society. Even under the British rule, they retained a semblance of formal 
sovereignty vis-a-vis masses as the British rule was, more or less, indirect. Thus, for 
the masses they continued to epitomize the Malay community or nation. The 'Malaya 
Union' was given up in favour of 'Malaya Federation' by the British as a result of the 
active opposition by the sultans represented by aristocrats'-dominated UMNO. The 
UMNO, overtime, became the mass-based organization and the de facto 
representative and protector of the Malays. Nevertheless, the UMNO elite had to 
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contend with an institutional framework in which the position and the privileges of 
the sultans were well accommodated. This included the provisions of elective 
monarchy and some definitive powers to the Conference of Rulers over the 
constitutional amendment process and religious matters, and their entitlement to legal 
immunities."^ 
The UMNO and the sultans maintained harmonious relationship for a long 
time since both depended upon each other for furthering their respective interests. The 
UMNO, in the beginning needed to consolidate its Malay support base. It was greatly 
dependent for its support base on rural hinterland where the bulk of the Malays were 
concentrated. It was in villages that the sultans exercised real influence based on 
patron-client relationship. The composition of the UMNO elites in the beginning was 
constituted of aristocratic elements with direct participation of the kith and kin of the 
sultans. At the same time, the sultans were also dependent upon the UMNO as it's 
alternatives, including the PAS, were not in a position to safeguard their position and 
interests. 
The consolidation of the UMNO over the political system gradually took 
place as a consequence of mass participation and modernization drive, and it was 
further helped by the centralization of power and direct corporate involvement of the 
UMNO resulting in direct availability of election funds. '^  Its dependence upon the r 
hereditary ulers for patronage began to decline. 
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At a time when the Malay middle class was beginning to express unhappiness with 
the traditional patron, a new patron was beginning to distribute benefits to the 
Malays. This was the state ... under the NEP, the government expanded existing or 
established new state .sponsored corporations like MARA (Council of Trust for the 
Indigenous People), PERN AS (State Trading Corporation) and PETRONAS 
(National Petroleum) that generally employed Malays and rendered services mainly 
to Malay enterprises. The beneficiaries of state assistance were naturally inclined to 
be grateful to these new patrons rather than to the sultans. '^" 
Mahathir Mohamad, being a commoner, unlike his predecessors, had no love 
for the special position enjoyed by the hereditary rulers. As far back as in 1969, he 
had inteipreted Malay backwardness as a direct result of centuries of genetic 
inbreeding and the feudal values of the Malays, which resisted radical transformation 
of the society. He had asked for old ways and values to be replaced by new, in order 
to progress rapidly.'^' Immediately after consolidating his position, he embarked upon 
the modernization drive.'^^ It also involved checking the feudal strongholds. In order 
to curtail the powers of the sultans, two constitutional amendment bills were 
introduced in the Parliament. The first amendment was meant to remove the 
discretionary power of the hereditary rulers to veto legislation, both at the federal and 
state levels. The second amendment sought the transfer of the power to declare the 
State of Emergency from the King to the Prime Minister. A crisis erupted when the 
Agong refused to assent to the amendments. The constitutional validity of even the 
proposed amendments was open to question, since the 1971 Constitution Amendment 
Act had prohibited discussion over the powers and prerogatives of the hereditary 
rulers without their consent as seditious and unconstitutional. After much 
maneuvering from both sides, however, a compromise was reached and the 
Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1984 was finally given assent to by the Agong that 
120. Hari Singh, "UMNO Leaders and Malay Rulers: The Erosion of a Special Relationship," Pacific 
Affairs, Summer 1995, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 195-6. 
121. Mahathir Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma, Asia Pacific Press, Singapore, 1970, ch.7. 
122. See, K.J. Khoo, "The Grand Vision: Mahathir and Modernization," in J.S. Kahn and Francis Loh 
Wah, eds. Fragmented, op.cit., pp. 44-76. 
allowed the Agong to return the Bill within thirty days with comments, but it took 
away the power of veto over legislation. It kept the state rulers' powers intact and also 
retained the king's prerogative to declare the State of Emergency.'^ "^ 
In 1987, the Johore sultan, then the reigning Agong, had beaten to death a golf 
caddy.'^'' The demand to review the legal immunity of the hereditary rulers was raised 
from many comers, but it was rejected by Mahathir as he was facing the challenge to 
his leadership within the UMNO from Tengku Razaleigh, who was an aristocrat 
having considerable support among the sultans. After having firmly established his 
control over the UMNO following victory at the 1990 General Elections, he availed of 
the opportunity to circumvent the immunities of the sultans when at the end of 1992, a 
sports coach was beaten up by Johore sultan for criticizing his meddling in the 
management of a local team. A motion of censure was passed by the Parliament in 
December 1992 against the Johore Sultan. The next month, the Constitution 
(Amendment) Act 1993, was passed by the Parliament, stripping the sultans of their 
legal immunity from prosecution. When the Conference of Rulers refused to 
endorse the amendment, the government orchestrated an organized campaign of 
public awareness against them disclosing unfair activities and incomes, spendthrift 
lifestyles oisultans, making the plea to stem the rot in the system. '^'' 
The Conference of Rulers was forced to agree to the abolition of sultans' legal 
immunity, but not to be tried in ordinary courts. Its legality was once again open to 
question in the light of Articles 38(4) and 159(5) of the constitution, which clearly 
stipulate that any amendment to the position of the sultans must have the prior 
12J. Han Singh, "UMNO, op.cit., pp. 198-99. Also see, B.T. Koo, Paradoxes of Mahathirisni: An 
Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad, Oxford University Press Singapore 1995 nn 
202-9. t, K ' , vv-
124. Ibid 
125. Ibid 
126. lbid.'i>p.2Q\-02. 
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approval of the Conference of Rulers. However, the Supreme Court could not 
determine the constitutionality of the Constitution Amendment Act 1993, as the 
constitutional amendment earlier in 1988 had curtailed its power of judicial review.'^^ 
It is quite apparent when seen in the light of other developments that Mahathir regime 
did not curtail the privileges of the rulers out of its love for democracy but as part of 
the larger design to increase the influence of the cabinet over other independent bases 
r 128 
01 power. 
Parting of the 'Malay Way' 
Malay political culture is traditionally characterized by consensus, 
compromise, reconciliation and accommodation. The defeated are generally spared 
the extreme humiliation and as a token of gesture are retained in some capacity in 
decision-making process depending upon the worth and support base of the 
individuals concerned, thus, paving the way for Malay unity and stability. This 
cultural trait is referred to as the 'Malay Way.' It seemed to be breaking down partly 
as a result of expediency and partly because of arbitrary leadership style of Mahathir. 
The Malay consensus within the UMNO was broken when Tengku 
Razaleigh'^^ challenged Mahathir for the UMNO presidency while Musa Hitam 
defended his post of Deputy President against Ghafar Baba, the Deputy Prime 
Minister. Both Razaleigh and Musa had independent support base in the UMNO 
having their roots in Kelantan and Johore. Several ministers and deputy ministers led 
by Datuk Rais Yatim openly declared their support to Razaleigh and Musa, 
127. William Case, "Malaysia in 1993: Accelerating Trends and Mild Resistance," Asian Survey, 
February 1994, Vol. XXXlV,No. 2, p. 121. 
128. For a discussion on Mahathir's assertion of executive power in relation to other government 
institutions, see, R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Malaysian, op.cil., Ch. 2. 
129. Hari Singh, "UMNO.." Pacific Affairs, op.cit 
collectively dubbed as Team B.'^" The contests had taken place earlier, too, within 
the UMNO. However, the competition in earlier times, as in 1981, was more or less 
on individual lines. It, generally, used to be meant by the contestants to improve their 
positions on the UMNO succession ladder, not as an organized effort on collective 
basis to provide an alternative to the incumbent leadership. 
Partly, as a result of bogus-voting and vote-buying and, partly, as a result of 
shrewd political gamesmanship by Mahathir, the election results yielded a 43-vote 
victory to Mahathir (761 to 718) and a 40-vote victory to Ghafar Baba (739 to 699).'- '^ 
Razaleigh and Rais immediately resigned their cabinet posts. Two days later Mahathir 
fired three more ministers and four deputy ministers (all Team B), including the vice-
president. Datuk Abdullah Badawi (the Prime Minister, today). The purge was then 
steadily extended down the UMNO organizational ladder.'^^ 
The High Court in a Ruling in February 1988, by stretching the interpretation 
of the UMNO constitution, declared the 1.4 million member party as "unlawful" on 
the basis of participation by thirty unregistered branches in the General Assembly 
elections in breach of the Societies Act, 1964. The judgement proved to be the boon 
for Mahathir. Now, the UMNO was required to be freshly registered under the 
Societies Act. Thus, Mahathir's outfit, the UMNO Baru (New UMNO) was finally 
recognized and it inherited the control over the funds, property, offices and branches 
130. Hitam was a trusted man of Mahathir till 1985 and had been acting as deputy prime minister and 
home minister in his cabinet since 1981. Mahathir's govt, came to be known as 2-M 
Government during those years. However, he resigned deputy prime ministership in February 
1986, citing irreconcilable differences with Mahathir over certain policies and handling of some 
crises and also alleging Mahathir's autocratic style and desire for complete submission from the 
cabinet members. In fact, Musa Hitam had earlier twice defeated Razaleigh for deputy 
presidency in the UMNO organization, and now a common goal had brought them together. See, 
D.K. Mauzy, "Malaysia in \9S6" Asian Survey, 1987, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, pp. 233-34. 
131. D.K. Mauzy, "Malaysia in 1987: Decline of'The Malay Way,'" Asian Survey, 1988, Vol. 
XXVllI,No.2,pp.213-6. 
132. Ibid. 
133. K.S. Nathan, "Malaysia in 1988: The Politics of Survival" Asian Survey, February 1989, Vol. 
XXIX, NO. 2, p. 130. 
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of the old UMNO to the gross disadvantage of the Razaleigh group.'^'' Mahathir 
decided upon the applications seeking membership afresh. Massive propaganda by the 
government through controlled media, and the deliberate dropping of suffix Baru in 
the Media, helped to improve the image of party leadership. Through his 
reconciliation efforts, Mahathir was able to win back a number of Team B notables or 
sympathizers - the prominent among them were Musa Hitam and former prime 
minister Hussein Onn.'^ '^  
The UMNO General Assembly elections had far-reaching implications for the 
process of political development in Malaysia. First, it broke down the 'Malay way.' 
The treatment meted out to some dissidents was quite contrary to the political culture, 
which had been accommodationist so far. Second, though, the elections endangered 
unity within the UMNO, yet, further brought the UMNO to centre-stage of Malaysian 
politics. The future leadership succession battles were to be fought within the UMNO. 
The UMNO elections became equally important affair in Malaysian politics like the 
general elections. Third, it proved that the feudal imprint on the Malay mind had 
faded as a result of social mobility, urbanization, education and erosion of prestige 
and patronage of sultans. Fourth, the repressive and intimidatory tactics applied by the 
regime became the norm in the future against the political dissidents and opponents. 
Despite his progressive and visionary ideas, Mahathir increasingly proved to be 
autocratic while dealing with dissent and political opposition. Fifth, the money use 
during elections (for buying support) received tremendous boost. Excessive use of 
134. The Registrar of Societies received two applications, one from Team A and anotlier from Team 
B, which were turned down by him on technical grounds (allegedly on directions by Mahathir, 
as the Registrar of Societies is subordinate to the home ministry, which was under the charge of 
Mahathir at that time) that "they were submitted before the original UMNO had been officially 
lifted from the societies register." Mahathir's application finally succeeded as only the Registrar 
(hence Mahathir) exactly knew the date on which the old UMNO was deregistered./^«/- Eastern 
Economic Review, March 3, 1988, p. 14. 
135. K.S. Nathan, "Malaysia in 1988, op.cit.. pp. 213-14. 
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money became more prominent in the all the successive elections.. Sixth, the elections 
and the resultant purges and the division of party, finally, paved the way, for a broad 
multiracial opposition coalition to emerge, suggesting the direction of possibilities of 
alternative to the ruling Front in future. And last, but not the least, the system suffered 
political decay, especially, on account of subversion of internal democracy within the 
UMNO. 
The purges were not just limited to the UMNO dissidents but were extended 
to the rival political groups in the form of arrests under ISA as well as suspension and 
termination of not so government friendly judges. A series of court decisions in 
1987 that had gone against the government led to accusations by it that judiciary was 
interfering with the executive prerogatives. '' As the Malaysian courts had been 
traditionally, conservative, the government was disturbed at the increasingly assertive 
tone of the judiciary. In May 1988, the Lord President (chief justice) of the Supreme 
Court, Salleh Abbas was suspended when the court was set to hear the appeal against 
the interest of the UMNO Baru.'^^ He was dismissed subsequently. Meanwhile, the 
government was confronted by one more attempt by judiciary to assert its 
independence in line with the principle of separation of powers and subdued it.''''^  
These suspensions and the controversy surrounding the composition and functioning 
of the tribunals greatly undermined the prestige of judiciary and ultimately fulfilled 
136. The operation lalang has been thoroughly discussed in the next chapter. 
137. See, D.K. Mauzy, "Malaysia..."/I.5., 1988, op.cit., pp. 216-17. 
138. A five member tribunal under the chairmanship of Abdul Hamid Omar found Salleh guilty of 
charges of misconduct and biasedness against the government. Later, Omar was elevated to Lord 
Presidentship. K.S. Nathan, Malaysia in 1988, op.cit.,p. 134. 
139. In July, a five-member bench was hurriedly convened to grant an injunction restraining Omar 
tribunal from submitting its report to the Agong. These judges were also suspended for their 
defiance and alleged gross misbehaviour. Two of them were finally dismissed after a second 
tribunal found them guilty and recommended their dismissal. Ibid. 
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the Executive's design to control the independent organs involved in the 
governmental process.''*" 
The Precarious Opposition Unity 
Razaleigh and his supporters in 1989 formed a new party called 
Semangat'46.''" It quickly developed an alliance with the PAS and two other smaller 
Malay parties, Berjasa and Hamin that was named Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah 
(APU-Muslim Unity Movement) in the light of approaching general elections.''*^ 
Semangat'46 proceeded further to develop a viable opposition by joining hands with 
the DAP, the alliance between the APU and the DAP was called Gangasan Rakyat 
(People's Concept).''*'' The alliance was highly beneficial to both as merely the DAP's 
and PAS' vote percentage added upto thirty six in the previous elections.'"*" The 
opposition moves were also guided by the understanding that given the complex 
ethnic configuration of Malaysia, and the composition of the BN, opposition could not 
seek political power at the Centre with the backing of just one ethnic group. 
However, the hindrance in opposition unity was that the PAS & the DAP were 
ideologically at the opposite ends of political spectrum.''*^ The former has been 
committed to the creation of Islamic state based on Malay identity, while the latter has 
140. On Mahathir government's assertion of executive power vis-a-vis other organs of government, 
see R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Malaysian, op.cil., ch. 2. 
141. The 'Spirit of 1946,' the year of foundation of the original UMNO. Thus, they shrewdly tried to 
stick to the legacy of the UMNO. 
142. Both these parties were breakaway groups from the original PAS. 
143. With the formation of the APU, Malay vote had considerably, split. Although, the PAS had won 
only one of the ninety eight parliamentary seats and just fifteen of the 265 assembly seats it had 
contested in 1986 elections, still it got 15.26 percent of the total votes cast in that election. It 
means that PAS had won around 25 percent of the Malay votes as it was exclusively Malay-
based party. If the Semangat could add up to 25 percent more, it could lead to the even split of 
the Malay vote. It increased the importance of Chinese vote more than ever. That's why both the 
groups made special gestures towards the Chinese. 
144. Hari Singh, "Political Change in Malaysia: The Role of Semangat 46," Asian Survey, August 
1991, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 712-28 (722-4). 
145. /hid. 
146. Hari Singh, "Political, op.cit., 
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always espoused the cause of 'Malaysian Malaysia' thus, logically committed to a 
secular political framework. At the same time, it articulates and tries to protect the 
exclusive Chinese interests. In the light of programmatic and ideological gap, the 
UMNO and the MCA played on the Malay and the Chinese fears, respectively. The 
Gangasan issued separate manifestoes, although, the PAS and the DAP had retracted 
from their extreme ideological stands in the parallel manifestoes.''*'' Still, it was a 
difficult task to sell the pact to the hardcore supporters on both sides. 
The election results gave a jolt to the ruling front, as was expected, but not 
severe enough to deny it two-third majority of seats in the Dewan Rakyat. It barely 
managed absolute majority of votes. The BN won 127 out of 180 seats with UMNO's 
tally reduced from 83 (out of 84 contested) in 1986 to 71 (out of 86 contested) in 1990 
elections.'''^ All the other BN partners, more or less repeated their past performance. 
The opposition won 53 seats against the 29 it won in the previous elections, with the 
DAP and Sabah-based, PBS doing exceedingly well. The agenda of Semangat was 
laudable that promised independence of the judiciary, the repeal of draconian 
repressive laws, the elimination of business investments by political parties and the 
restoration of workers' rights.'''^ However, it won only eight seats out of fifty-nine it 
had contested. Being the linchpin of opposition alliance, such dismal performance 
invalidated its claims for the Malay leadership as well as the leadership of the 
opposition in future. ^ 
147. Ibid. 
148. Kim H. Khong, Malaysia's General Election 1990: Continuity Change and Ethnic Politics 
ISEAS, Singapore, 1991, ch. 1. 
149. Jhidp.n. 
150. Large-scale defections took place from Semangat to the UMNO after the elections. Having 
suffered another rot in the next General Elections, it was dissolved in 1996 with its prominent 
members, including Razaleigh rejoining the UMNO. See, James Chin, "Malaysia in 1996: 
Mahathir-Anwar Bouts, UMNO Election, and Sarawak Surprise," Asian Survey, 1997 Vol 37 
No. 2, pp. 181-7(183-4). 
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It is quite clear that the UMNO fully succeeded to count upon the close 
identity it had forged with the Malay voters over the years through the New Economic 
Policy which had created a huge class of Malay beneficiaries, who had come to view 
the UMNO as the most appropriate and effective vehicle for promotion of Malay 
interests. However, the BN failed to win even a single parliamentary or assembly seat 
in the Razaleigh's stronghold, Kelantan. In rest of the northern states, its tally was 
quite impressive.'^' 
Problems of Internal Party Democracy 
Political leadership in Malaysia is provided by UMNO. In this sense, the 1990 
General Election, though, it was the contest between two broad multi-racial coalitions 
could still, be seen as the logical extension of the unfinished power struggle between 
Mahathir and Razaleigh.'^^ At the triennial party elections of the UMNO in 1993, 
Anwar Ibrahim was elected Deputy President (normally, a stepping stone to the 
leadership of the party). He defeated a veteran incumbent Ghafar Baba by a huge 
margin. Largely considered as Mahathir's protege till then, Anwar organized a team 
of his supporters, dubbed as 'Vision team' or 'Wawasan Team.' This team swept all 
the three direct vice-presidential slots defeating the incumbent "old guard," including 
Abdullah Badawi.'^'' 'Money politics' and a frenzy of 'vote-buying' was alleged by 
the "old-guard.'^'' Although 'Vision Team' pledged loyalty to Mahathir and his 
policies, its blitzkrieg potenfially threatened the position of the President who had no 
151. Kim H. Khpng, Malaysia, op.cit. 
152. Hari Singh, "Political, op.cit., pp. 712-28 
153. William Case, "UIVINO Party Election in Malaysia: One for the Money," Asian Survey, 1994, 
Vol. 34, No. 10, pp. 916-930 (924-5). 
154. Michael Vatikiotis, "UMNO's Dark Horse," FEER, January 14, 1993, p. 23. 
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willingness to retire from politic soon. Mahathir publicly expressed his displeasure 
over the team approaches in the elections as well as the practice of vote-buying.'" 
The huge victory at 1995 General Election helped Mahathir play some 
balancing act and increase his hold over party organization.'"'*' Mahathir further 
tightened the nose around Anwar by pre-emptying his position as President of UMNO 
from challenge by getting a resolution passed by the party to insulate both presidency 
and deputy presidency from contest. The Malay tradition {muafaqat) was invoked for 
the top leadership.'" '^' The supreme council of the party also banned campaigning by, 
or for, any candidate to insulate party from money politics. ~ While the measure had 
some positive implications in checking the misuse of money in party elections, it also 
favoured the incumbent candidates. Tacitly, the move was aimed to downplay 
Anwar's influence.'^^ Whatever be the motives, the democratic procedures appeared 
sharply diminished as a result.'^° The final results of the elections were interpreted as 
restoring Mahathir's paramounting over his deputy. The key posts were filled by 
Mahathir's men.'^' 
155. William case, "UMNO, op.cit., p. 925. 
156. Mahathir omitted many of Anwar's men from contesting the elections, and post- election, placed 
his own men in key positions and Anwar's men in positions of less significance. See, William 
case, "The 1996 UMNO Party Election: "Two for the Show,"" Pacific AJJairs, Fall 1997, Vol. 7, 
No. 3, pp. 393-411 (398-99); "Cleaning the Cabinet," Asia Week, 19 May 1995, p. 33, Hari 
Singh, "Democratization," or Oligarclic Restructuring? The Politics of Reform in Malaysia," 
Government and Opposition, 2000, Vol. 35, No. 4, -pp. 539-40. 
157. William case, "The 1996, op.cit,. pp. 399-400. 
158. Ibid. pp. 400-\. 
159. After becoming Finance Minister, Anwar undertook networking on a grand scale, benefiting his 
supporters through privatized deals and closed tender contracts. He also got many of his key 
supporters in important positions in party organization. With the great possibility of Anwar 
succeeding Mahathir, big business elements were well supposed to help Anwar this supporters 
with the money to buy votes. See, E.T. Gomez, "Anwar's Friends: Factionalism and Money 
Politics in UMNO Baru," Aliran Monthly, 1993, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 35-39; M. Vatikiotis, 
"Power Machinations," FEER, August 13, 1992, p. 13. 
160. "Mahathir's Plea Swings Election from His Rival," AlVSJ, October 11-12, 1996, pp.l-2; W. 
case, "The 1996," op.cit. pp. 409-11 
161. Ibid. Najib Razak, the minister of education, and Muhammad Taib, the chief minister of 
Selangor (previously both members of Anwar's 'Wawasan Team' but now shifted their loyalty 
directly to Mahathir) retained their vice-presidential slots. While Muhyiddin, still identified 
closely with Anwar was defeated by Abdullah Budawi, the foreign minister who was now 
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Doubtless, the UMNO remains the most vital vibrant and democratic 
organization in Malaysia.' The free and open contestation within UMNO is very 
essential for furthering the process of democratization in Malaysia. In the absence of 
viable opposition, and insignificant assertion by coalition partners in the BN, the 
democratic procedures within party acquire special importance. The leadership 
challenges emerge at the party organization level rather than the legislative electoral 
level. "^ ^ Jesudason goes to the extent of saying that "the loss of coherence of the 
ruling coalition, particularly the UMNO" will provide an impetus for poUtical change, 
thus, democratization, rather than the emergence of strong opposition. The scuttling 
of internal party democracy hampers political development. 
Redefining Ethnic Identity 
The Chinese community became increasingly disposed towards the BN in 
1990s, particularly in the Malay-majority or mixed constituencies."'^ A number of 
factors facilitated this trend. The most important was voters' disillusionment with the 
opposition. The bonhomie between the PAS and the DAP ended after the failure in 
1990 elections. The ideological divisions between the two aggravated due to PAS 
government's move in kelantan to implement the hudud (Islamic criminal code) on all 
residents in the state.'^^ The DAP withdrew formally from the Gagasan Rakyat]\xsX a 
couple of months before the 1995 General Election. Another important factor was 
considered to be the President's man. He had earlier been vice-president for three consecutive 
terms between 1984-1993. 
162. G.P. Means, "Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore," Journal of Democracy, 1996, 
Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 104. 
163. W. case, "The 1996," op.cit. pp. 393-7 
164. J.V. Jesudason, "The Syncretic," op.cit. p. 155. 
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Parliamentary Elections," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2005, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 44-63 (51-2). 
166. James Chin, "The 1995 Malaysian General Election: Mahathir's Last Triumph," Asian Survey, 
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Manifesto, Progress with Islam, in the ensuing elections. Though its islamic stance has ensured 
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the liberalizing trends in business and education, which reduced the misgivings of llie 
minorities about the government. With increasing privatization, consistent growth and 
slackening NEP goals, the sense of relative deprivation declined among the non-
Malays. The increased emphasis upon English language and funding for Chinese and 
Indian schools also removed fears about the cultural policy of the government among 
non-Malays.'^^ 
The ethnic identity needed a redefinition in the wake of social mobility, 
relative homogenization of living standards, growing middle class, lessening rural-
urban divide, erosion of feudal tendencies and secularization of political culture. 
"Political expediency, underlined by the BN's growing dependence upon Chinese 
votes facilitated this redcfuiition." The hegemonic-consociational variant model of 
democracy cultivated by the UMNO has worked to the huge advantage of the 
government. It has preserved communal peace and balance. The government, being an 
inter-communal coalition of several parties, continuously harps on the theme of 
stability and security. It continuously invokes the plea that the regime change would 
disturb inter-racial harmony and jeopardize the special privileges of the Malays as 
well as security of non-Malays. An observer sums up the political arithmetic of plural 
Malaysian society, "political contestation takes place within a societal context, and in 
this connection, the BN has skillfully exploited the politics of a 'plural society' in 
entrenching its hegemony over the political processes." 
a core of supporters among rural Malays particularly, and urban Malay.s with traditional outlook, 
it has very often sabotaged the chances of genuine opposition unity and consolidation in the 
recent past. It has also pushed many non-Malays towards the BN. See Hari Singh, "The 1995 
Malaysian General Election; Reaffirmation of Barisan Nasional Dominance," The Round Tabic, 
July 1997, 343, pp. 389-409 (403). 
168. James Chin, "The 1995, op.cit. 399-400, FEER, 1 December 1995, p. 32 
169. Hari Singh, "The 1995, op.cit. p. 404 
170. [bid. p. 396. 
The economic performance is another yarloslick that sustains the reyjme and 
provides the government with the leverage to manipulate the public mood in its 
favour. Despite high degree of corruption and nepotism, and colossal exposures of 
financial misappropriations and mismanagement, the economy sustained growth of 
about eight percent per annum, since the recovery in late 80s. The unemployment 
almost vanished during that period. 
The sustained economic growth, weak opposition and balancing of ethnic 
demands disposed the public opinion highly in favour of government in 1995 General 
Election. Its vote-share rose to sixty five percent fi^om the previous fifty three. The 
vote-share of the DAP maintained a downslide.''''' The PAS retained Kelantan, 
otherwise it did not show a good performance. 
Financial Crisis and Autonomy 
The Southeast Asia experienced a severe financial crisis during 1997-1998.'^^ 
It began with the baht devaluation in Thailand leading to a sudden flight of capital 
from the domestic markets and sharp decline of currencies across the region. ' A 
171. As a result of illegal transactions and mismanagement, state-owned enterprises, particularly 
financial institutions suffered losses in billions of dollars. The contracts and licences were 
awarded to companies in lieu of kickbacks, sometimes even without tenders, the most notorious 
example being the award of projects to an inexperienced company, the United Engineers 
Malaysia (UEM). The corruption worsened with the privatization drive as the special shares 
reserved for humiputeras before public listing were often appropriated by BN leaders and their 
cronies. See, Aliran Monthly, 1992, Vol. 12, No. 5, p. 3; Ibid., Vol. 14, No. 12, pp. 3-5, 38-39; 
Ibid., Vol 14,-^0. 5, p. 22; Ibid. 1995, Vol. 15, No. II, p. 36. 
172. Hari Singh, "The 1995, op.cit., p. 397. 
173. It captured 162 out of 192 seats for the Dewan Rakyat and made a clean sweep to the Parliament 
from seven states.James Chin, "The 1995, op.cit. pp, 405-7. 
174. The popular vote for the DAP was 21.1 percent in 1986, 16.5 percent in 1990 and 12.1 percent 
in \995. Ibid 
175. On general nature of Southeast Asian financial crisis, its causes and dimensions, see, W.T. Woo, 
J. Sachs and Schwab, eds. The Asian Financial Crisis: Lessons for a Resilient Asia, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 2000; K. Jomo, ed. Tigers in Trouble: Financial Governance, Liberalization and 
Crisis in East Asia, Zed Books, London, 1998; Manual Montes, The Currency Crisis in 
Southeast Asia, ISEAS, Singapore, 1997. 
176. The share prices at the stock exchanges fell rapidly that in turn further accelerated capital 
outflow. As a result, the debt situation became pathetic and prices of commodities rose 
considerably in most of these countries. 
large number of firms and in\cstors became bankrupt and defaulters. Malaysia was 
also hit hard. '" However, the enormity of the crisis in Malaysia was relatively less as 
compared to neighbouring Thailand and Indonesia because of low foreign debt, sound 
external reserves and alternative sources of funding available to the government. 
Therefore, the Malaysian government refused the IMF bailout package.'^** A home-
grown adjustment strategy was developed, which reflected domestic ideological 
priorities and economic arrangements while accommodating global market forces and 
constraints of capital mobility. 
Mahathir indicted the currency speculators whom he believed were moved by 
narrow economic gains and, often, manipulated by Western powers to their advantage 
1 O A 
damaging the interests of developing countries. He is always well-known for his 
deep resentment against the machinations, manipulations and double-standards of the 
western governments. However, this time, he was quite unequivocal. He suggested 
at the international fora that the trading in currencies should be banned except for 
trade purposes. This statement further eroded the confidence of foreign investors. ^ 
The initial policy responses by the government backfired triggering a massive sell-off 
177. On implications of tlie financial crisis upon Malaysian's economy and its response, see, Helen 
E.S. Nesadurai, "In defence of national economic autonomy? Malaysia's response to the 
financial crisis," The Pacific Review, 2000, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 73-113; Anita Doraisami, "The 
Political; Economy of Capital Flows and Capital Controls in Malaysia," Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 2005, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 249-63; K.S. Jomo, ed. Malaysian Eclipse: 
Economic Crisis and Recovery, Zed Books, London, 2001, D.M. Perkins and W.T. Woo, 
"Malaysia: Adjusting to Deep Integration with the World Economy," in W.T. Woo, J. Sachs and 
Schwab, ed. The Asian, op.cit. 
178. The IMF conditionalities could possibly have involved the removal of restrictions on foreign 
equity ownership and fiscal discipline, including the dilution of ethnic-based distribution policy. 
See M.Y. Chen, "Malaysia Wants to Avoid Asking IMF for Assistance," AWSJ, 3 December 
1997. 
179. Helen Nesadurai, "In defence, op.cit. pp. 74-8. 
180. /il-F^y, 2 September 1997. 
181. See, M. Vatikiotis, "The Mahathir Paradox," FEER , 20 August 1992, p. 17; B.T. Khoo, 
Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad, OUP, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1995, pp. 57-61. 
182. Raphael Pura, "Tough talk by Mahathir Rattles Overseas Investors," A WSJ, 2 September J 997. 
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at Kuala Lumpur Stock lAcliajigc (KLSli).''*'' A mild budget was unveiled in Oclober 
1997.' '* The downslidc of ringgit and KLSE continued. A policy package was 
announced by Anwar in December that took into account the domestic weaknesses of 
the economy and streamlined government spending. 
The National Economic Action Council (NEAC) was established in January 
1998 as a consultative body to the cabinet to formulate policy response to the 
economic crisis.'^^ The former finance minister, Daim Zainuddin was appointed its 
Chairman. The NEAC gradually became a contending centre of power in dealing with 
the crisis. Contrary to Anwar's strategy, it emphasized fiscal stimulus, low interest 
rates and bail-outs of important companies. The bailouts did help some companies but 
eroded the confidence of general public and investors in the fairness of government 
policy.'''' The corporate restructuring deals and selective bailouts need to be 
understood within the context of political economy of Malaysia. Most of the UMNO-
linked conglomerates flourished with the government backing. They constitute the 
core support base of funding of UMNO, The position of its president by virtue of 
183. As a first major policy response on September 3, 1997, the government announced funding of 
sixty billion ringgit by using Employee Provident Fund to buy shares from the Malaysian 
investors at a premium above the market price. It slightly discriminated the foreign investors. In 
addition a ban was imposed on short selling of hundred blue-chip stocks. However due to 
negative market response the curbs were lifted within two days. See, Helen Nesadurai, "In 
defence" op.cit. pp. 85-6. 
184. The interest rates were held to be steady and the broad thrust of the high growth strategy and 
government ftinding was left intact. See, Anita Doraisami, "The Political," op.cit., p. 257. 
185. Dubbed as brain-child of Anwar, it contained provisions for banking sector reforms, increased 
credit rates, postponement of some big public sector investment projects and cut in government 
expenditure by eighteen percent. See, Martin Feldstein, "Refocusing the IMF," Foreign Affairs, 
1998, Vol. 77^ No. 2, pp. 20-33. 
186. Eight Malaysia Plan 2001-2005, Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department, 
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 2001, p. 27. 
187. A bailout was facilitated for a bankrupt company Renong that was closely linked with the 
UMNO. A cash-rich listed company United Engineers Malaysia (UEM) bought 32.6 percent 
stakes in it at a share price double the market price. Another debt-ridden company, Konsortium 
Perkapalan Berhad (KPB), which was half-owned by Mahathir's eldest son, was acquired by oil-
rich Petronas. This deal was a conflict of interest as Petronas comes under Prime Minister's 
Department. See, Helen Nesadurai, "In defence," op.cit. pp. 90-1; Leslie Lopez, "Petronas 
Purchase Plan Fuels Questions," /iW^,/, 9 March 1998. 
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which he becomes prime minister, depends to a large extent upon his ability to 
dispense favours to his key supporters in business. 
Anwar was dismissed as finance minister in September 1998. His exit was 
preceded and followed by major policy reversals by Mahathir, which included 
lowering of interest rates, increasing liquidity and providing additional funds for 
1 SO 
investments. A sixty-six billion ringgit fund was envisaged for continuing various 
projects and to re-capitalize the banks and absorb their non-performing loans. The 
stocks reserved for Malays in the ailing corporations were allowed to be sold to non-
Malays and foreigners. In order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), the equity 
policy in manufacturing sector was liberalized.' ' 
The economy showed signs of recovering towards the end of 1998. The main 
impetus for growth came from external demand following the strong global demand 
for electronic goods and the depreciation of ringgit. The external reserves increased 
following the slackening of imports.' ^ Thus, the economy registered an average 
growth rate of 7.2 percent during 1999-2000 period following a negative growth of 
7.4 percent in 1998.' It was a tremendous recovery within a short span of time. It 
emerged out of homegrown strategy. Perhaps, it also provided the shield to the regime 
against the democratic pressures in the wake of economic crisis and public perception 
of government's excesses in Anwar's trial. Since the economic system in Malaysia is 
188. The cooperation of some segments of the business elite is crucial for the continuity of the semi-
authoritarian regime. When they suffer the crisis, they may recalculate their association with 
government and may throw their lot with the opposition. Haggard and R. Kaufman, The Political 
Economy of Democratic Transitions," in Lisa Anderson, ed. Transitions to Democracy, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, pp. 72-96 (77-8). 
189. Eighth Malaysia Plan, op. cit. p. 27. 
190. Helen Nesadurai, "In defence, op.cit. pp. 102. 
191. The ceiling of thirty percent was relaxed in selected sectors like telecommunications, shipping 
and insurance. Eighth Malaysia Plan, op.cit. p. 27. However, the cap on foreign equity in 
banking sector was maintained that was so important for financial autonomy of the system as 
well as to preserve the system of patronage. See, Helen Nesadurai, "In defence, op.cit. p. 10!. 
192. Eighth Malaysia Plan, op. cit. p. 24. 
193. Ibid. 
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deeply embedded in socio-ethnic reality both the recent economic crises reveal the 
close connection between the economy and politics. The policy responses can't be 
divorced from the contextual constraints. The bumiputera corporations and 
conglomerates built and sustained with patronage policies "are vital not only because 
they constitute valuable support bases for the country's leaders but they also represent 
the success of Malaysia's brand of ethnic-based social engineering."''^'^ They 
symbolize Malaysia's "economic nationalism." The reform packages are likely to be 
predicated on economic necessity as well as political expediency. 
Anwar's Trial and Reforniasi 
Although, the differences between Mahathir and Anwar were brewing for 
quite a long time,''''^ ' the association came to a breaking point at the party's General 
Assembly in June 1996. The party's Youth President, Zahid Hamidi, apparently with 
Anwar's backing echoed the call for end to corruption, cronyism and nepotism. 
Mahathir's supporters responded with a brochure entitled Fifty Reasons why Anwar 
Cannot Become Prime Minister.^^^ Mahathir issued a list of recipients of various 
government contracts and allocation of public-listed stock shares reserved for Malays. 
Apart from Mahathir's sons and close associates, it also included the name of 
194. Helen Nesadurai, "In defence, op.cit. p. 105. 
195. Anita Doraisami, "The Political, op.cll. p. 262. 
196. The power struggle was quite evident at the party's General Assembly elections in 1996. See, 
W. Case, "The 1996, op.cit. Though Anwar never openly challenged the leadership of Mahathir. 
He even moved a parliamentary motion of confidence in Mahathir to defuse the growing 
speculation of a possible changeover of leadership in the wake of economic crisis, in November 
1997. It is another matter that he didn't have a sufficient power base to mount the challenge. 
See, Daniel Lynn, ed. The Far, op.cit.,. p. 728. Anwar was ideologically more in consonance 
with universal human rights and open democracy than Mahathir's concept of 'Asian Values.' 
See, Anwar Ibrahim, Tlie Asian Renaissance, Times Book International, Singapore, 1996, pp. 
53-5. 
197. Suharto's fall in Indonesia the previous month due to the economic crisis might have 
emboldened Anwar and his supporters in Malaysia. At an international forum in April earlier 
that year Anwar had argued that financial crisis could have positive consequences in destroying 
crony capitalism in the region. See, S. Jayasankaran, "Credible Clean-up," FEER, 19 June 1997. 
198. He was accused of corruption and sexual offences in it. Hari Singh, "Democratization, op.cit. 
pp. 538-42. 
Anwar's assoiciates including his fatlier, brotlier and tlie Youth President as well. 
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In the following weeks Mahathir systematically dismantled Anwar's power-base. ' 
He was dismissed from all positions in September 1998.^ '^ Anwar's disapproval for 
'big projects' and 'bailouts' might have displeased many of entrenched interests 
linked with the UMNO. No doubt, he had political aspirations, but the leadership 
challenge in an organization with oligarchic and autocratic tendencies might well be 
supposed to be crushed in a high-handed manner. 
When Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah challenged Dr. Mahathir for UMNO's 
presidency in 1987, the party's oligarchic model had yet to be transformed into a 
wholly autocratic one. Power distribution was still pluralistic with the ruling cartel of 
elites. ...By the time Anwar had set his aspirations fort the highest political office. ... 
Power among the ruling elite was no longer pluralistic but had become concentrated 
in one man. The prime minister was no longer the first among equals': he was the 
first and brooked no equals. 
It was evident in the manner in which Mahathir treated Anwar. Anwar was 
soon arrested under the ISA. Then he was made to undergo the trial that was highly 
manipulated from the beginning. He was even beaten in police custody."' The 
Malaysian Bar adopted resolutions condemning preventive detention laws and 
199. Greg Felker, "Malaysia in 1998: A cornered Tiger Bares Its Claws," A.sian Survey, February 
1999, Vol. 39, No, 1, pp. 44-5. 
200. A.^ia Week, 31 July 1998, p. 26; The editors of two leading newspapers who were close to 
Anwar were forced to resign. See, Greg Felker, "Malaysia in 1998, op.cit. p. 45. 
201. It is open to speculation whether Anwar's exit was caused by his differences with Mahathir over 
the policy approach to the economic crisis or was it just an age clash between the two, or was 
there conspiracy angle to it.Hari Singh, "Democratization, op.cit. pp. 538-41 
202. Anwar was particularly critical of grandiose projects like Putrajaya City Centre and Petronas 
Twin Towers. He linked those to the cosmetic surgery which do not add to the real value. See, 
Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian op.cit., p. 89. 
203. Hari Singh, "Democratization, op.cit., p. 540. 
204 D. Lynn, The Far, op.ci!., p. 729. 
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demanded independent inquiry into allegations of police brutality. ""' The ISA 
detention orders were rescinded and Anwar and his associates were put under legal 
normal course. However, the trial exposed several anomalies about the police and 
legal system of Malaysia with the authorities changing the charges and line of 
prosecution many a times. °^^  Anwar was finally convicted of several charges of 
207 
corruption and sodomy and made to undergo fourteen years of imprisonment. 
Anwar's arrest and regime's excesses in course of his trial inflamed public 
unrest and protest and unleashed a nation-wide protest movement, which came to be 
known as reformasi, following Indonesian precedent, to topple the regime. The 
reformasi gauntlet was taken up by civil society, especially in urban areas. A number 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) converged on a platform demanding 
fuller civil and political rights and rescission of preventive detention laws. The 
prominent Islamic organizations like Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) 
and the Malaysian Reform Society joined hands with PAS, and formed Gerak 
(Malaysian People's Movement for Justice). Predominantly, non-Malay NGOs like 
Suaram (Malaysian People's Voice) joined hands with DAP in forming Gagasan 
(Coalition for People's Democracy). At a later stage, around forty NGOs associated 
with Gerak and Gagasan organized Permantau (Malaysia's Citizens' Election 
Watch).-°^ 
205. Due to mounting domestic and international pressure, the government was compelled to hold an 
inquiry. The Inquiry Commission's Report was made public. The Inspector General of Police 
was indicted in the report. He was prosecuted and sent for two months' imprisonment. Ibid. 
206. Ibid. pp. 729-30 
207. In corruption charges he was sentenced for six years in March 1999. Next year he was awarded 
additional sentence of nine years for soolomy charges. The sentence of such length is followed 
by disqualification of five years from political office under Malaysia law. See, Ibid; Patricia 
Martinez, "Malaysia in 2000: A Year of Contradictions," Asian Survey, Feb. 2001, Vol. 41, No. 
l,p. 195. 
208. William Case, "New Uncertainties for an Old Pseudo-Democracy: The Case of Malaysia," 
Comparative Politics, 2004, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 83-104. 
209. Ibid. pp. 88-9. 
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The most prominent organization was Adil (Justice) led by Anwar's wife Wan 
Azizah Wan Ismail, which provided coherence across ethnic lines to civil society in 
the movement. The significant aspect about the reformasi was that it enabled the 
NGOs to transcend the ethnic identities and boundaries, to such an extent, for the first 
time in Malaysia. The Anwar trial, of course, proved to be a catalyst for the 
autonomous assertion by civil society. Upon Adil's registration as the Parti Keadikm 
Nasional (National Justice Party) in April 1999, it became a linchpin between the 
PAS and the DAP and their alliance was concretized into the Barisan Alternatif (BA, 
or Alternative Front). 
The BA issued a common Manifesto, a big lead forward in opposition unity, 
considering deep-rooted ideological differences between the PAS and the DAP. It 
promised clean government, abolition of coercive legislation and term-limit for the 
prime minister.'^" Thus, a genuine multi-racial alternative equation emerged for the 
first time in Malaysia. Due to Anwar factor '^^  the PAS^'^ made heavy strides among 
the Malays. Its membership reportedly increased by 25 percent within one year.^ '"* 
On the face of it, the opposition failed to deny even the two-third majority to 
the governing coalition in 1999 General Election. The performance of opposition, 
however, had interesting dimensions. The Malay votes in the peninsula tilted, slightly, 
in favour of the opposition for the first time.^'^ The BN won 148 out of total 193 
seats, but the elections gave a jolt to the "UMNO's traditional role as the guarantor of 
210. Ibid. p. ^9. 
211. Greg Felker, "Malaysia in 1999: Mahathir's Pyrrhic Deliverance," Asian Survey, Feb. 2000, 
Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 52-3 
212. He was the President of the ABIM beforejoining the UMNO in 1982. The ABIM is closely 
linked to PAS. 
213. The ABIM is closely linked to PAS. 
214. D. Lynn, The Far, op.cil. p. 730 
215. in Peninsular Malaysia, the BN received 53 percent votes, while the BA received 43% votes. 
The BN got 103 and BA 42 seats in peninsula. See, P. Martinez, "Malaysia in 2000, op.cil., p. 
189 
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Malay rights and privileges," making it a ''bittersweet victory" for Mahathir." ' For 
the first time, UMNO's seats (72) were less than its constituent partners' combined 
(76).^''' Had it not been for a huge swing of Chinese vote in its favour, and except for 
the scale of success in the Borneo territories, the BN could have been easily voted out 
of power. 
The reformasi withered away after the elections, but its contribution to the 
political development of the country, especially in terms of secularizing and 
democratizing political culture and strengthening civil society was stupendous and 
unprecedented. It can't be under-estimated by its failure to push for greater 
liberalization of legal apparatus. It also can't be glossed over by the opposition's 
failure to make any significant electoral inroads, which otherwise is a routine matter 
in Malaysian politics. The real worth of the movement lies in producing multi-racial 
alternative equation by uniting disarrayed opposition groups, surpassing earlier such 
attempts. Still, more significantly, it had tremendous effect upon liberalization of 
political culture. Merely Anwar factor is inadequate in understanding its varied 
dimensions and implications. The protests against Anwar's prosecution just 
crystallized and reflected deeper resentment and under-currents of democratic 
aspirations. The 'political culture' approach is useful in comprehending the nature of 
movement and its nuances. 
The modernization process has gradually eroded feudal institutions and the 
idea of absolute and unquestioned loyalty to the ruler.^'^ The emergence of strong 
216. Jason Abbott, "Bittersweet Victory: The 1999 Malaysian General Election And The Anwar 
Ibrahim Affair," The Round Table, April 2000, 354, pp. 245-58 (253) 
217. Ibid. 
218. Estimates reveal that almost seventy percent Chinese and ninety percent Indians voted for the 
BN in the Peninsula. And East Malaysia gave forty-eight Members of Parliament to the BN. 
Ibid. 
219. Hari Singh, "Democratization, op.cit. pp. 531-2; Also see, Hari Singh, "UMNO, op.cit. 
middle class had an im|xict upon liberalizing political culture."" As William case 
argues, "Economic growth and urbanization enlarge "middle class" populations, while 
heightened educational levels modernize their attitudes, leaving them less in awe of 
ascriptive statuses and patterns of deference."^^' Though the civil society is barred to 
a great extent from actively shaping policy outputs and generating direct pressures 
upon the state, the movement proved that the transgressions by the state upon civil 
and political rights may emboden the middle classes to assert for fuller democratic 
rights. The movement also showed that the civil society is less guided by ethnicity as 
organizing principle as compared to the organization of political parties. 
The emergence of Malay corporate and middle class has made Malay unity as 
symbol of cohesion, a less useful factor to be exploited by the UMNO elite to prevent 
challenges to their position than it has traditionally been the case. 
A contagion effect from the political development in neighbouring states of 
Indonesia and Thailand definitely shaped reformasi. The term itself was borrowed 
from a somewhat similar movement in Indonesia. The satellite television and 
increasing integration of Malaysia's economy into the global capitalist market has 
exposed the people to the dominant ideas, conventions and institutions of the global 
system that promote universal human rights and a liberal regime as a precondition for 
realizing individual choice and social welfare. 
Thus, it can be argued that the fundamental rules governing the majority as 
well as minority political culture changed and strengthening of civil society augurs 
220. The size of middle class households, defined as those earning between RM 1500 to RM 3500, 
increased from 32.3 percent in 1995 to 37 percent in 1999. Eighth Malaysia Plan, op.cit., p. 60 
22 ]. William Case, "Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change," 
Pacific Affairs, 1993, Vol, 66, No. 2, pp. 183-205 (189). 
222. J.V. Jesudason, "The Syncretic, op.cit. p. 152. 
223. Hari Singh, "Democratization, op.cit. p. 533. 
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well for the greater pluralism and democratization in future. Reformasi was a 
cumulative response to a range of socio-economic, cultural and political factors. 
The Reconstruction of Islam as a Political Force 
The PAS won twenty seven seats to the Parliament and ninety eight seats to 
the state assemblies in 1999 - a milestone in its evolution as a political force in 
Malaysia. It retained Kelantan and wrested Terengganu. In two other northern states, 
the contest was close between the PAS and the UMNO.^ '^' There were observers who 
didn't read much into the PAS success while others attributed it to the rising tide of 
political Islam and, still, some others looked for its success in reformasi?^^ 
Islam has always been used for political purposes by both the UMNO and the 
PAS. Still, the politicization of Islam has been intensified in the last two decades. ' ' 
Till 1970s Islam remained essentially a component of broader concern of Malay 
ethnic identity.'^ ^^ Islam increasingly replaced Malay ethnicity as a key reference point 
by the PAS since then. It was partly the result of Islamization of the Malay society 
assisted by bonhomie between the UMNO and PAS in 70s and, partly, it was driven 
by the global Islamic resurgence. Under a radicalized new leadership, the PAS 
brought the objective of establishment of Islamic state {Darul Islam) to the centre-
224. Jason Abott, "Bittersweet, op.cit. p. 253. 
225. J. Funston, "Malaysia's Tenth Elections; Status quo, reformasi or Islamization" Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, 2002, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 55-6 
226. Books on political Islam include, K. Abdullah, The Politics of Islam in Contemporary Malaysia, 
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New Malay Dilemma," in J. Chin & K.L. Ho, eds. Mahathir Administration: Performance and 
Crisis in Governance, Times Books International, Singapore, 2001; S.A. Hussein, "Muslim 
Politics and the Discourse on Democracy," in Francis Loh Wah and B. Teik Khoo, eds. 
Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices, Curzon, Richmond, 2002; A.B. Shamsul, 
"Identity Construction, Nation Formation and Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia," in R.W. Hefner 
and P. Horvatich, eds. Islam in an Era of Nation State: Politics & Religions Renewal in Muslim 
Southeast Asia, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1997; H. Mutalib, Islam and Ethnicity in 
Malay Politics, OUP, Singapore, 1990; Alias Mohamed, Malaysia's Islamic Opposition, 
Gateway Publishing House, Kuala Lumpur, 1991. 
227. H. Mutalib, Islam, op.cit. pp. 51-3; Joseph C.Y. Liow, "Exigency or expediency? 
Contcxtualizing Political Islam and the PAS challenge in Malaysian politics," Third World 
Quarterly, 2004, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 359-72 (362-4) 
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stage of political discourse by mid-SOs."" By that time, a number of Islamic 
organizations and movements such as ABIM had become active and were seen as 
pressure groups. ' 
Despite the radical Islamic moorings of its campaign, the PAS gave its worst 
ever performance in 1986 elections.^"'^ The debacle in 1986 pushed the PAS in 
direction of moderation and cooptation. A loose coalition of political parties was 
formalized for the 1990 elections that helped the PAS regain control over the state of 
Kelantan. In the process, the PAS eschewed its hardcore brand of political Islam. 
Thus, the "1990s marked the decade where opposition Islam shifted from fatwa-
dominated discourse towards democratization and coalition politics in Malaysia." " It 
is against this backdrop, the PAS performance in 1999 elections need to be analyzed. 
The PAS this time reconstructed Islam into a voice of dissidence against the 
authoritarian excesses of UMNO-led government. The "Islamic governance was 
increasingly presented not in the dogmatic legalistic-institutional form of the mid-
1980s but one highlighting the centrality in Islam of social justice, rights of the 
citizen, honest elections and clean government." 
No doubt, the party received an electoral boost from Anwar foctor. ^"^ 
However, its success was also due to refocusing upon concerns of good governance 
228. For detailed elaboration on the Islamic state concept in Malaysia, see, H. Mutalib, ls!lam in 
Malaysia:from Revivalism to Islamic Stale, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1993. 
229. See K.S. Jomo and A.S. Cheek, "Malaysia's Islamic movements," in J. Kahn and Francis Loh 
Wah, eds. Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, University of 
Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1992. 
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ISEAS, Singapore, 1988, p. 60. 
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and social justice while temporarily adjusting to the imperatives of coalition 
politics. " The PAS was not penalized by the Malay voters this time for joining hands 
with the DAP. To this effect, it is indicative of future possibilities of political change, 
if both the parties moderate their extreme ideological positions and consolidate upon 
coalition building. However, the PAS resumed its quest for 'Islamic state' after 
eclipsing its partners in 1999 polls.^ ^^ 
The federal government is also committed to Islamizing the nation, despite the 
popular perception attributing political Islam to PAS. The UMNO often resorts to 
championing the cause of Islam for political purposes. However, UMNO's cooptation 
of moderate and progressive Islam in its agenda reconciles with the modernization 
objectives and multi-racial character of Malaysian society that contrasts favourably 
among the moderate Malays and tolerably among moderate non-malays against the 
parochialism of PAS. The regime project(s) a modernist interpretation of Islam. 
Islam's symbols are powerfully upheld publicly, and some concessions have been 
made to Islamic economic practices, such as establishing Islamic banking, but 
versions of Islamic thinking that are anti-consumerist and socialistic in orientation 
have been contained.'"' 
The Constitution proclaims Islam to be the official religion of the Federation, 
but permits the freedom of religion.^ •'^  Though every religions group has the right to 
establish and administer institutions for the education of children in its own religion, 
the constitution permits the state to establish, maintain or assist the Islamic 
235. J. Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition, Zed Books, London, 
2001, pp. 206-09. 
236. The Terengganu government also passed Hudud laws. The DAP withdrew from the BA towards 
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institutions. •* Despite Islam being the official religion and provisions of federal 
fijnding for various religions aciivities, the state agenda in more or less secular. It 
does not interfere with the religions activities of other communities.^"" 
Resilient Regime: Weak Opposition 
After showing remarkable unity in 1999, the ideological divisions resurfaced 
among the opposition. ""^  It has become a routine exercise for opposition to unite with 
a limited agenda, suffer failure in the elections, and then, instead of consolidating its 
unity, it soon loses coherence due to mutual suspicions, ideological differences and 
narrow vision. They are not able to organize a formidable challenge to the ruling front 
because of their narrow ethnic appeals. It is "(b)ecause they take up the issue of ethnic 
betrayal, the Malay-based PAS and the non-Malay based DAP find it very difficult to 
cooperate with each other."^ "*^  In fact, the narrow ethnic agenda of PAS as well as 
DAP make opposition unity brittle in contrast to the accommodationist and relatively 
secular platform of the BN. 
The opposition political parties have great difficulty developing a 
coherent programmatic alternative to the ruling regime, because the 
state has a powerful ability to absorb diverse ideological orientations 
and interests in societ}', leaving only narrow constituencies for the 
opposition to cullivate.''^'^ 
Due to their failure to provide long-term inputs in building a syncretic 
alternative to the ruling coalition, opposition parties have just ended up as a means to 
legitimize the hold of illiberal regime through electoral procedures. It is only through 
240. /6ic/. Article 12, Clause 2 
241. The hudiid laws passed by PAS government of Kelantan in 1993 providing for deatii penalty for 
apostasy could not be implemented as the requisite federal consent was not given. See, P. 
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242. The DAP withdrew from the BA. The KeAdilan lost its organizational coherence on account of 
internal factionalism. 
243. W. Case, "The UMNO, op. cit., pp. 917-8 
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136 
a wide and sustainable inter-communal coalition that the opposition can pose a 
promising challenge to the BN.^ ''^  Thus, the problem of opposition is deeper than 
having to operate in an electoral system in which the rules of the game are heavily 
stacked against it.'^ '*^  It is fundamentally the lack of ideological and sustainable 
programmatic unity among opposition ranks. 
The freedom to organize political parties and civil associations is normally 
granted in Malaysia. These organizations are free to put across their views and even 
criticise the government, but within certain limits set by the state, since due to the 
single dominant party regime the distinction between the state and government has 
become highly blurred. The government has responded to their independent assertion 
by circumscribing their right to express, and organize freely. This has involved 
habitual recourse to preventive detention Acts like the ISA and the Sedition Act and 
also other arbitrary Acts like the Police Act and Printing Presses and Publications Act. 
These Acts in the recent past have been used more against the political opposition 
than the genuine national security threats. Be that as it may, the politics of electoral 
adjustment and coalition has played a greater part in entrenching the regime than the 
politics of coercion. 
The ruling coalition is able to secure majority support by 
propagating, encompassing, non-negotiable identities and 
ideologies, such as religion and ethnicity. These vertically structured 
ideologies crowd out secular identities and ideologies based on class 
politics and notions of autonomy from the state, promoting a 
245. Ibid.^AAQ 
246. Though the balloting and counting procedures are by and large fair, the open electoral 
competitiveness is marred by gerrymandering of constituencies, short campaign periods, ban on 
open-air opposition rallies, government's control over media, misuse of state machinery and 
poll-eve populist measures by the government including on the spot development grants and 
warnings of squeezing of federal funds to the opposition-ruled states. See, W. case, "Semi-
Democracy," op. cit. p. 187-8 
247. Simon Barraclough, "The Dynamics of Coercion in the Malaysian Political Process," Modern 
Asian Studies, 1985, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 797-822 (820) 
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clientilist consciousness that undercuts the development of effective 
alliances and ideologies against the regime.' 
The BN also scores over the opposition in terms of prudent strategies and 
visionary leadership. The arbitrary handling of Anwar affair by Mahathir had 
significantly eroded the credibility of the government. The new dilemma, UMNO 
faced was whether it could win back its core Malay constituency without alienating 
the Chinese whose support was increasingly becoming decisive for the survival of the 
regime. It could not be resolved more smoothly in favour of the UMNO by a 
development less significant than the voluntary abdication of power by Mahathir.^ "*^ 
Abdullah Badawi succeeded himP^ 
The BN entered the 2004 polls on a very high vote and registered its most 
spectacular victory ever. The government was on high moral ground while disunity in 
opposition ranks had eroded whatever credibility it earlier enjoyed. The BN won 181 
of the 202 contested seats and seventeen uncontested seats.^^' In Terengganu, it 
248. J.V. Jesudason, "The Syncretic, op.cit., p. 135 
249. In fulfillment of his pledge in June 2002, Mahathir tendered resignation on October 31, 2003 
putting end to his twenty two year stint as prime minister. His legacy has come to be known as 
Mahathirism. Of all the leaders, he left the deepest imprint upon the socio-economic and 
political landscape of Malaysia. He ruled in an autocratic style though he had disliking for 
feudal values. He got the constitution and the laws amended to suit the interests of the 
establishment and did not refrain from using preventive detention laws to silence his political 
opponents. He justified curbs on rights and limited semi-authoritarian character of the regime in 
the name of 'Asian values' and the imperative of 'strong state' in context of developing 
countries. Yet, he was no dictator. He didn't explicitly crossed the legal-constitutional limits 
normally. Much of subversion of constitution and curbs on civil rights had already been in place 
when he ascended the prime ministership. If he had dictatorial designs, he would not have 
relinquished the levers of power to his deputy so easily. His bold stand on various international 
issues catapulted Malaysia onto the world-.stage. The most lasting legacy of Mahathir is "Vision 
2020," the year by which Malaysia has committed itself to achieve developed-industrialized 
country status. See Mahathir Mohamad, The Malay, op.cit.; K.J. Khoo, "The Grand," op.cil.\ 
B.T. Koo, Paradoxes, op.cit. 
250. At the UMNO General Assembly elections in May 2000, he stood as the sole candidate for 
party's Deputy President. He had a clean image and was generally trusted for his integrity. The 
Vice-Presidential slots in 2000 were won by erstwhile Anwar's 'Vision Team,' all of whom had 
by now switched over to Mahathir. See D. Lynn, The Far, op.cit.. p. 731 
251. Vejai Balasubramaniam, "The Politics, op.cit., p. 45. 
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v /^rested all the parliamentary seats from the PAS. There was a clean sweep in six 
states.^ ^^ 
The single-party dominant semi-democratic regime has shown great resilience 
and appears to be stable in the immediate future, too. " The regime's "departure from 
democratic norms and practices does not signal any imminent crisis of legitimacy."^" '^' 
The persistence of the regime has been boosted by the continuous economic growth 
and the absence of excessive coercive element in the actual functioning of the state. 
However what gives credence to the process of political development is the overall 
avoidance of ethnic conflict and preservation of peace amidst inherent pluralist 
tensions in Malaysian system. In crouch's formulation, the "neither democratic nor 
authoritarian regime is a product of a rough balance between social groups which 
have a stake in the status quo and those groups which desire greater 
democratization." Jesudason calls the regime as syncretic. 
252. Ibid. pp. 46-1 
253. William case, "Semi-Democracy, op.cil. pp. 183-4 
254. J.V. Jesudason, "The Syncretic, op.cit. p. 128 
255. Harold Crouch, "Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian nor Democratic," in K. Hewison, R. Robison 
and G, Rodan, eds. Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, 
Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, 1993, pp. 147-50. 
256. The syncretic state he defines as a brittle amalgam of sometimes contradictory elements. It 
combines coercion with democratic procedures, secularism with religion, ethnic mobilization 
with nationalism and liberal capitalism with state intervention at critical points. J.v. Jesudason, 
"The Syncretic," op.cit., p. 130 
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CHAPTER-IV 
ILLIBERAL CONSTITUTION: RIGHTS AND EQUITY IN 
MALAYSIA 
The political development in Malaysia since Independence reflects a concern 
for security and stability over liberty and equality.' It is characterized by the growth 
of authoritarianism in spurts and continuous erosion of accountability tempered with 
regular elections and relatively, open competition for political power, leading to a 
complex blend of authoritarian strands with the liberal elements within a largely 
procedural-democratic framework. It is also marked by the restrictions upon 
democratic rights and the incessant grip of the same coalition on political power^ 
impeding the process of political development, which is moderated by the free 
electoral participation and increasing political consciousness facilitating, somewhat, 
the process of democratization of political culture. 
Much of political change in Malaysia is elite-directed. It has acted as a catalyst for 
political development yet it is the ruling elite, which has been largely responsible for 
political decay in certain spheres. The authoritarian policies and laws have certainly 
This is reflected in official ideology. The law prohibits even discussion or debate over certain 
sensitive issues for the sake of peace and stability. 
The media is not free. The opposition's activities are curbed with the help of a plethora of 
repressive laws with severe restrictions upon the rights of free expression and assembly. The 
delimitation of constituencies favour the ruling coalition. The ruling establishment has 
developed huge corporate interests, providing it with much greater access to electoral funds in 
comparison to the opposition. Still, the people have absolute right to choose among the 
contenders for the legislative seats and there is open competition for political power within the 
framework of multi-party system. 
The ruling alliance, the Barisan Nasional has always enjoyed two-third majority in the 
Parliament as well as majority of the votes, except in 1969 elections. It has never been voted out 
of power. The coalition has proved to be so stable and such a huge umbrella that with the 
exception of opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Semangat-46 (which was a 
breakaway faction of UMNO and re-joined UMNO after a brief stint) all the other political 
parties at one time or another have been part of the BN. See, D.K. Mauzy, Barison Nasional: 
Coalition Government in Malaysia, Marican & Sons, Kuala Lumpur, 1983. 
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helped maintain conditions of peace, order and stability that induced socio-economic 
progress, which in turn has contributed to the continuity of the semi-democratic 
political process in Malaysia. At the same time, the authoritarian practices have 
constricted the democratic space affecting the autonomy and growth of civil society. 
Many observers of Malaysian political scene associate authoritarianism with 
Mahathirism. While there is truth in this assertion, authoritarianism goes back much 
beyond the reign of Mahathir, and it can be linked to the philosophy of the 
Constitution of Malaysia itself as it has evolved since Independence. The Constitution 
is not cast in a liberal-democratic mould. Although, it fulfils all the requirements of a 
procedural-functional democracy, many authoritarian strands can be found in the 
various provisions of the Constitution. What is more alarming is the continuous 
enjoyment of the two-third majority by the same ruling alliance that has enabled it to 
temper with the Constitution to suit its requirements. The absence of any viable 
alternative in the form of opposition to the government has further encouraged the 
authoritarian tendencies. All that has enabled the government to dilute some 
restraining provisions as well as make use of the illiberal elements of the Constitution 
by enacting a number of restrictive legislations and implementing those with 
impunity. 
Thus, the basis of a 'strong state' and 'weak individual rights' has been 
provided by the Constitution itself The government was left with enough scope to 
create a super-structure of a strong state within largely democratic frainework by 
incorporating and making use of the authoritarian strands in the Constitution. The 
government was willing to do so and the circumstances favoured it. In fact, the 
4. R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir, Routledge, London, 1999; 
Munro-Kua Anne, Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1997. 
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government had a clear and conscious design to create a strong state. And the 
government was also willing to justify it as an "Asian value" in the name of harmony 
and stability. Therefore, in order to understand the governmental process and political 
change, it becomes imperative to have a look at the Constitution in guiding the same. 
The constitutional-legal development has direct bearing over the process of political 
development in Malaysia. 
Restricted rights 
The Constitution of Malaysia contains a list of nine liberties. The term 
'liberties' has been preferred over the term 'rights' and these are designated as 
'Fundamental Liberties' in Part II of the Constitution. These are (a) Liberty of the 
person,^ (b) Freedom from slavery and forced labour,^ (c) Protection against 
retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials,'' (d) Equality,^ (e) Prohibition against 
banishment and freedom of movement, (f) Freedom of speech, assembly, and 
association,'*^ (g) Freedom of religion," (h) Rights in respect of education,'^ and (i) 
Right to property. 
Although, these rights have been adjudged 'Fundamental,' these do not 
occupy any special place vis-a-vis other parts or provisions of the Constitution. The 
Parliament under its power of amending the Constitution can amend the Fundamental 
Liberties like its other provisions. Rather, the amendment of any right does not even 
require the consent of the Conference of Rulers as it is required to amend some other 
5. Federal Constitution of Malaysia, Part 11, Article 5. 
6. Ibid. Article 6. 
7. Ibid. Article 7. 
8. Ibid. Article 8. 
9. Ibid. Article 9. 
10. ft/c/. Article 10. 
11. A/c/. Article 11. 
12. /^/.i. Article 12. 
13. /6/W. Article 13. 
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important provisions of the Constitution.''^ It is further interesting to note that any 
amendment to clause (4) of Article 10, which restricts the freedom of speech in 
certain cases, requires the consent of the Conference of Rulers, " but such consent is 
not required for curtailment of any basic right. It means that the task of curtailing any 
fundamental right through the amendment process is easier for the Parliament than 
removing restrictions upon them. 
Moreover, unlike the United States or India, the citizens in Malaysia do not 
have a direct access to the apex courts in case of violation of their Fundamental 
Liberties. Thus, part II is not bestowed with any special sanctity or inviolability vis-a-
vis other parts of the Constitution of Malaysia. The rights are limited by the terms and 
conditions that are ingrained in the constitution itself. However, the terms of 
restrictions are not imposed upon all the rights. Thus, the Fundamental Liberties can 
be categorized into two, (a) those which are absolute by the nature of the provisions, 
and (b) those which are limited by certain restrictions, the grounds of which are given 
in the respective Articles. 
The following Fundamental Liberties appear to be absolute, at least, going by 
the language of the respective constitutional provisions, (a) Freedom from slavery,"' 
(b) Protection against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials, (c) Prohibition 
against banishment of citizens,'^ (d) Right not to receive instruction in or take part in 
any ceremony or act of worship of a religion other than one's own,'^ and (e) Right to 
adequate compensation for the compulsory acquisition of property. ^  
14. Ibid. Part XII, Article 159, Clause 5. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid. Part II, Article 6 clause 1. 
17. Ibid. Article 9, clause 1. 
18. Ibid. Article 11, clause 1. 
19. Ibid. Article 13, clause 2. 
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Other 'Fundamental Liberties' are limited either by the qualitled language to 
limit the extent or by making certain exceptions in the relevant Articles. Article 5(1) 
provides, "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in 
accordance with law." The phrase "in accordance with law" has been used. The "due 
process" clause of the American Constitution has been avoided, as it would give 
preeminence to the judiciary vis-a-vis the legislature. Therefore, the courts refused to 
look into the fairness or reasonability of law in Malaysia. The courts are not as 
innovative or independent as in Lidia. Although, lately, some Supreme Court 
decisions in Malaysia have been inspired by the Menaka Gandhi judgement of India 
but, more or less, the courts merely look into the procedural aspects in matters of 
compliance, not into the validity of law by invoking the Principles of natural justice. 
The right to property, like right to life and liberty, is also subjected to law. 
The right to equality is extensively qualified by excluding significantly, the 
provisions entailing - (a) regulation of personal law, (b) restricting office or 
employment comiected with the affairs of any religion, (c) protection or advancement 
of the aboriginal peoples of the Malay Peninsula (including the reservation of land) or 
the reservation to aborigines of a reasonable proportion of suitable positions in the 
public service, etc."""" 
20. Nik A.K.N. Mahmod, "Equal Protection of the Law: The Malaysian Experience," a research 
paper presented at a Seminar on "77/e Constitutional Model of Equality and Fraternity: The 
Indian Experiences, organised by Dr. Ainbedkar Chair of Legal Study and Research, 
Department of Law, AMU, Aligarh on 29-30 March 2003. The Article 21 of the Constitution of 
India says, "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the 
procedure established by law." The courts in the beginning were reluctant to look into the 
fairness of the procedure established. They merely used to look whether the procedure, which is 
established by the law, is being complied with or not. Thus, the protection was available against 
the executive, not against the legislature. However, in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (AIR 
1978 SC 597) case the Supreme Court propounded that the procedure established must not be 
arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable. 
21. The Federal Constitution, Article 13, Clause I. 
22. //)/J. Article 8, Clause 5. 
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The Parliament exercises complete discretion while framing provisions 
restricting the right to freedom of movement,^ •^  Article 4(2)(a) '^* even relieves the 
Parliament of the requirement of making laws strictly in relation to the matters 
mentioned in the right to freedom of movement. The right to the freedom of speech, 
association, and assembly also come within the complete discretion of Parliament.^'' 
Article 4(2)(b) protects the Parliament from any impugning of its motives. 
The right to freedom of speech, assembly and association is marred by various 
grounds upon which the restrictions or limitations can be imposed by the Parliament 
in its exercise and enjoyment by the citizens. The right to freedom of speech and 
expression can be restricted by the Parliament on any of the grounds, namely, friendly 
relations with other countries, public order, morality, the privileges of the Parliament 
or any Legislative Assembly, contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an 
offence. The right to assembly can be limited in the interest of the security of the 
Federation or public order. The right to association can be restricted on grounds of 
security, public order or morality. These are, more or less, permissible grounds by 
universal standards of human rights laws. These are also consistent with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states, 
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
23. Ibid. Article 9, Clause 2. 
24. Article 4(2)(a) is as follows: T/je validity of any law shall not be questioned on the ground that -
(a) it imposes restrictions on the right mentioned in Article 9(2) but does not relate to the 
matters mentioned therein. 
25. Article 10, Clause 2. 
26. Article 4(2)(b) is as follows: The validity of any law shall not be questioned on the ground that -
(b) it imposes restrictions as are mentioned in Article 10(2) but those restrictions were not 
deemed necessary or expedient by Parliament for the purposes mentioned in that Article. 
27. Federal Constitution, Part 11, Article 10, Clause 2(a), (b) & (c). 
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freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society" . 
However, what provides the scope for 'arbitrary contravention of rights in 
Malaysian case is the absence of the terms, like "just" as qualifies the grounds of 
restrictions in the UDHR or "reasonable" as precedes the word 'restrictions' in the 
Article 19 of the hidian Constitution?^ The courts in Malaysia have, so far, been 
found reluctant to apply the criteria of 'reasonability,' while litigating on the 
restrictions imposed by law. In the case of PP v Parkin Cumaraswamy, Justice Chan 
said, "the validity of any law which the Parliament under Article 10(2) has deemed 
necessary to pass to impose restriction on freedom of speech shall not be 
questioned." Two recent judgements, however, hold good promise that the test of 
reasonability has begun to be applied by the courts in Malaysia. In Dewan Undangan 
Negeri of Kelantan v Nordin Salleh, the court held that a restriction can be 
challenged if the inevitable consequence of the restriction imposed is such that il 
makes the exercise of fundamental right ineffective or illusory, hi another case PP v 
Pimg Chen Choon, the court of appeal held that the legislation imposing restriction 
can be struck down as ultra vires of the Constitution if it is couched in a language 
wide enough to cover restrictions within as well as outside the permissible limits. The 
court emphasized that the test to determine a particular piece of legislation, whether it 
falls within or outside the orbit of permissible restrictions, is that the object of the law 
28. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 29. 
29. The Article 19 of the Constitution of India provides for the freedom of speech, assembly, 
association, etc. More or less, on similar grounds, as in Malaysia, restrictions can be imposed on 
these rights by the Parliament in India. However, these restrictions should be "reasonable" as 
required by the Article. The test of reasonableness has been applied from the beginning by the 
Indian courts. The broad criterion is that a proper balance should be maintained between social 
control and the rights of the individual. 
30. ML.J., I, 1986, S.C. 512(517) 
31. /*/«'. 1, 1992, S.C, 343 
32. /i^ /fl'. 2, 1994, S.C.,203 
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must be sufficiently connected to the eight grounds of restrictions available against 
the right to freedom of speech and expression. The connection must be real and 
proximate, not far-fetched or vague. In the earlier cases the test of reasonableness 
was being applied to the executive acts only by the courts. For instance, in Chai 
Choon Hon v OCPD of Kampur case, the Supreme Court struck down a restriction 
on the number of speakers at an after dinner speech organized by the Democratic 
Action Party as unreasonable under the Police Act, 1967 because the licence under 
the Police Act had already restricted the function with regard to time of the function. 
Therefore, the restriction on the number of speakers was irrelevant, hence void. The 
fact remains that in the absence of sound criteria of reasonableness, a number of 
restrictive often-arbitrary laws enacted by the Parliament go unchecked. This lacuna 
partly explains the application of arbitrary laws, like Police Act, Societies Act or 
Printing Presses and Publications Act with impunity. 
An amendment was passed with the declared objective to remove certain 
sensitive issues from the realm of public discussion and to further entrench the special 
position of the Malays in the constitutional scheme."^ ^ The right to freedom of speech 
was curtailed whereby Parliament was empowered to pass laws prohibiting the 
questioning of any matter or right established or protected by the provisions of Part III 
(pertaining to citizenship), Article 152 (pertaining to Malay language as the national 
and official language), Article 153 (reservation of seats for the Malays in government 
jobs and educational institutions) and Article 181 (related to the prerogatives and 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid. 2, 1986, S.C, 203. 
35. Prior restraint on freedom of speech and assembly may be exercised by an officer-in-charge of a 
Police District acting under the Police Act to regulate the conduct in public places of assembly 
and meeting. The officer may in granting the licence to hold the meeting proscribe subjects to be 
touched on in the speech. 
36. The Constitution (Amendment) Act [Act A30], 1971. 
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powers of the Rulers), otherwise than in relation to the implementation of policies or 
laws pertaining to such constitutional provisions.''^ 
This amendment not only insulated certain issues from the domain of public 
debate, but also empowered the government for an indefmite period, to encroacii upon 
the Fundamental liberty of speech and expression even without resorting to 
amendment procedure. Furthermore, clause 4 of Article 10 was made entrenched. It 
means that any amendment to this clause now also requires the consent of the 
Conference of Rulers. 
The 1971 Act also removed the protection enjoyed by the members of the 
Parliament or of the legislative assembles from judicial proceedings against anything 
said in the legislatures. Thus, even the Parliament could be prohibited from raising a 
discussion over the "sensitive issues." Now this was again in violation of the principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty and the very negation of the deliberative function of the 
Parliament. All issues must be allowed to be debated in the Parliament, howsoever 
sensitive, as the Parliament is the most valuable safety-valve available in a democratic 
society. It is the ultimate forum for debate. Not any kind of restrictions can be 
justified, which may impinge upon its freedom of discussion. 
The purpose behind the move was to avoid conflict, controversy and 
disharmony in society so that all energies could be focused in direction of growth, 
development, peace and stability. Though, it was not done merely to protract the 
Malay privileges, the citizenship provisions were also brought under the scope of 
prohibition, which were meant to protect the interests of the non-Malays. Still, it was 
definitely an assault on the spirit of free inquiry and open discussion. 
37. Federal Constitution, Article 10, Clause 4. 
38. Ibid. Articles 63(4) and 72(4). 
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This fact was underscored by the frequent use of the Sedition Act by the 
authorities against the political opponents. As no law has been passed under clause 4 
of Article 10, effective prohibition on the discussion of sensitive issues was brought 
about by an amendment to the Sedition Act, 1948. The Emergency Ordinance No. 45 
of 1970, even well before the 1971 Act, did it. It declared it as a seditious tendency to 
question any matter, right, privilege or prerogative established or protected by the 
provisions of Part III of the Federal Constitution and Articles 152, 153 or 181 of the 
Constitution.^^ 
Emergency Provisions: Encroachment upon Rights 
The right to free speech, assembly and association along with other 
fundamental rights are further subjected to the emergency provisions of the 
Constitution.'*'^  Any law enacted under these provisions has an overriding effect on the 
Fundamental Liberties. Therefore, the discussion on the situation of human rights in 
Malaysia cannot be complete without a close look at emergency provisions, which 
give sweeping powers to the government to resort to the arbitrary laws even in normal 
circumstances under the pretext of social order or national security. Under Articles, 
149, 150 and 151, rights can be taken away just by an ordinary process of law making 
if any Act is enacted by the Parliament under these Articles. Not only this, under 
Article 150, the Executive gets an indirect power to encroach upon the rights by not 
necessarily submitting even to the ordinary process of law-making. 
Article 149 provides for special powers of parliamentary legislation against 
subversion, violence or action prejudicial to the public order if any substantial body of 
39. R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Politics, op.cit., p. 95, 
40. Part XI. Its title reads as Special Powers Against Subversion, Organised Violence, and Ads and 
Crimes Prejudicial to the Public, and Emergency Powers. 
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persons acts or threatens - (a) to cause fear among the citizens, or organized violence 
against persons or property, or (b) to excite disaffection against the Government, or 
(c) to promote feehng of ill-will and hostility between different communities likely to 
cause violence, or (d) to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of 
anything by law established, or (e) which is prejudicial to the maintenance or the 
functioning of any supply or service to the public, or (f) which is prejudicial to public 
order or national security. Any Act in pursuance of Article 149 is deemed valid, 
notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of liberties under 
Articles 5, 9, 10 or 13. 
Such law gets precedence over the right to life and personal liberty, protection 
against arbitrary arrest, freedom of movement and residence, freedom of speech, 
assembly and association, and the right to property. The rights affected by this Article 
are very crucial for the fair maintenance of rule of law and the democratic process. A 
statute enacted under Article 149 can be in force indefinitely since Article 149 does 
not prescribe a time limit. It ceases to have effect only when it is repealed or annulled 
by resolutions of both Houses of the Parliament. 
Article 149 was amended in 1960 by the amendment Act of I960.'" The 
amendment had the effect of making it more arbitrary. The original Article 149 just 
provided a link between the legislative enactment and 'the recital that the action was 
taken or threatened by any substantial body of persons, whether inside or outside the 
Federation, to cause, or to cause a substantial number of citizens to fear, organized 
violence against persons or property'. The amendment provided for four additional 
alternative perspectives with which the action or threat could be linked. Another 
41. The Constitution (Amendment) Act [Act 10], 1960. The sub-clauses (b), (c), (d) and (f) were 
added to the clause 1 of Article 149. 
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important safeguard, which the original Article 149 carried against its misuse by the 
Executive that was tempered by the Amendment Act, 1960 was the provision that 
restricted the validity of a legislative Act under Article 149 to one year, although the 
Parliament was entitled to re-enact it. The amendment removed the limitation of one 
year, with the effect that such legislative Act if not sooner repealed or annulled by the 
Parliament, would continue in force indefinitely. Thus, the amendment did not merely 
broadened the scope of Article 149 but also curtailed the scope of its parliamentary 
review. 
The Sedition Act 1948, as amended in 1971, persists in the light of Article 149. 
This Act was introduced by the British in 1948 to curb the growing anti-British 
feelings and propaganda in Malaya. The main target was the militant Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP) that openly propagated violence against the colonialists. The 
law also aimed at the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), which was waging a struggle 
seeking to free the country from the British yoke. The Sedition Act was modified in 
1971 to deal with the prevailing tense conditions and ill will between the Chinese and 
the Malays, in the wake of 1969-riots. The Sedition Act makes it an offence to utter or 
publish words which have a seditious tendency, defined as - (a) bringing into hatred or 
contempt or exciting disaffection against any Ruler or Government; (b) exciting the 
alteration other than by lawful means of any matter by law established; (c) bringing 
into hatred or contempt the administration of justice; (d) promoting ill-will and 
hostility between races or classes of the population; (e) questioning any matter, right, 
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status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by Part 
III or Articles 152, 153 or 181, which are known as the sensitive issues.'*^ 
Though not frequently invoked, the Sedition Act, still, provides the actual or 
potential power to the government to subdue the opposition and silence the critics. It 
was selectively used against the opposition leaders and newspapers in 1987 in the 
course of operation lalang. In January 2000, Karpal Singh, Anwar Ibrahim's 
defence counsel and deputy chairman of the Democratic Action Party was charged 
under the Sedition Act on account of statements he had made in court about the 
alleged poisoning of his client, casting aspersions on the freedom of lawyers in 
courts.'*'* Sedition charges were also brought against the editor and publisher of the 
PAS newspaper Harakah, for publishing an allegedly seditious article. It was also 
invoked against Marina Yousuf, Vice-President of the National Justice Party led by 
the wife of Anwar Ibrahim, for her anti-government speech at an election rally which 
was alleged to provoke racial tensions by the government.''^ Chandra Muzaffar notes 
speech made by Marina and the article that appeared in Harakah 
last year come within the ambit of issues which are discussed and 
debated in any vibrant democracy. It is true that they call into 
question the integrity of Mahathir's riding party, the United Malays 
National Organization (UMNO), in one instance, and the probity of 
certain current leaders, in another. But how can that be against the 
law in a democracy? 
Much more problematic and wide-ranging in its impact upon the fundamental 
rights as well as other provisions of the Constitution is Article 150 that provides for 
42. Thus, the Sedition Act in pursuance of Article 149 also brought into force the clause (4) of 
Article 10 which reads as thus: "In imposing restrictions in the interest of the security of the 
Federation or any part thereof or public order under Clause (2)(a), Parliament may pass law 
prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or 
prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part III, Articles 152, 153 or 181 
otherwise than in relation to the implementation thereof as may be specified in such law." 
43. Abdul Halim Sidek, "Restrictions," op.cit. 
44. Amnesty International Report 2001, p. 164. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Aliran Monthly, Year-end 1999, Vol. XIX, No. 11. 
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proclamation of emergency. It enables the Government with the widest range of 
extraordinai")' legislative as well as executive powers, which might contravene any 
provision of the Constitution except provisions relating to religion, citizenship, 
language, Islamic law or the customary law of the Malays and native law of 
indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak/'' Thus, Article 150 is much broader in 
scope and implications than Article 149. It's Clause 1 and 2 permit, the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong to issue a proclamation of Emergency if he is "satisfied that a grave 
emergency exists whereby the security, or the economic life, or public order in the 
Federation or any part thereof is threatened," or the proclamation may be issued even 
before the actual occurrence of such emergency if there is "imminent danger of the 
occurrence of such event." Originally, this Article also had some limiting grounds, 
which were removed by subsequent amendments to this Article. Originally, 
Emergency could be imposed only on grounds of "war, external aggression or internal 
disturbance." These restrictive grounds were removed by a constitutional amendment 
4fi 
in 1963. The provision that permits proclamation, even before the emergency 
situation exists, was added by another Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1981. The 
power to proclaim emergency is vested in the king who normally exercises this power 
at the advice of the Cabinet. This power was proposed to be taken away from the king 
to be vested in the office of the Prime Minister by an amendment in 1983, which was 
subsequently dropped after a compromise formula was reached between the Prime 
Minister, Mahathir Mohamad and the king.'*^ 
47. Federal Constitution, Part XI, Article 150, Clause 6(A). 
48. The Constitution (Amendment) Act [Act 26], 1963. 
49. The Asia/I Wall Street Journal, December 19, 1983. 
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The king is empowered to promulgate an ordinance in pursuance of 
Proclamation of Emergency if the Houses of Parliament are not in session.^ This is 
quite a normal provision. But what is most arbitrary and detrimental to the democratic 
spirit of the Constitution is the clause 3 of Article 150, which states, 
A Proclamation of Emergency and any ordinance promulgated under 
Clause (2B) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and, if not 
sooner revoked, shall cease to have effect if resolutions are passed by 
both Houses annulling such Proclamation or ordinance, but without 
prejudice to anything previously done by virtue thereof or to the 
power of the Yang-Pertuan Agong to issue a new Proclamation under 
Clause (1) or promulgate any ordinance under Clause (2B). 
Thus, the Houses don't have any decisive control over the government's 
willingness to resort to the Emergency. No time limit is specified in the constitution to 
obtained the consent of the Parliament. And when the houses meet, just simple 
majority is required to approve the measures. This is retrogressive from the point of 
view of rule of law and goes against the principle of parliamentary democracy. The 
original checks upon the Executive power have been diluted by the amendment of 
1960.^' This is a clear and decisive shift of power balance from the Legislature to the 
Executive. The important thing is that all these developments took place in prc-
Mahathir era, and even before 1969, the year of communal riots, which provided a 
justification for the strong state authority needed to deal effectively with future such 
crises or violence or propagation of disharmony among ethnic groups that could lead 
to the disruption of social order, peace and security. 
50. Federal Constitution, Article 150, Clause 2(B). 
51. The clause (3) of Article 150 as it originally stood before the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 
1960 read, thus: A Proclamation of Emergency and any ordinance promulgated under clause (2) 
shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and, if not sooner revoked, shall cease to be in 
force - (a) a proclamation at the expiration of a period of two months beginning with the date on 
which it was issued; and (b) an ordinance at the expiration of a period of fifteen days beginning 
with the date on which both houses are first sitting -
Unless before the expiration of that period, it has been approved by a resolution of each house 
of Parliament. 
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At the same time, it must be conceded that the Article 150 has not been 
grossly misused. The Fundamental Liberties have not been encroached by the 
Government by taking recourse to emergency powers under this Article. This is 
perhaps largely due to the reason that other avenues are available to the Government 
to circumvent and restrict the fundamental rights^^. Although, none of the 
proclamations promulgated in the years 1964, 1966, 1969 and 1977 have been 
revoked, and thus continue as such, despite the events that occasioned them no longer 
exist.^ ^ An Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969, 
which provides for detention without trial also continue "^*. Merely the continuation of 
proclamations for so long under normal conditions, even if no substantial misuse of 
authority takes place, is violative of the liberal spirit of the Constitution. This is in 
contrast with the Indian Constitution wherein safeguards against the misuse of the 
emergency powers have been progressively incorporated into the Constitution through 
successive constitutional amendments.^^ The courts in Malaysia have upheld the 
unlimited powers of the government under emergency proclamation. In Eng Keock 
Cheng V Public Prosecutor,^ the Federal court upheld the power of the Parliament, 
52. The most draconian laws like the Internal Security Act (ISA), 1960 as amended in 1971 and the 
Sedition Act, 1948 as amended in 1971, operate under Articles 149 and 151 of the constitution. 
The Societies Act, the Defamation Act, Contempt of Court, Official Secrets Act, 1972, the 
Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, etc. have recourse broadly to the clause (2) of 
Article 10. 
53. Suhakain (National Human Rights Commission of Malaysia) Report, 2001, p. 14. 
54. Ibid. p.36. The Report criticized this ordinance along with the other laws providing for 
preventive detention as infi-ingement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but 
unfortunately, it did not call upon the Government to immediately repeal these laws. It merely 
called for "review" of preventive detention laws. 
55. The Constitution of India, Part XVIII, Article 352. The Proclamation of Emergency can't be 
issued on grounds of'internal disturbance' or 'public order.' It must be approved within one 
month of its promulgation by a special majority in both Houses of the Parliament. It continues in 
force for only six months unless further approved in the like manner by the two Houses, and so 
on. None of the Fundamental Rights except under Article 19 can be encroached by the 
Parliament during the Emergency. Furthermore, the enforcement of the right to life and the right 
against double jeopardy, self-incrimation and retrospective criminal legislation can't be 
suspended at all. 
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during an Emergency, to legislate on any subject and to any effect, even if 
inconsistencies with articles of the Constitution (including the provisions for 
Fundamental Liberties) are involved. 
Preventive Detention: Weak Judiciary 
The procedural restrictions on preventive detention under Article 151 as 
originally incorporated in the Constitution had an important purpose to serve as a 
check upon the misuse of governmental authority in safeguarding the citizens' right 
against arbitrary airest. However, through subsequent constitutional amendments, the 
protections envisaged by this Article have also been substantially diluted so as to 
become ineffective in safeguarding the right against arbitrary arrest. Instead of 
operating as a check upon arbitrary misuse of emergency powers under Articles 149 
and 150, the Article 15l" has become an instrument or an adjunct of those Articles. 
There is no express provision in the Constitution, which sanctions preventive 
detention except the provisions under Part XI on emergency powers. Article 5 bars 
detention without trial. Since Articles 149 and 150, when invoked, can have the effect 
of suspending the Fundamental Liberties, it can be fairly concluded that the law 
56. ML.J., 1, 1966, F.C. 18. 
57. It reads as - (I) Where any law or ordinance made or promulgated in pursuance of this Part 
provides for preventive detention (a) the authority on whose order any person is detained under 
that law or ordinance shall, as soon as may be inform him of the grounds for his detention and, 
subject to Clause (3), the allegations of action on which the order is based, and shall give him 
the opportunity of making representations against the order as soon as may be; (b) no 
citizen shall continue to be detained under that law or ordinance unless an advisory board 
constituted as mentioned in Clause (2) has considered any representations made by him under 
paragraph (a) and made recommendations thereon to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong within three 
months of receiving such representations, or within such longer period as the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong may allow. 
2. An advisory board constituted for the purpose of this Article shall consist of a chairman, who 
shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and who shall be or have been, or be qualified 
to be, a judge of the Federal Court or a High Court, or shall before Malaysia Day have been a 
judge of the Supreme Court, and two other members, who shall be appointed by the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong after consultation with the Lord President of the Federal Court. 
3. This Article does not require any authority to disclose facts whose disclosure would in il.s 
opinion be against the national interest. 
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providing for preventive detention can be saved only by the Articles 149 and 150. 
Article 151 applies only to the cases where any law or ordinance made or 
promulgated in pursuance of Part XI provides for preventive detention. It does not 
prohibit law providing for preventive detention having recourse outside the scope of 
Articles 149 and 150. However, since Article 5 prohibits it, the preventive detention, 
can only be justified under Articles 149 and 150. 
Although, Article 151 was designed as a check upon preventive detention and 
it envisaged restrictions upon executive power but those restrictions have been 
gradually removed or diluted. Today, it stands as a pale shadow of its original 
construction. Before 1960, clause 1(b) held that "no citizen shall be detained ... 
beyond three months unless an advisory board ... has reported, before the expiration 
of that period, that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention." Thus, it 
was mandatory for the Government to release the detainee if the Advisory Board 
would report contrary to the detention. The Amendment Act of 1960 changed it. The 
Advisory Board is now required to consider the representations within three months 
and 'make recommendations to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong'. This reduced the role of 
the Board from making binding report to recommendations only, which could be set 
aside by the Executive. The final blow came in response to a Federal court judgement 
in Re Tan Boon Liat @ Allen andAnor et al, v Mentri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri and 
CO 
Ors case that ordered the release of citizens detained under the Emergency (Public 
Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969 when it was proved that the 
Advisory Board had not considered the representations made by detainees within the 
constitutionally specified time-limit of three months. In 1976, Article 151(l)(b) was 
further amended and the time limit of three months was linked to the time of 
58. MZ„J.,2, 1977,F.C. 108. 
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representation made instead of the time when the detention was made/^ Furthermore, 
it gave the discretion to the Executive to extend the time Hmit of three months. The 
latter change completely took away a constitutional protection and put it under the 
discretion of the Executive. Thus, the constitutional safeguards were so easily 
tempered with, in favour of increasing the authority of the Executive. No denying that 
the national security was in bad shape in those times. Just the previous year, high-
ranking police officials were assassinated and bomb-blasts were caused by the 
Communist-terrorists.^'^ Strong executive was the need of the day. But the point is that 
the Executive was already, fairly strong and enjoyed wide powers including the 
emergency powers. Communist violence was occasional and government's powers 
under preventive detention were vast enough, such threats could be dealt within the 
operational legal framework. There was no need to dilute such an important 
constitutional check upon the arbitrary authority of the executive. By doing so, the 
balance was completely tilted in favour of 'order' over 'liberty.' The citizens' need 
for security against misuse of government authority was ignored. A constitutional 
right of the citizens was put under discretion of the Executive against which the right 
was, in fact, previously available to the citizens. 
The Malaysian courts have consistently held that there can be no judicial 
review of the subjective 'satisfaction' of the executive to detain a person. In Karam 
Singh V Mentri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia, case, Justice Suffian stated, 
The discretion whether or not the appellant should be detained is 
placed in the hands of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acting on 
Cabinet advice. Whether or not the facts on which the order of 
detention is to be based are sufficient or relevant is a matter to be 
decided by the Executive. In making their decision, they have 
59. The Constitution (Amendment) Act [Act 354], 1976. 
60, R.S. Milne, "Malaysia and Singapore, 1975," Asian Survey, February 1976, Vol. XVI, No. 2, p. 
190. 
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complete discretion and it is not for a court of law to question the 
sufficiency or relevance of these allegations of fact.' 
To get respite from preventive detention on ground of mala fides is always 
very difficult for the defendant when the onus is upon him to prove that he has been 
detained mala fides. It is all the more difficult when the judiciary is seen as pliant in 
politically motivated cases.^^ 
The judicial review on procedural grounds is readily available to the citizens 
i.e. it is available on ground of failure to comply with fundamental procedural 
requirements, whether under Article 151^^ or law providing for preventive detention' . 
However, after the constitutional amendments of 1960 and 1976 in Article 151 after 
the amendments hardly provides sufficient scope for review of even procedural 
grounds. Be that as it may, the relief on procedural ground does not mean much for 
the protection and promotion of human rights when the law in principle is arbitrary or 
when grossly misused by the executive for mischievous and ulterior motives. 
The preventive detention law that has become synonymous with 'oppression' 
or 'coercion' in Malaysia is the hiternal Security Act (ISA). Originally passed in 1960 
to deal with the remnants of insurgents in the aftermath of the Communist-led 
insui'gency (1948-60) and to check internal subversion and violence, the ISA in 
practice has been frequently used against the opposition leaders, dissidents within 
ruling alliance and social activists from diverse backgrounds. To put it succinctly, the 
61. ML7., 2, 1969, F.C. 129(151). 
62. in various cases of 'operation lalang' detentions of 1987 and Weformasi activists' detentions of 
1998-99 (including Anwar Ibrahim's detention) under Internal Security Act, the defence brought 
out the facts of mala fides, but the courts generally did not entertain such arguments. Amnesty 
International Report(s), [1988; 1989; 2000; 2002]. 
63. Ref No. 59, Sw/iz-a. 
64. Section 8B of the Internal Security Act, which explicitly rejects judicial review in cases of 
detentions under ISA, permits judicial review on ground of "question on compliance with any 
procedural requirement" for any act done or decision made by the Executive in exercise of its 
discretionary power under the ISA. 
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ISA is generally seen as applied to the opponents of the government. The Act allows 
the police to arrest without warrant any person suspected of acting in "any manner 
prejudicial to the security of Malaysia .... or the maintenance of essential services 
therein or to the economic life thereof "^ ^ Any police officer can detain any person 
under the ISA without producing him before the judicial magistrate for thirty days, 
and beyond thirty days with the approval of Home Minister for a maximum period of 
sixty days. The trauma of an ISA detainee does not end here. Beyond two months he 
can be detained under a direct order of Home Minister, which allows for a maximum 
period of two years, which is liable to be renewed ad infinitum. For instance, 
Nasharuddin Nasir, who was accused of being a member of Kumpulan Mujahidin 
Malaysia (KMM) was arrested in April 2002 and was given a two-year detention 
order. The High Court in November 2003 held his detention unlawful on procedural 
grounds and ordered his release. He was released but immediately rearrested and 
given another two-year detention order. ^ 
Thus, while the executive is left with full discretion whom to arrest and how 
long to keep him, the judiciary is deprived of judicial review except on procedural 
grounds. The Act provides for the Advisory Board in accordance with the requirement 
of Article 151 of the Constitution to review all the detentions within three months of 
receiving the representations. There are evidences that the detaining authorities 
often force delays in the representations to be made to the Advisory Board. Moreover, 
65. The Internal Security Act, 1960, Section 73( 1 )(b). 
66. Ibid, Scclion S(\). 
67. Amnesty International Report 2003, p. 169. 
68. 7'/7e75^, Section 11. 
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the recommendations of the Advisory Board are non-binding, which are often ignored 
by the Executive.^ 
The ISA has become a tool of political oppression, an instrument which is 
formally legal but violative of basic human rights. If we analyse the two biggest 
crackdowns under the ISA viz. 'operation lalang' in 1987 and 'reformasi crackdown' 
in 1998, we find its application for narrow political purposes. It is not the threat to 
national security but government's stability, which appears to be its raison d'etre for 
the government. In 1987, the Prime Minister Mahathir, in wake of the most severe 
crisis to his leadership from within the UMNO and a number of Supreme Court 
rulings having gone against his government, amidst just, a little tension between the 
Chinese and the Malays over the Education Policy of the government, found an 
excuse to crackdown on his opponents.'' He ordered the arrest of 106 people in 
October and November 1987, including prominent leaders from the opposition 
parties, the UMNO dissidents and human rights activists. These arrests took place 
under the operational codename 'lalang,'' (a type of weed). Tunku Abdul Rahman, the 
former Prime Minister and founder of UMNO, criticized Mahathir, saying, "This is 
undemocratic and I deplore the attitude of the Prime Minister ... it portends ill for the 
future of the country."^' Thus in casting such a wide net, Mahathir managed to subdue 
the opposition and consolidate his position, but not without hampering the process of 
political development. 
69. In November and December 2002, the Board recommended the release of five KeADlLan 
activists, but the Government ignored its recommendations. P. Ramakrishnan, the head of the 
civil society group Aiiran said in the Aliran Media statement of March 10, 2003. "The Advisory 
Board comes across as nothing more than a farcical facade of democracy which makes a 
mockery of justice." ["Scope of the ISA Advisory Board" Aliran Monthly, March 2003, Vol. 
XXIII, No. 3]. 
70. Diane K. Mauzy, "Malaysia in 1987: Decline of the Malay Way," Asian Survey, February 1988, 
Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, p. 215. 
71. Strait Times, October 30, 1987, cited in Ibid. p. 218. 
In the wake of financial crisis in 1997-98, Mahathir faced the second biggest 
challenge to his leadership, this time from his Deputy, Anwar Ibrahim. The rift 
became wide open between the two men over the differences in economic polices as 
well as due to the clash between their political ambitions. On September 2, 1998, 
Mahathir sacked Anwar from the government and later Anwar was arrested under the 
ISA. He was convicted of misuse of power and sodomy in trials marred by high 
drama which showed coerced confessions as well as change of statements by 
witnesses, re-drafting of charges by the prosecution many a times, and also a 
revelation that Anwar was beaten up in police custody by the chief of police force. 
The IGP pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two months' imprisonment for serious 
injuries suffered by Anwar.^ ^ After long trials, Anwar was finally convicted in August 
2000 of sodomy and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment, to be served 
consecutively with an earlier six-year sentence in April 1999 for alleged abuse of 
ministerial powers. The leading international human rights organizations hold him to 
be a prisoner of conscience as his prosecution was motivated with the design to 
remove him from public political life. 
At the end of year 2002, seventy one people were languishing in jails under 
the ISA. Thirty seven arrests were made in the year 2002 itself, with none brought to 
trial.''' The conviction rate is very low under the ISA. In most cases, trials are not 
even attempted by the authorities. This clearly points toward mala fides. In principle, 
the ISA should be used sparingly and against serious crimes or criminals or against 
the threats of very serious nature. Its abuse is mainly political. Therefore, we can't 
72. Hari Singh, "Democratization or Oligarchic Restructuring? The Politics of Reform in Malaysia," 
Government and Opposition, Autumn 2000, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 543. The torture in police custody 
is commonplace in Malaysia. See G.Lim, "Policing the Police: Human Rights, Politics and the 
Police," Aliran Monthly, September 2002, Vol. XXII, No. 9; P. Ramakrishnan, "Abuse of Power 
under the ISA," Aliran Monthly, November 2001, Vol. XXI, No. 11. 
73. AIReporl,2003,p. 169. 
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have its abuse-less implementation unless it is repealed altogether or until serious kind 
of safeguards are introduced in it. Unless punishment is prescribed against the 
detaining authorities for misuse of preventive detention laws, human rights regime 
and a fuller democracy can't usher in Malaysia. The Article 151 of the Constitution of 
Malaysia should not only be restored to its original status but the recourse to any 
preventive detention law in normal times or circumstances should be strictly 
prohibited. 
The irony is that the opposition is unable to provide a genuine alternative or 
even deny two-third majority to the government. And the government, through a mix 
of continuous economic growth, accommodation, patronage, media control and 
repressive laws, has entrenched itself in power. Unless the genuine alternative to the 
government emerges, we can't expect rapid development towards democratization 
and enforcement of human rights. However, the political consciousness is increasing 
in the society as symbolized by the reformasi. The elections at frequent intervals have 
sharpened the political culture towards democratization and secularization. The 
people are taking the repressive character of the government into stride as long as it is 
delivering in certain respects and the opposition remains weak and disunited. 
However, it is no mean achievement of the government that it has ensured conditions 
of relative peace stability and prosperity over such a long period of time. 
Media, Rights and Democracy 
Free media is synonymous with the freedom of speech and expression in any 
democratic set-up. It is the best valve against the arbitrariness of government and 
facilitates democratic change. A vibrant free press is the prerequisite of a well-
functioning and well-ordered democratic society. Ii is the most important link 
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between the government and the citizens. It keeps government aware of the social 
pulse, thus responsive and corrective. It also helps citizens in formulating independent 
and rational choice while exercising vote. The need to restrict the airing or publishing 
of extreme views, which may lead to ill will or violence among different sections of 
society can't be disputed. However, the curbs upon the slightest pretexts and blurring 
the distinction between the government and the state are inconsistent with any norms 
of democratic process as well as freedom of speech and expression. 
Media in some fundamental respects in Malaysia is as free as the government 
allows it to be. It operates under various restrictive and coercive laws. For Malaysian 
readers of the mainstream press the resuh is a daily diet of self-censored news. Any 
extreme critical view of the ruling establishment is easily given the colour of sedition 
and the person can be booked under the sedition Act.^ "* Besides, the Defamation Act 
and Censorship Board Act are too heavily loaded against the journalists, and 
frequently invoked. 
The Official Secrets Act (OSA) gives wide powers to the government to 
prosecute any journalist who publishes official secrets without authorization. ' The 
Official Secrets Act was amended in 1986 to provide for mandatory minimum one-
74. Amnesty International Report, 2001, p. 164. 
75. The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Param Cumaraswamy 
was booked under defamation suits in 1995 for comments he made in his official capacity 
concerning complaints that certain business entities were able to manipulate the Malaysian 
courts. In 1999, The International Court of Justice gave a ruling that held him immune from 
prosecution. After a long time, in July 2000, the High Court in Malaysia struck down 
defamation suits against Cumaraswamy. In March 2001, the Chief Justice, Mohamad Dzaiddin 
Abdullah recommended limits on the size of defamation awards to avoid unjustified curbs on the 
freedom of expression. Amnesty International Report 2000; Ibid. 2003, p. 169. 
76. Mohamad £zan Nor, leader of the youth branch of Parti Keadilan Nasional (PKN) was 
sentenced to two-years imprisonment in August 2002 for reading out documents regarding 
investigations by the Anti-Corruption Agency into senior government ministers at a press 
conference in 1999. Ibid. p. 170. 
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year imprisonment to the offender.'^ Earlier the penalty was not mandatory and 
judiciary had full discretion to determine the amount of penalty. Moreover, the onus 
to prove his innocence is upon the accused in most offences under the OSA. The 
government should not be allowed to have the discretion to stamp any document as 
secret. Only the documents related to national security should come within the 
purview of such classification. Instead of tightening the laws like the OSA, thus, 
curtailing further the right to free expression, the government should recognize the 
citizens' right to information in a democracy. Moreover, all offences are not of same 
nature while some can be committed under ignorance, too. Therefore, the prescription 
of minimum penalty of one-year imprisonment under OSA defies any logic of 
jurisprudence. 
To circumvent the freedom of press, further, the Government has at its 
disposal the most arbitrary and anti-democratic, the Printing Presses and Publications 
Act, which was enacted in 1984.^  This Act requires all publications and Printers to 
obtain licenses and, further, they are required to apply for annual renewal of their 
licenses from the Minister of Home Affairs. The Minister's decision is final and he 
can revoke any license by exercising his discretion. Newspapers risk losing their 
licences if they exalt the virtues of the opposition and compete with each other to 
77. Gurinit Singh, ed. No To Secrecy: The campaign against the 1986 amendments to the Malaysian 
Official Secrets Act, Petaling Jaya, 1987, p. 1. Although the Bill had been tabled in the 
Parliament as far back in 1983, the Government's efforts to tighten the noose was occasioned by 
some events in 1986. Two articles critical of the "moral rot" in the ruling establishment and the 
Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin's financial activities (it was alleged that he stood to profit 
from his sale of United Malayan Banking Corporation shares to Pernas (a government 
corporation) published in Asian Wall Street Journal (April 30, 1986 and September 29, 1986) 
led to a suspension of the AWSJ and the expulsion of its two resident journalists. That was 
successfully challenged in the Supreme Court, but the government quickened it efforts to tighten 
the Official Secrets Act. 
78. Ibid. 
79. A.H. Sidek, "Restrictions," op.cit. 
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extol the virtues of the government.^" A Malay newspaper Minggnau Waktu was 
Q j 
banned in 1991 for criticizing the Prime Minister. The Government prohibited 
public sales of PAS newspaper, Harakah, in early 1990s. In March 2000, it's 
publication frequency was cut down from twice a week to twice a month. It was in 
the wake of prosecution of Anwar in 1998-99, which Harakah covered in detail, 
quadrupling the readership of the bi-weekly to three and a half lakhs. Under the terms 
of its license, Harakah can be sold only to the members of the PAS. In fact, the very 
terms of license are ridiculous, particularly in a democratic country. A political party 
should definitely have the right to propagate its views, ideology and policies to a cross 
section of people. Restricting it is the negation of freedom of expression. Moreover, 
how the government can decide over the frequency of opposition newspaper. It is not 
consistent with the principle of open and free competition for political power. 
All these repressive measures are on top of the fact that most of the major 
newspapers as well as radio and television stations in Malaysia are either directly 
owned by the ruling alliance members or their close associates. The ruling parties' 
propaganda is unabashedly pedaled to the public through government-controlled 
media. The major dailies like the New Strait Times and the Utusan Malaysia are 
controlled by the UMNO. The star is owned by the MCA. 
The media is biased. The government's policies and actions are given huge 
coverage by the media, particularly the alliance-controlled media. An 'independent' 
case study examined the coverage of the New Strait Times, The Star and The Sun 
80. Hari Singh, "The 1995," op.cit. p. 399. The licence of three newspapers {The Star, Watan and 
Sin Chew Jit Poh), which toed the line of opposition during the crisis of 1987, was revolted in 
October. However, their licences were restored in March 1988. In the year 2000, the pro-reform 
magazines, Detik and EksklusifwerQ denied the renewal of their licences. 
81. Michael Vatikiotis, "A Tabloid Tamed," FEER, Jan. 9, 1992, 
82. Mustafa Anwar, "When Other Voices are Curbed," Aliran Monthly, January 2001, Vol. XXI, 
No. 6. 
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during the campaigning period of the 1999 General Elections in Malaysia. The study 
found out almost all the news reports, opinions and letters published in these 
newspapers were substantially favourable towards the ruling alliance and detrimental 
towards opposition. 
Tlie ownership or control of the media by the political parties is imbued with 
anti-democratic spirit in two areas. First, the persecution of the opposition-owned 
media by the government takes place. Second, media loses credibility among the 
public as they start looking at it as biased, thus, relying increasingly upon rumours 
and foreign media. Internet is emerging as the main source of information in 
Malaysia.^ "^  The editor of on-line paper Malaysiakini, Steven Gas was one of the four 
journalists selected for year 2000 to receive the International Press Freedom Award 
by the Committee to Protect Journalists. Internet media relatively independent. " 
Though, it faces digital divide as the rural and the poor masses do not have access to 
it. 
The visual media is particularly useful to the regime for not only distorting the 
opposition's platforms but also for blurring the vital distinction between the 
government and the state. The patriotic songs subdy extol the achievements and 
virtues of the government and thus, are instrumental in socializing the masses into the 
ideology of the regime and its efficacy for stability and growth. ^ ^ 
83. Wong Kok Keong, "Unfair Coverage: A book at the mainstream media's bias 'in tlie 1999 
general election," ^ /(/-awMow/A/y, January 2001, Vol. XXI, Issue 1. 
84. Hari Singh, "Bittersweet, op.cit., pp. 251-2. 
85. The only advantage to on-line media over the traditional mainstream media is that it does not 
have to apply for licence or its renewal annually. However, the Sedition Act, the OSA, the ISA 
etc. are applicable here too. 
86. Aliran Monthly, Vol. 10, No. 11, 1990, pp. 16-19; Ibid. Vol. 15, No. 1, 1995, pp. 3, 10; Hari 
Singh, "The 1995" op.d/. p. 399. 
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The contempt of court has become controversial in recent times. There is no 
uniform pattern in dealing with the cases of contempt by the judiciary. It is misused, 
too. For instance, Zainur Zakaria, the President of the Malaysian Bar and one of 
Anwar Ibrahim's defence lawyer was summarily sentenced to three months 
imprisonment for filing an affidavit on behalf of his client, which alleged that the two 
public prosecutors had attempted to fabricate evidence against Anwar. The 
application requested the court to disqualify the two prosecutors from being part of 
the prosecution team. The documents in support of evidence were attached with the 
application. Politically motivated, the High Court Judge booked Zainur under 
contempt of court on the plea that by filing a "baseless" application, he had tried to 
"undermine the integrity" of trial. Zainur was not even allowed the time to prepare his 
defence and call witness in support of his affidavit. The Court of Appeal also upheld 
the decision. The Federal Court, however, overturned the ruling and severely indicted 
the High Court judge for his "blatant disregard of rules of procedure" and normal 
judicial process. The Federal Court held that the judge by the "speedy finding of guilt 
without even allowing Zainur to call any witness, had given the picture that he was 
behaving as though he was acting as the lawyer for the two prosecutors."^^ Thus, it is 
a clear case of bias by the High Court Judge in a high profile case. Not only he 
violated the rules of fair trial but also invoked contempt proceedings where no ground 
existed for them. Zainur's affidavit, even if in case it could not be sustained, was in no 
way an attempt to obstruct the course of justice. The point is that why can't a judge be 
booked for showing contempt of the principles of natural justice and fair play. 
87. Raja A. Addruse and Malik I. Sarwar, "Restoring Logic and Reason: The Zainur Zakaria Affair: 
An Analysis of Judicial Indepdnence, Aliran Monthly, June 2001, Vol. XXI, No. 6. 
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Some other major obstacles in the better realization of human rights are the 
Societies Act 1964 and the Police Act 1967, which are violative of the freedom of free 
association and assembly. The Societies Act requires every society, association or 
political party to seek government's permission for its establishment. The Registrar of 
societies has been given wide discretion including the power to de-register any society 
on security or moral grounds, or for deviating from its original goals. The Registrar 
comes under the jurisdiction of Home Ministry. In 1988, the High Court Ruling 
declared the UMNO unlawful. The Registrar at the behest of government played trick 
upon two applications of rival groups, and finally recognized Mahathir's outfit as the 
successor of the original UMNO. 
The trade union activities are also curbed in Malaysia. Although there are 
national level unions like Malaysian Trade Union Congress, in-house unions are 
encouraged by the government.^° The Government on September 22, 1988 took a 
decision to allow the formation of in-house unions for the 85000 strong work force in 
the electronics industry, which was hitherto deprived of union activity. In Malaysia, 
the Registrar of Trade Unions (Director General of the Department of Trade Unions) 
has the power to refuse registration to a union if he is convinced that an appropriate 
union in that industry or field already exists. The trade unions have been prohibited to 
create political fiands, and their officials can't hold posts in political parties.^' Thus, 
inter-union competition and alternative options are generally discouraged. The right to 
strike is highly restricted. 
88. Jason P. Abbott, op. cit., p. 247. 
89. K.S. Nathan, "Malaysia," op.cit., pp. 130-1. 
90. Fatimah Halim, "The Transformation of the Malaysian State," Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
1990, Vol. XX, No. l,p. 76. 
91. Anthony Woodiwiss, Globalization, Human Rights and Labour Law in Pacific Asia, Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, pp. 21i-I2. 
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Under the Police Act, prior permission of officer-in-charge of a Police District 
is required to hold public meetings and rallies. The Police Officer can deny the 
permission under one pretext or another and has the power to proscribe subjects to be 
touched in the speech. He has also the power to prescribe the time limit for any such 
meeting. These restrictions are not reasonable and therefore not consistent with the 
right to peaceful assembly granted by Article 10 of the Constitution. However, the 
courts have refused to look into the reasonability of restrictive laws enacted under 
clause 2 of Article 10. The Government has always applied these restrictions 
selectively and discriminately against the opposition rallies and meetings. The 
opposition parties and the NGOs are frequently refused the right to assemble 
peacefully.^" Suhakam indicted the police in its first annual report for violently 
dispersing peaceful demonstrations. The next year, Suhakam criticized government's 
ban on political gatherings and recommended that the police need only be notified of 
public meetings rather than the condition of seeking permit from the police.^ '^  
Malaysia has not so far signed or ratified the basic international agreements 
on human rights. It has yet to sign International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) 1966; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) 1986; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, 1965; and Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984. Malaysia ratified in 1995 the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) 1979. Yet some legal discrimination continues against women by certain 
92. Aliran Monthly, September 2002, Vol. XXII, No. 9. 
93. AI, 2003, p. no. 
94. Ramdas Tikamdas, "Has the State of Human Rights Improved in Malaysia?" Aliran Monthly, 
April 2001, Vol. XXI, No. 4. 
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clauses of Immigration Act 1963, Employee Social Security Act 1969 and some 
provisions of citizenship laws.'"'' Despite all these lacunas, it is very assuring that 
Malaysia is a signatory to the Convention Against Genocide, given the precarious 
communal balance in the country. 
The National Human Rights Commission, Suhakam, created by an Act of the 
Parliament in 1999 is gradually coming into its own. It has criticised the government 
on its poor record in protecting the rights of citizens, on a number of occasions. 
Although, it has not been provided with teeth, and aspersions have been cast upon its 
. . . Of, 
composition and autonomy. 
Ethno-Economic Imbalance and Protective Discrimination 
The constitution of Malaysia ensures "equality before law and equal 
protection of law." ^ Notwithstanding, the highest office can't be occupied by a non-
Malay, Islam is the state religion, Malay the official language and special privileges 
have been granted to the humiputeras. In fundamental respects, rule of law prevails in 
Malaysia. Laws are equally applicable to all. Everybody is free to practice or prol^ss 
religion of his choice. Citizenship laws are equally applicable to all. Any citizen can 
occupy the office of the Prime Minister, the real executive head. The people are not 
prohibited, discriminately, from occupying any profession or trade. There is Universal 
Adult Franchise hood and legislative seats are open to all. The people can't be 
discriminated by law on the basis of religion, race or descent.^^ 
95. Prema Devraj, "Legal Discrimination continues: Is the Issue of Justice for Women Not a 
Necessity?" Aliran Monthly, October 2000, Vol. XX, No. 10. 
96. Fan Yew Teng, "Disappointing Composition: A critique of the National Human Rights 
Commission," Aliran Monthly, April 2000, Vol. XX, No. 4. 
97. Federal Constitution, Article 8, Clause 1. 
98. /i/c/. Article 11. 
99. Federal Constitution, Article 8, Clause 2. It says "Except as expressly authorized by this 
Constitution there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, 
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The clause uses the words "except as expressly provided by this Constitution". 
Thus, outside the scope of expressly provided permissible limits requiring different 
treatment from the general norms, any law or action violative of the provisions under 
this clause may be declared unconstitutional by the courts. This Article is very wide in 
its scope as it covers general dimensions of equality. The constitution also protects the 
federal principle of equality, and prohibits discrimination in favour of any person on 
the ground that he is subject of any particular state. 
The permissible grounds of protective discrimination under right to equality 
have already been discussed. However, those are merely in the form of exceptions and 
do not prescribe measures of protective discrimination. When Malaysia became 
independent, the Malays constituted majority but they were the most backward 
community. In no area, their strength or status was commensurate with their numbers. 
The Chinese were dominating the trade, industry, services and education. Since the 
Malays were lagging far behind vis-a-vis the Chinese and the Indians, some special 
rights and privileges were considered imperative for them. Since they had numerical 
majority, they were in a political position to push for special privileges in their favour, 
successfully. 
The special privileges, though, unusual for the majority community to claim, 
were consistent with the goals of equity. As we have discussed in the second chapter 
that formal equality in cases where inequalities are acute only sharpens and reinforces 
inequality. In fact, in the absence of substantive package of affirmative action in 
favour of the Malays in the economic field in the early period after independence i.e. 
race, descent or place of birth in any law or in appointment to any office or employment under a 
public authority or in the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or 
disposition of property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, 
vocation or employment." 
100. //);W. Article! 53, Clause 3. 
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from 1957 to 1970, inequality of income between the Chinese and the Malays actually 
increased.' ' Therefore, justification existed for Article 153 that envisages a wide 
range of protective discrimination measures in favour of bumipurteras in public 
1 09 
services, business and education. Regarding education, it specifically provides for 
reservation of bumiputeras for admission on a preferential basis in educational 
103 
institutions. 
However, the constitution concedes due rights of all the communities or 
persons from deprivation against existing facilities in education or business being 
enjoyed by them while extending privileges to the bumiputeras. No business or 
trade can be solely restricted or reserved for the bumiputeras.'"^ Thus, Article 153 not 
only provides privileges for the socio-economically weak majority, but certain 
protections for the minorities are also ingrained in it. The Article, however, is 
inconsistent with the principle of equality in one major respect, viz. it does not 
101. R.S. Milne and D.K. Mauzy, Politics, op. cit. pp.328-29; Lim Lin Lean, The pattern of Income 
Distribution in West Malaysia, 1957-]970, Geneva, 1974. 
102, Federal Constitution. The Clause 1 and 2 of Article 153 read as: "it shall be the responsitbilty of 
the Yang-di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of 
the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article." 
"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,but subject to the provisions of Article 40 and of 
this Article, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall exercise his functions under this Constitution and 
federal law in such manner as may be necessary to safeguard the special position of the Malays 
and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and to ensure the reservation for Malays 
and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak of such proportion as he may deem 
reasonable of positions in the public service (other than the public service of a State) and of 
scholarships, exhibitions and other similar educational or training privileges or special facilities 
given or accorded by the Federal Government and, when any permit or licence for the operation 
of any trade or business is required by federal law, then, subject to the provisions of that law and 
this Article, of such permits and licences." 
103. Ibid. Section (8A) of Article 153 reads, thus: "Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, 
where in any University, College and other educational institution providing education after 
Malaysian Certificate of Education or its equivalent, the number of places offered by the 
authority responsible for the management of the University, College or such educational 
institution to candidates for any course of study is less than the number of candidates qualified 
for such places, it shall be lawfijl for the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by virtue of this Article to give 
such directions to the authority as may be required to ensure the reservation of such proportion 
of such places for Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak as the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong may deem reasonable; and the authority shall duly comply with the directions." 
104. /i/J. Article 153, Clause 4. 
105. /6/d'. Article 153, Clause 9. 
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provide for a time period, or a deadline to review the special privileges for the 
bumiputeras. Such specifications must be part of the constitutional scheme. It 
becomes all the more imperative in case the privileges are extended to the majority 
community. 
Protective discrimination measures were attempted immediately after the 
independence in favour of the Malays. These measures were primarily concentrated in 
agriculture, small-scale industries, and establishment of the banks to extend loans to 
the Malays on a preferential basis.'°^ However, these measures did not make any 
significant impact upon the condition of the Malays. Their involvement in the 
corporate sector almost remained negligible. In comparison to the Malays, the income 
of the Chinese rose considerably. The poverty was mainly concentrated among the 
Malays."'^ 
The first two Malayan Plans (1956-60 and 1961-65) avowed economic growth 
and the elimination of economic disparity among the ethnic groups as their main 
objectives. However, at implementation stage, the first objective was given the 
attention while the latter was ignored believing that high economic growth would 
result in higher employment rates and opportunities, which will ultimately help to 
rectify the disparities. The First Malaysia Plan (1966-70) continued with the same 
focus. The economic growth was quite impressive during all these years."'** However, 
106. R.S. Milne & D.K. Mauzy, Politics, op.cit., pp. 321-28. 
107. The various agencies set up in 50s and 60s to help the rural Malays like Federal Land 
Development Authority (FELDA), the Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority (FAMA) and 
the Agricultural Bank of Malaysia failed to alleviate poverty and indebtedness among the rural 
poor. See, K.V. Vorys, Democracy, op.cit., Ch. 16; Andaya and Andaya, A History, op.cit., pp. 
282-4. 
108. First Malaysia Plan achieved 6.1 percent growth in economy in GNP terms against the projected 
target of 5 percent increase. K.V. Vorys, Democracy, op.cit., p.407. 
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the disparities between the bumiputeras and non-bumiputeras grew. The income 
disparity between the rich and the poor increased between 1957 to 1970.' 
All that led to dissatisfaction with the existing arrangement culminating in the 
communal riots in 1969. The main cause of the riots was identified by the 
establishment as the poverty and economic deprivation of Malay community and 
inter-ethnic disparities, which needed to be corrected if stability, peace and growth 
were to be achieved. The government came to the conclusion that the "bargain" 
affected at the time of Independence had fallen short of rectifying economic 
inequalities despite assuring constitutional privileges to the Malays. The broken peace 
had necessitated the acceleration of existing, and, creation of new, affirmative policies 
in favour of Malays. 
Equity Restructuring: The New Economic Policy 
Against such backdrop, the New Economic Policy was conceived. It was to be 
implemented over a period of twenty years with the objective of creating conditions 
of national unity by reducing poverty and inter-ethnic income disparities. The Second 
Malaysian Plan outlined its purpose, 
National unity is ... unattainable without greater equity and 
balance among Malyasia's social and ethnic groups in their 
participation in the development of the country and in the sharing 
in the benefits from modernization and economic growth. ... The 
plan incorporates a two-pronged New Economic Policy for 
development. The first prong seeks to reduce and eventually 
eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and increasing 
employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race. 
The second prong aims at accelerating in process of restructuring 
Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce 
and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic 
function. This process involves the modernization of rural life, a 
rapid and balanced growth of urban activities and the creation of 
a Malay commercial and industrial community in all categories 
109. Kwame Sundaram Jomo, A Question of Class: Capital, tlie Stale and Uneven Development in 
Malaya, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1986, p. 249. 
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and at all levels of operation, so that Malays and other indigenous 
people will become full partners in all aspects of the economic life 
of the nation. The New Economic Policy is based upon a rapidly 
expanding economy which offers increasing opportunities for all 
Malaysians, as well as additional resources for development. Thus 
in the implementation of this Policy, the Government will ensure 
that no particular group will experience any loss or feel any sense 
of deprivation. 
Thus it was made clear that restructuring would be achieved, primarily, 
through sustained economic growth and interventionist equity promotion policies by 
the government, not through transfer or takeover of Chinese enterprises. Four areas 
were given specific attention in pursuit of restructuring goals. First, the income gap 
among various ethnic groups as well as regions was to be reduced. Second, greater 
employment opportunities for Malays at each sectoral level were to be generated. 
Third, the redistribution of the ownership and control of corporate sector and the 
creation of bumiputera commercial and industrial community was to be achieved. 
Fourth, the poverty was to be reduced from the 1970 period of forty nine percent of 
household to seventeen percent by 1990." 
To correct the ethnic imbalance, the NEP explicitly focused at corporate 
restructuring v/ith the clear aim to achieve the target of thirty percent of industrial and 
commercial share capital in all categories and scales of operation for the Malays by 
the year 1990 i.e. by the end of the NEP period. The foreigners' share was to be 
reduced to the level of thirty percent, while other Malaysians' share was targeted at 
forty percent. In 1971, the ownership of share capital in limited companies, a 
significant measure of industrial and commercial sector, was just 1.9 percent for the 
Malays, 22.5 percent for the Chinese, 1% for the Indians and huge 60.7 percent for 
110. Government of Malaysia, Second Malaysian Plan, 1971-75, Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 
1971, pp. 1-4. 
111. Anita Doraisami "The Political, op.cit., p. 250. 
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the foreigners. Thus, the equity had to be achieved at the cost of foreign sliare, not 
the Chinese' share in the economy. The share of Malays in the corporate economy 
was to be increased fifteen times in the next twenty years, while the share of the 
foreign ownership was to be reduced by half This was by all standards quite an 
ambitious target, necessitating direct government intervention to promote the Malays 
business interests. To increase the Malay percentage of share capital in limited 
companies, the government set targets of nine percent by 1975, sixteen percent by 
1980, twenty three percent by 1985 and thirty percent by 1990."^ 
The Second Malaysia Plan (1971-75) focused upon rural sector. The majority 
of the bumiputeras were concentrated in rural areas. The focus remained growth 
oriented. Instead of directly tackling the problems of poverty and indebtedness, the 
state concentrated upon land development, small credit schemes, better irrigation and 
electricity. The land redistribution schemes were continued with greater zeal. The 
Second Plan projected 6.5 percent annual increase in the GNP, while it achieved 7.4 
percent."" The bumiputera share ownership in public companies rose according to 
schedule during the plan period."^ 
The Trust agencies and state-owned enterprises were charged with the 
responsibility of mobilizing resources and accumulating capital on behalf of 
bumiputeras. Public sector allocations for the premier agencies and programmes 
] 12. Fred R. Mehden, "Communalism, Industrial Policy and Income Distribution in Malaysia," Asian 
Survey, 1975, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 247-61 (250); James W. Morley, ed. Driven by Growth: 
Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region, ME Sharpe, New York, 1993, p. 151. 
113. Government of Malaysia, Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75, Govt. 
Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1973, p. 82. 
114. S.W. Andaya and L.Y. Andaya, A History, op.cit., p. 284. 
115. K.S. Jomo, "Whither Malaysia's New Economic Policy," Pacific Affairs, Winter, 1991, Vol. 63, 
No. 4, pp. 469-99 (476). 
177 
linked with the NEP were increased manifold."^ Merely by rapid economic growth 
and creation of assets by the state, the NEP goals could not be achieved. Therefore, 
the government undertook upon itself the tasks of encouraging investments, 
promoting exports, building infrastructure, generating employment, creating public 
enterprises, redistributing resources as well as providing opportunities to the Malays 
at easily accessible and preferential terms, The government adopted three-pronged 
strategy. First, it tried to modernize the agriculture with promotion of agro-based 
industries as well as basic infrastructure and credit facilities in rural areas. Second, it 
selectively concentrated upon urban industrial sector as through employment 
generation Malays could be accommodated there, apart from generation of revenues. 
I 1 7 
Third, the affirmative programmes were intensified further. 
The Government heavily funded the public enterprises and agencies. It 
involved purchasing of shares on behalf of Malays, too. The Bumiputera Investment 
Foundation (BIF) was established in 1974 to increase bumiputera investment in 
shares. The pioneer Agency in the government's effort to intensify Malay share 
capital was Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB). It was entrusted with the task to 
select and acquire shares in companies with sound potential health."' In 1981, it set 
up Amnah Sahain Nasional (ASN) with the purpose of buying PNB's shares and 
selling them to Malay individuals. 
116. Second Plan, op.cit., pp. 68-71; For instance FELDA received 12.5 percent of share of the total 
public sector investment in the Second Plan. The share of rural credit schemes was 2.1 percent. 
Ibid. 
117. K.V. Vorys, Democracy, op.cit., pp. 402-3. 
118. Steve Majstorovic, "The Politics of ethnicity and Post - Cold War Malaysia: The dynamics of 
an ethnic state," in M.T. Berger and D.A. Borer, The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of The 
Pacific Century, Routledge, London, 1997, p. 158. 
119. With heavy funding from the state, PNB purchased substantial stakes in many of Malaysia's 
high profit companies. By 1988, PNB controlled around twenty five percent of the finance 
sector and thirty six percent of the plantations. By the 90s, it became Malaysia's largest 
shareholder of corporate equity. See, Anita Doraisami, "The Political," op.cit., p. 251. 
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The fiscal policy was inextricably linked to the NEP. In 1973, the Banking 
Act was passed. It imposed a cap of thirty percent on foreign equity in banking sector 
and froze the setting up of foreign banks in Malaysia. It also required foreign-owned 
banks to comply with the NEP requirements.'^" The distinction between private and 
public became increasingly blurred. The Second Plan explicitly declared that the 
public policy would favour projects "with management and ownership by Malays," 
and public investment would be channeled through the government agencies and 
corporations to new industries, which would "offer more opportunities for 
participation by Malays." Initially the government depended on voluntary 
compliance by industry. Relief in corporation tax was extended to the firms 
employing a certain number of Malay workers. However, the progress did not occur 
at the desired level and there was a tendency among the firms to hire Malays at lower 
grades of employment. To overcome such problem, the Industrial Coordination Act 
(ICA) was passed in 1976, which required firms with capital share of more than P.M 
0.25 million to employ thirty percent Malays at every level of employment. The 
Minister of Trade was given the authority to grant or revoke manufacturing licences 
of the firms not complying with government guidelines in this regard. 
The NEP was helped in the first decade by expanding job market, export 
promotion, exploration of oil together with tremendous rise in oil prices and state 
intervention in the economy without invoking the fear that the gain of one community 
would amount to a significant loss of other community. The bumiputera share in the 
120. Ibid. p. 255. 
121. K.V. Vorys, Democracy, op. cit. pp. 410-11. 
122. To attract investments in the wake of recession in 1986, the exemption limit was revised to RM 
1 million. It was further revised, a little later, to RM 2.5 million or the firms engaging 75 or 
more full time employees. See, Fatimah Haiim, "The Transformation of the Malaysian State," 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, 1990, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 64-85 (73). 
123. Christine B.N. Chin, "The state of the 'state' in globalization: social order and economic 
restructuring in Malaysia," Third World Quarterly, 2000, Vol. 21, No. 6, p. 1043. 
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corporate economy had gone up to 9.2 percent by 1975 and 12.4 percent in 1980 and 
significantly to 19.1 percent by 1985, the figures almost touching the targets.'^'' 
Interestingly, the Chinese' and the Indians' shares also increased, while the foreign 
share going down, as it was meant to be. The majority of the Malays were uneducated 
and under-skilled, thus, lacking the qualifications and the skills required for filling the 
jobs, especially, the managerial and the higher technical positions. Thus, there was 
dire need for bumiputera resource development i.e. for imparting training, education 
and skills to the Malays on preferential basis and enhancing opportunities for their 
employment. This involved increased opportunities in higher education. 
Education has been the largest item in federal government budget and the 
larger chunk goes into the tertiary education. In 1970, the Malay percentage of 
university students was forty percent, which rose to fifty seven percent in 1975 and, 
still further, to sixty seven percent in 1980. However, these figures do not show the 
true picture. More Chinese pursue their higher degrees overseas as compared to the 
Malays. Moreover, the Malays are more concentrated in liberal streams than 
professional and science streams as compared to other communities. For example, in 
1970, only twelve percent of the Malay students pursued degrees in Science as 
compared to forty nine percent of non-Malays. By 1975, the percentage of the Malays 
in Science stream had increased to twenty nine percent as compared to sixty five 
196 
percent of non-Malay students. To overcome this problem, the seats were reserved 
for the Malay students in all streams and at all levels of higher education. Technical 
schools, bypassing degree education, were opened up to train the Malays in technical 
and managerial fields. However, the Malays, still lag behind in the administrative and 
124. Ibid. pp. 1043-5. 
125. Steve Majstorovic, "The Politics, opxit., p. 158. 
126. Ibid. p. \ 59. 
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managerial positions as compared to Chinese in the private sector. Still, it is worth 
noting that in the public services, the Malays far outnumber the other communities.'^^ 
The percentage share of the bumiputeras in the corporate economy could rise 
by just 1.2 percent during the Fifth Plan.'^^ The economic crisis of mid-80s and the 
subsequent austerity as well as liberalization measures by the government slowed 
down the process. Though, the economic recession and the follow-up privatization 
drive affected some NEP-related programmes, sufficient care was taken to ensure that 
growing share of Malays in corporate wealth should not be whittled away by 
improper sales to non-Malays. A Central Information Collection Unit (CICU) was set 
up in 1985 to oversee more than 900 government owned companies involving 
investments totaling more than US $ 1.26 billion at par value.'^^ All public shares 
issued under privatization drive, reserved one-third of the shares in the primary issue 
I -1 A 
for bumiputeras. Thus, privatization didn't hamper the promotion of Malay 
corporate interest. 
Though, the target could not be achieved within the specified time period, 
still, the success was formidable. The NEP success could be attributed to the 
government's resolve and the consistent high economic growth rate over a period of 
two decades. The NEP in Malaysia proved to be one of the best exercises in equity 
restructuring across the globe, which has ever been accomplished in such relatively 
peaceful and consensual manner. It also caused ethnic polarization and some tension 
127. See K.S. Jomo, "Whither, op.cit. 
128. The equity ownership of the Malays in the corporate sector in 1990 was 20.3 percent. For 
Chinese, it was 44.9 percent and Indians' share was one percent. Government of Malaysia, The 
Second Outline Perspective Plan, National Printing Department, Kuala Lumpur, 1991, p. 12; 
Also see, K.S. Jomo, "Whither, op.cit. Table 7. 
129. Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysia, op.cit. p. 152. 
130. Suresh Narayan, "Fiscal Reforms in Malaysia; Behind a successful Experience," Asian Survey, 
1996, Vol. XXXVI, No. 9, p. 878. 
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over the issue but these were ever present in the Malaysian society. The equitable 
redistribution combined with the growing economy on a consistent basis. The Chinese 
were not deprived of their assets, avenues and businesses. The non-ht/mipii/cras 
corporate holdings increased from 32.3 percent to 46 percent, which was well above 
the target figure of 40 percent. Appreciating the Malaysian approach of economic 
restructuring, a United Nations Report states. 
Unlike many other countries, Malaysia refrained from 
nationalizing the assets of the richer minority community. This 
restraint ensured adherence to an efficient, market led economic 
framework and reassured the Chinese minority. Political power 
rested in the hands of the Malay majority, the bumiputeras. Their 
legitimate grievances were addressed largely through extensive 
intervention in the public sector, including programmes for 
affirmative action in education, technology and employment. 
Poverty, Class and Equity 
However, the accumulation and redistribution of assets by the state a.s well as 
the privatization drive assisted and regulated by the state had some negative 
consequences in store not only for the economy but also for fairer distribution across 
the classes. 
State subsidized development inputs encouraged the establishment of a 
complex system of patronage penetrating into all areas of life. As 
subsidies and contracts for development projects were awarded first 
and foremost on the basis of political position, party affiliation, family 
and friendship network, their cumulative effect was to seriously deepen 
the process of differentiation within the Malay community. The NEP 
was ostensibly for the Malay but for the Malay poor their lot had only 
improved marginally.'^^ 
In the process of equity restructuring through award of government contracts, 
the extension of subsidized business loans, relatively cheaper shares, special business 
131. United Nations Human Development Report 2000, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2001 
132. Fatimah Halim, "The Transformation, op.cit., p. 79. 
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quotas and licenses, etc. the government has extensively indulged in favouritism, 
patronage and corruption. Those who were well connected to the establishment 
could derive major benefits at the expense of others. The share allocations have been 
used to reward the UMNO supporters and the loyalists and close family members of 
the UMNO elite. Questioning the philosophy of patronized economy, Chandra says 
Those who are well-connected to the dominant elite have 
benefited disproportionately from the allocation of shares and 
the award of contracts compared to Malays without connections 
who are also entitled to shares and who may also be in a position 
to bid for contracts. Indeed, many Malays now know that the 
NEP was the creature of an economic philosophy that was bound 
to result in uneven development. '^  
The NEP tremendously helped the bumiputeras but not the majority of poor 
among them. There was reduction in poverty among bumiputeras in absolute terms 
but not in relative terms. The NEP could not do much to alleviate poverty and develop 
human resources in rural areas. The corporate ownership of the Malays increased ten 
times. But the gap between the rich and the poor also increased, despite the 
tremendous growth of economy, redistribution policies and poverty alleviation 
programmes.'^'^ As Mehmet observes, "Inter-racial income inequality, historically a 
major source of conflict in multi-racial Malaysia, is now being replaced by widening 
intra-ethnic inequality, especially among the Malays."'''^ 
Thus, the dilemma is how to reconcile the growth of Malay capitalists class 
with the majority of the Malays who are still deeply mired in poverty and 
133. The system of political patronage is well documented in E. Gomez and K. Jomo, MaUmia'.s 
Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1997. 
134. Chandra Muzaffar, "UMNO, PAS, Aliran Monthly, December 1999, Vol. XiX, No. 1, 
135. See, Ozay Mehmet, Development in Malaysia, Croom Helm, London, 1986; K.S. Jomo, A 
Question of Class: The State and Uneven Development in Malaysia, OUP, Singapore, 1986. 
136. Ibid. Preface. 
183 
backwardness. This problem can be illustrated with the example of the ASN - a unit 
trust scheme set up in 1981 to give investment opportunities to all the Malays. Shares 
were set at a constant value per unit and shareholding was restricted to fifty thousand 
units per individual in order to spread the benefits widely. Despite the government's 
efforts only forty five percent Malays had participated in the scheme by the late 
1980s. Of these 1.3 percent Malays owned seventy five percent of the ASN shares 
despite the limit of fifty thousand units per individual. Thus, even deconcentrated 
economy is unable to solve the problem of concentration of capital. According to one 
estimate, near about one hundred families owned about half the capital in Malaysian 
corporations. Thus, Malaysia is not free from the larger problem of equity, which is 
associated with all the capitalist systems. The share of income of poorest ten percent 
people in 1997 was 1.7 percent, while that of the richest ten percent was 38.4 
percent.'^^ The Gini Coefficient Index'^° for 1980 was 49, while for 1997 it was 
49.2."" 
Thus, huge gap persists between the rich and the poor. There are conclusive 
studies, which show that the gap between the rich and the poor has increased since 
independence although the number of poor below poverty line has decreased 
significantly.'•*•• The problem of equity has not been solved in its entirety. 
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CHAPTER V 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Southeast Asian nations, with the exception of Thailand, got Independence 
from colonial rules in the backdrop of, more or les, intense nationalist struggles. The 
ideas and institutions of liberal democracy found considerable appeal among the 
leaders and intelligentia. But their democratic experiments proved to be short-lived. 
The trend was initiated by Indonesia towards the end of 1950s where, in a gradual 
shift "fifty percent plus one" democracy was replaced by "Guided Democracy" of 
Sukarno and later, by the same logic, even his brand of semi-democracy had to pave 
way for authoritarian rule of Suharto, which continued for three decades. One of the 
reasons for authoritarian takeover in Indonesia was the threat of communism. The 
same threat was invoked by democratically twice-elected Marcos in Philippines who 
towards the end of his second term, imposed Martial Law in 1972 and established 
himself at the helm as dictator. His idea of "constitutional authoritarianism" was 
marked by importance of stability over participatory politics.' In Malaysia, the 
complex numerical configuration of three principal etlinic group and economic 
imbalance between the majority and minority communities imposed limits from the 
very beginning upon the liberal progress in an otherwise fully functional democracy. 
The same problem along with extremely small size, easily facilitated the practice of 
single party rule in Singapore. 
Immature, fragile and non-secular political culture and lack of 
institutionalization of democratic procedures was attributed behind the collapse of 
1. M.C. Yong, "Political Structures," in Nicholas Turling, ed. The Cambridge History of Southeast 
Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 426. 
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democratic regimes after the Second World War. Lucian Pye contrasted two 
conceptions of authority in Southeast Asia. While one was influence by colonial 
tradition, the other was rooted in indigenous cultural traditions. Initially, the former 
prevailed but during the course of time, in the absence of structured institutional 
support, the latter revived. Sukarno took the lead in this respect when he abandoned 
the liberal democratic structures in favour of patrimonial rule (Guided Democracy) 
based on the traditional principles of irwafaqal, musjawarah and golong-rojong. 
A brief description of the process of political development followed by the 
important polities of Southeast Asia is imperative for the purpose of present analysis 
to arrive at generalizations and of delineate the model of political development in 
Southeast Asia, if any. 
Thailand 
The political development in Thailand has followed far more complicated 
trajectory than any other country in the region. It was the only country to escape 
European colonialism. It was not influenced by the foreign factors to the same degree 
in its political development as was the case with other nations of the region. There 
was no particular external power whose model could be copied or which could induce 
political changes in the political system of Thailand, unlike Malaysia or Philippines, 
which decisively modelled their political systems on the British and American 
pallerns, respectively. The traditional institutions and practices were not abruptly 
thrown out or given up. The political process and political culture of the country is 
constantly evolving and maturing on the path of democratization, though, with 
occasional setbacks. The process of political development in the country is not 
2. Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority; Belknap Press, 
Cambridge, 1985. 
3. 13. Glioshal, Indonesia Politics 1955-59: The Emergence of Guided Democracy, Bagchi & Co., 
Calcutta, 1982. 
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unilinear or unidirectional. Whatever be its course, the process is relatively self-
directed as can be expected in societies with non-colonial background. 
The initial modernization drive undertaken by the kings Mongkut (1851-68) 
and Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) had unleashed modernization currents in the society 
and produced a group of educated people who could not be easily excluded from 
power sharing. A coalition of soldiers and intellectuals engineered a bloodless coup 
d'etat in 1932 that radically altered the political landscape of the country.^ Although, 
it did not ushered in the persistence of democracy, yet changed altogether the 
character of monarchy viz., from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy. 
Monarchy has survived since then but in limited sense only. Therefore, 1932 can be 
considered as a watershed year in Thailand's political development. Political activism 
expanded considerably after the overthrow of the absolute monarchy. Thais were led 
by People's Party led by Pridi Phanomyong. It received considerable support from the 
workers and students. A constitution was proclaimed which provided for unicameral 
national legislature but half of its members were to be appointed by the executive. It 
guaranteed universal suffrage to men and women, but various elections were excluded 
from exercising it. Elections were held next year. The debates in the tlrst National 
Assembly were quite vigorous and illuminating reflecting the broadening of political 
space. However, the monarchists attempted an armed rebellion but could not find 
public support and were defeated by the government. However, the conflict between 
the monarchists and the democrats did not end. It continued with low intensity, which 
gave military increasing space, conversely, narrowing down the free democratic 
4. David M. Jones, Political Development in Pacific Asia, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 103-4. 
5. Nicholas Tarling, Nations and States in Southeast Asia, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1998, p. 41. 
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space. By 1938, the military firmly established its control. The military had tasted the 
political power and now, was in search of directly controlling the political system. 
The military regime started introducing policies which smacked of increasing 
authoritarianism. It cooperated with Japanese. The soldiers and bureaucrats were 
appointed to the legislature in large numbers and were also given dominant role in the 
executive organs of the government.'^  
With the end of second world war, Phibun, The Prime Minister/ a military 
man, stood discredited and was succeeded by his longtime chief civilian adversary, 
Pridi Phanomyong. Thus, civilian rule was re-established. A new constitution was 
proclaimed in 1946 providing for bi-cameralism, with the lower house popularly 
elected and the members of the upper house elected by the lower house. Pridi got 
substantial legislative majority in the elections held under the new constitution in 
1946. However, he once again entered into rift with the royalists after first coopting 
them. By mid-1946, the assassination of King Mahidol forced Pridi's resignation."' It 
created once again a situation for the military to intervene. The military under the 
leadership of his old rival Phibun staged third successful coup d'etat, in November 
1947. The next decade might be considered one of clear-cut military rule despite the 
retention of semi-parliamentary framework." Phibun, though less dominant now, was 
able to maintain his position by coopting military and police officers into important 
government positions. Thus, strong foundations of military-bureaucratic polity were 
laid down. Although, his cabinet was technically responsible to the lower House of 
the Parliament, half of the members of that House were government appointees. The 
8. David Elliot, Thailand: Origins of Military Rule. Zed Press, London, 1978. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Jolin Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1981, pp. 
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Press was relatively free during those days. Due to intra-elite conflicts and public 
discontentment, Phibun's position started weakening and he embarked on the process 
of democratizing the polity. Elections were held in 1957, which were widely 
contested amidst high-level political debates. Phibun's party won the elections by a 
narrow margin for the elected-half of the national legislature. However, the charges 
of corruption against the government, a thin margin of victory for elected seats and 
growing public discontent provided a pretext to the military to stage another coup 
under the leadership of General Sarit Thanarat. 
Sarit abolished the constitutional regime by abolishing the Constitution and 
the Parliament, outlawing political parties and unions, and putting curbs on the Press. 
A fully authoritarian regime was established accompanied by persecution of political 
opponents and communists, and curbs on all sorts of political activism.'^ Thus, while 
the Thai public was pressing for more responsible government what it got, finally, as 
a result of yet another military coup was absolute authoritarian government. 
Tremendous changes took place in Thai politics and economy during Sarit's regime, 
but not certainly in the direction of democratization of public policy or political 
culture. Sarit won the support of royalists and civil servants. The model of 
bureaucratic polity was consolidated during his regime. He resurrected the prestige 
of monarchy embodying a paternalistic notion of representation. ^ After Sarit's death 
in 1963, authoritarian rule continued for another decade under General Thanom 
Kitticachorn and General Prapass Charusathiarana. Anti-communism provided the 
12. Kevin Hewison, op.cit., p. 13. 
13. Ibid. 
14. F.W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernizalion of a Bureaucratic Polity, East west Center Pres, 
Honolulu, 1966, ch. 1. 
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rationale for the maintenance of repressive policies by the military regimes during llie 
1960's, which also got support from the US. 
Thus, except for a brief interlude during mid-1940's the military continued to 
rule with the help of efficient Civil Service. Wilson argues that a combination of 
Military and bureaucrats dominated the political system completely during the 1950's. 
He gives a cultural explanation for the apolitical masses and politicized bureaucracy. 
He explained that the culture of deference to the authority and Buddhism stifled the 
development of strong political interest among the masses, leaving enough scope for 
the politicized elite to dominate the political system. In a later work, Riggs 
characterized fhailand's society as "prismatic" which lies somewhere between tlie 
two ideal types identified by him as traditional or '"fused" society at one side of tlie 
political spectrum and the modern or "diffracted" society at the other. By "prismatic," 
he meant bureaucratic polity which could be defined as a system of government that is 
neither traditional nor modem in character.'' Riggs agreed with Wilson that 
bureaucracy along with military was in total control of the system. The bureaucratic 
forces were able to dominate the system, according to Riggs, because the 
modernization and differentiation in bureaucracy had occurred at a much quicker pace 
than in the other organs or components of the polity. 
With the end of the Indo-China war, the US commitment and support to 
military regime declined. People had openly started demanding the widening of 
democratic space and responsible government. A new constitution was promulgated 
in 1968 and the elections followed under the new constitution, for the first time since 
1957. However, these elections were marred by accusations of rigging. The campaign 
16. David Wilson, Politics in Thailand, Corneli University Press, Ithaca, 1962, pp. 46-7. 
17. F.W. Riggs, Thailand: op.cit., p. 11. 
18. Ibid. p. 32. 
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for increased political participation continued. Much of the increased political 
activism involved students and academics not the political parties as such. Finally in 
October 1973, students' led demonstrations brought hundreds of thousands onto the 
Bangkok streets and broke the pernicious cycle of authoritarian military bureaucratic 
rule. The uprising won the support of the common citizens and the king. The uprising. 
though, partly accidental, was caused by an interplay of various forces and factors. A 
new pluralistic constitution with accountability safeguards was demanded. 
A civilian government was established. The powers of the lower House were 
increased and all of its members were now to be elected by the people. Political 
parties were given the freedom to organize and contest the elections. The 1975 
elections were contested by as many as forty two political parties. However, the 
civilian rule lasted for three years only viz., 1973-76. This period witnessed intense 
political competition, rivalry, contlict and instability. The governments changed 
frequently, resulting in the failure to maintain effecti\e controls. The conflict between 
the Right and the Left intensified. Although, the democratic space created by the 
civilian rule was the widest ever experienced in Thailand, the parliamentary regime 
failed to maintain it. Inflation, unrest, disorder and frequent labour strikes plagued 
Thailand. A military coup was staged in October 1976. Anti-communism was one of 
the logic of the coup as the communist regimes had triumphantly seized power in the 
neighbouring Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam." The, authoritarianism was re-
established. 
Because of democratization of political culture during the brief three-year 
democratic interregnum, 'fhai politics quite opened up. Although, it continued to be 
19. CD. Nelier and Ross Marlay, Democracy, op.cil. p. 31 
20. Nicholas Tarling, Nations, op.cil. 
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ruled by military-bureaucratic apparatus, ordinary citizens had tasted participation in 
politics and in the process acquired new democratic values. Therefore, the emergent 
democratic space could not be totally ignored by the subsequent militan,' regimes. 
Under the democratic constitution of 1974, the government and military oftlcials were 
for the first time excluded from politics unless they resigned their positions. The 
prime minister was to be an elected member of the lower House of the Parliament, 
with the Cabinet accountable to the lower Mouse. The upper House was to be 
appointed by the President of the Privy Council (the body of senior advisers to the 
king) rather than by the Military."' 
The Thai politics could not return to the old roots. A new constitution was 
promulgated in 1978, which had more longevity and stability than the earlier 
constitutions. (It was abrogated in 1991 by another coup). Since 1978, the 
governments led by military rulers made certain deliberate attempts to loosen the 
authoritarianism which has been called by some analysts as a period of semi-
democracy." It was a blend of Western-style, parliamentary-procedural democrac)' 
and the authoritarian values developed over a long period in Thai political culture that 
buttressed military invob.ement in governmental business. Former General, Preni 
Tinsulanand remained the Prime Minister from 1980 to 1988. During his regime, 
evolution towards democratic norms and procedures took place. uninterruptedK. 
Although, he enjoyed support of the important military factions as he had earlier 
served as commander-in-chief of the Array and later as defence minister, too. He 
forged a power-sharing compact between military-bureaucracy and political parties. 
The civilian-dominated legislature was given precedence in the formulation and 
21. Ibid. p. 32. 
22. CD. Neher, ••Democratization in Southeast Asia," Asian Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1991, p. 150. 
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approval of policies. Political parties operated freely and the Press was also free in 
publishing conflicting viewpoints. During 1978-1991, the country witnessed four 
general elections as well as tremendous political stability. 
The most visible sign of democratization in Thailand under 1978-Constitution 
was the ascendancy to prime ministership of the first elected member of Parliament 
since 1976, Chatichai Choonhawan who became Prime Minister following the 1988 
Elections, even without the backing of military. He formed a coalition government 
after his party received the largest number of seats in the lower House of the 
legislature. In the earlier Prem regime, the decision-making and policy continued to 
be concentrated in the hands of military-bureaucratic complex, while the popularly 
elected politicians were increasingly accommodated into the system. The Chatchai 
administration, emphasized the dominance of elected representatives and asserted 
civilian control over the military. Due to coalition arrangement, however, the 
corruption increased and the newspapers published the cases of corruption against 
various cabinet ministers. Still, the Press was not curbed. 
Although, the rampant corruption was the proclaimed legitimizing logic behind the 
military coup in 1991, the more direct reason was the exclusion of military in some 
important aspects of decision-making and the attempt to subordinate it to civilian 
control.^ '* In February 1991, Army commander-in-chief, Suchinda Kraprayoon staged 
a coup, dismissed the government and set up a temporary National Peace-Keeping 
Council (NPKC) with powers of martial law.^ ^ The progress towards democratization 
was halted but some elements of earlier semi-democratic period could not be 
abandoned. The Army this time did not directly take control of the system. A civilian, 
23. CD. Neher and Ross Marly, Democracy, op.cit. p. 33. 
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Anand Panyarachun was appointed prime minister with the Cabinet consisting of 
technocrats, scholars and senior officials. The political parties were retained and a 
national legislature was installed retaining some old faces and other new appointees of 
the miiitary to frame a new constitution. Anand's brief rule proved to be very 
efficient. He over facilitated the passage of new laws designed to streamline the 
bureaucracy and to promote economic development. However, he could not rein in 
the NPKC leaders who insisted that the proposed constitution should give the upper 
House (appointed members) powers equal to that of lower House (elected members) 
of the Parhament. Anand was not prepared to concede this ground to the military 
clique which could have constitutionally ensured political power directly into the 
hands of the military. The military leaders sponsored their own political party, 
Samakkhi Tham and enough money was pumped in. The March 1992 elections were 
notable for vote-buying, party switching and horse-trading. The pro-military 
political parties won the elections while the pro-democracy parties fared poorly, 
mainly because of the narrowed political space, excessive use of money in the 
elections and the rigging of elections. The coup leader, Suchinda, who had earlier 
refused to assume the premiership in case pro-military group won the elections 
became the Prime Minister and immediately stuffed all the higher appointments with 
his cronies and relatives. There were charges of use of money to buy offices also."' 
The democratic ideals had taken strong roots in the political culture of 
Thailand by that time. Such an open disregard for established democratic norms and 
practices was not tolerated by the educated middle classes of Thailand. After just 
forty-eight days in office, massive demonstrations took place tluoughout the country 
26. Ibid. p. 34-35. 
27. Ibid. p. 35. 
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against the Suchinda government. Finally, after the police-firing at demonstrators 
resulting in heavy casualties and injuries on May 18-21, 1992, the king Bhumipol 
Adulyade sided with the public and advised Suchinda to step down. Vast 
dissemination of information to the public through the modem means of 
communications helped people to rise to the occasion as they could not afford another 
stint of authoritarianism under military rulers when the outside world was 
democratizing. Suchinda stepped down and the king once again reverted to Anand to 
provide interim administration till the fresh elections could take place, which were 
scheduled for September 1992. Anand immediately carried out two important 
constitutional amendments, one requiring the Prime Minister to be an elected member 
of The Parliament, and the other, curtailing some powers of the military-dominated 
Senate. ^ He also demoted some army officers from important political and 
administrative positions. The pro-democracy parties won the elections this time. The 
five-party coalifion formed the next government choosing a civilian Chuan Leekpai 
who had proven to be a modest and honest long time leader of the Democratic Party. 
This time, the shift towards democratization was far more decisive, concrete 
and irreversible, though man'ed by frequent elections and political instability during 
the initial phase. Although, the military was assigned its rightful place in the barracks 
and seemed reluctant to intervene in the political process again, the progress, so far. 
had not been entirely in the liberal directions, as the developments were to prove later. 
Thailand has still to come out completely from the illiberal mould which grips the 
southeast Asia in general. The Leekpai government started with great promises and 
started deepening the political refonns, and made some progress towards liberal 
democracy. However, as usual with coalition arrangements, this goverrmient was also 
28. Ibid. 
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caught by charges of corruption and indulgence in unethical partnership. A major pro-
military political party, though led by a moderate, former prime minister Chatichai, 
Chat Pattana Party was brought into the coalition as a replacement for New-
Aspirations Party, which had opted out of the coalition. This decision of Leekpai 
more than any other, detracted his many democratic supporters. Sensing crisis. 
Leekpai called for snap elections in July 1995. 
A decisive shift occurred in the composition of the ruling elite. The balance of 
power started gradually shifting from previous military-bureaucratic elite towards 
business elite. The capitalist development continued with sharpened pace during the 
1990's. It provides a partial explanation for the loosening of military's hold over the 
political system and the growing clout of the elected representatives and the business 
class.^" 
The July 1995 elections were vigorously contested among twelve political 
parties for 391 parliamentary seats. Again, no political party won the absolute 
majority. The largest number of seats were won by Chart Thai (Thai Nation) Party 
and its leader Banharn Silapa-Chara headed the coalition of seven political parties. 
The Democrats led by Leekpai sat in the opposition. The government collapsed soon 
amidst disagreement among the coalition partners. The opposition parties and some 
ruling coalition partners contemplated an alternative government. Banliarn, however, 
proved to be too shrewd for them and instead of resigning himself (he had promised 
to resign in lieu of support at the no confidence motion) called for the dissolution of 
the House. 
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Fresh elections were held in November 1996. The money-use was more 
pronounced during these elections. The Campaign expenditure, including the 
illegitimate vote-buying was estimated at about 20 billion baht by the Thai Farmer's 
Bank Research Centre.^ ^ A lot of defections took place from the ruling Chart Thai 
Party, which helped the New Aspirations Party (NAP) to win the largest number of 
seats viz., 125, two seats more than its rival Democrat Party's 123. The NAP leader 
Chavalit dropped Banharn's chart Thai in favour of more popular Chart Pattana Party 
led by former prime minister, Chatichai Choohawan. The rest of the parties were 
retained in the coalition. 
A Constitutional Drafting Assembly was convened in early 1997 consisted of 
academics, lawyers, NGO leaders and metropolitan business elite. A People's 
Constitution was drafted by this Assembly aiming at durability of parliamentary 
governments, the decentralization of political power and eradicating the ills of vote-
buying as well as party defections. The proposed charter encouraged horizontal 
accountability with parallel independent state agencies now proposed to be sharing 
the burden of governance and putting checks upon the government. The draft was the 
result of wide public consultations and had the strong backing across various sections 
of the public. When the constitution came up for adoption in the Parliament, it met 
with strong resistance by the government itself The New Aspirations Party was dead 
against its adoption and was also joined by various vested interests including some 
elements of the military.^'' 
Amidst deadlock over the proposed constitution, the country was severely 
struck with the worst financial crisis in the mid-year. The currency collapsed, massive 
32. Ibid. 
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capital flight took place from the countr>', many financial institutions and corporations 
became insolvent and the government got bankrupt. The crisis which had just begun 
to erupt provided a much-needed impetus to the political-constitutional reforms. 
Forced by the circumstances, the ruling elite were encouraged to reorganize their 
relations on more conciliatory lines. They ultimately decided to cooperate on the 
passage of the constitution, of course, forced by the public outrage over the issue. The 
NAP-led government, meanwhile, contemplated declaration of state of emergenc>-. 
but the military refused to cooperate this time - unthinkable for many observers of 
Thailand's recent politics - "an important milestone in democratic persistence."''^ 
The constitution was finally passed in September 1997 after a month of 
continuous debate and came into effect in May 1998. Shortly afterwards, Chavalit 
resigned. The country once again turned to Leekpai at the head of another fragile 
coalition to bring it out of the financial mess. The new Democrats-led government 
matched its political performance with the reforms in the financial sector. Fifty-six of 
the ninety-one financial companies were closed down. A US$ 17.2 billion loan 
-in 
ultimately bailed the country out of the financial mess. By 1999, Thailand was on 
the path to financial reco\ery. 
The new constitution was reformist in nature. It brought sweeping changes to 
the political system. An independent Election Commission was set up to supervise 
and conduct the elections. Earlier, the Interior Ministry was performing that role, thus, 
inviting frequent allegations of poll-rigging. The multi-member constituencies were 
given up altogether and were replaced by single-member constituencies. The strength 
of House of Representatives was increased to 500 out of which 400 were to be 
35. William case, "Thai...." op.cil.,p. 531. 
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directly elected by the people while the rest were to be elected by a proportional 
party-list system. However, the parties were required receive five percent of the total 
T O 
votes to qualify for representation on the basis of party-list. Thus, the uncontrolled 
proliferation of parties was averted. In addition, restrictions were placed on party 
defections. The candidates were also required to possess bachelor degree before 
contesting the elections. One of the far-reaching measures aimed at political stability 
was the provision of constructive no-confidence on the pattern of Germany's 
constitution.'^ ^ The no-confidence motion can now be proposed by 200 members of 
the House and must be accompanied by the nomination of an alternative prime 
minister. To free the ministers from the pressures emanating from their local 
constituencies, they are required to resign their legislative seats upon entering the 
offices. They are also required to declare their personal assets before entering the 
office. The Senate, for the first time, has been made directly elected. 
The constitution appears to be one of the most progressive written document 
in the region entailing provisions for a Human Rights Commission, an Ombudsman, 
Right freedom to Information, national health care, twelve years of public schooling, 
consumer rights, gender-equality and consultation with relevant NGOs over projects 
having environmental impact. It was widely believed that the application of the 
constitution will bring tremendous improvement in the quality of governance and the 
electoral process. Its reformist provisions were supposed to challenge the polifical 
behaviour and attitudes of vast number of entrenched sections in the society. It would 
test the resilience of the Thais to persist with, and further deepen, the democratic 
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experiment. Notwithstanding the authoritarian strands sliow no sign of loosening grip 
over the Thai political culture. Rather, the soft authoritarianism was re-introduced 
within the democratic framework by initially highly successful, but now discredited 
Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. 
The elections under the new constitution took place in January 2001. Thirt>' 
seven parties competed for the 500 seats of the lower house and the voter turnout was 
unprecedented seventy percent.'*' Thaksin, considered to be the richest man of 
Thailand made a blitzkrieg and successfully used his wealth as a springboard to rise in 
politics. He had since mid-1990's served as foreign minister and twice as deputy 
prime minister, albeit for very brief stints. After abandoning the Palang Dharma Party 
in 1997, he founded his own political party that came to be known as Thai Rak Thai 
(Thai Loves Thai). Over the next two years, he used his vast wealth to attract a large 
number of sitting representatives from other parties, a practice known locally as duut 
(the Suck). In order to hasten the extinction of smaller parties to ensure political 
stability, the Election Commission had relaxed anti-defection provisions for a brief 
period that benefited Thaksin's party.''^ 
After consolidating his party machinery, Thaksin made many populist appeals 
to woo the voters across different sections of the society. He promised a national asset 
management company, relieving big banks of their non-performing assets and loans, 
while easing the terms of restructuring for corporate debtors. Catering to the 
provincial business, he promised a new Bank geared to small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Appealing to farmers, he pledged three-year moratorium on debt 
repayments to the banks, and most ambitiously, a revolving credit scheme of one 
41. Ibid. p. 535. 
42. . Ibid. pp. 536-37. 
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million baht for each of the country's 77000 villages. He also promised generous state 
subsidy for medical treatment.''"^ Thus, he had something for everyone. He forged a 
cross-class coalition that linked big businessmen, insecure small proprietors, farmers 
and alienated masses. The masses percei\ed some vision in his promises against the 
stale and defensive campaign of the Democrat Party. Combined with the free flow of 
money available, Thai Rak Thai, made history in Thailand's electoral politics by 
becoming the first party to won the absolute majority on its own. 
At personal level, equally important triumph came to Thaksin when the 
Constitutional Court acquitted Thaksin in an assets-concealment case. Thaksin had 
put strong pressure upon the judges warning of unrest in case of conviction as he was 
the legitimately elected leader of the country and he also stressed that the countr\' 
needed his leadership at that critical juncture. Different sort of pressures and even the 
money-use can't be ruled out as the Constitutional Court had found guilty each of the 
seven defendants previously in similar cases. 
Although, there was downward trend in the economy the following year, he 
went ahead to fulfill some of the important election promises that entailed hea\y 
expenditure on the part of government. His government brought debt relief for a 
period of three years to the eligible farmers. By the mid-2001, the scheme of allotting 
one million baht per village for development purposes was launched."* The equity 
measures were laudable, but those were attempted strictly within the capitalist 
43. Michael Montesano, "Thailand in 2001: Learning to Live with Thaksin," Asian Sun-ey, Vol. 
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framework. As the economy picked up from the next year, by the end of year 2003, 
the government's pohcy came to be called as 'Thaksinomics' as it produced a growth 
rate exceeding that of all the major economies of Asia except China.''^ 
The resurgence of economy and political stability was, however, accompanied 
by the reverse swing in the democratization process. Despite the conditions biding ripe 
for deepening the quality of democracy, Thaksin is no believer in the liberal approach 
towards politics. Like his counterparts in the region, he also believes in the concept of 
strong state and does not mind soft authoritarian practices alongside vibrant 
procedural democracy in order to achieve quick development as well as order in the 
society."^ ^ He became increasingly oblivious of state excesses and human rights 
violations. Before the leaders gathered for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) summit at Bangkok in October 2003, Thaksin ordered the streets of Bangkok 
scrubbed and tens of thousands of homeless people removed out of town. The 
government banned some 500 human rights and social activists from entering the 
country and threatened potential organizers of protests with possible arrests. ^ The 
same year the government cracked down hard on narcotic drug dealers in a 
widespread campaign, which continued for several months. This measure of the 
government became very popular across different sections of the society but also got 
mired in controversy over the suspected violations of human rights of the suspects as 
the police indulged in innumerable cases of tiring upon the alleged drug traffickers.'^' 
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Thaksin assumed a hard line, punitive approach towards the Muslim insurgency in 
three southern provinces, which even worsened the situation. ' 
By mixing his financial clout with populist measures, Thaksin seemed to have 
worked out a strategy of electoral dividends in terms of military support. However, by 
January 2006, his family was alleged by media making rich profits from a private sale 
for which tax laws were subverted through parliament in its favour. This revolution 
brought some resentment among the urban middle classes and disarrayed and 
weakened opposition got united demanding Thaksin's resignation. To overcome this 
impasse Thaksin held snap-polls that were boycotted by opposition but Thaksin's 
coalition won 57% of the votes."^ ^ However, a number of seats remained vacant for the 
Lower House of the Parliament and could not be filled after the subsequent b\"-
elections. '^* The Consfitutional Court's Ruling declared the parliamentary elections 
unconstitutional and asked for fresh elections."^ 
These developments precipitated a crisis situation and military usurped 
political power in yet another coup.^ *" It marks, so far, the most high profile coup o[f 
the present century. Initially, it was popular with the masses as it ended a stalemate.'^' 
The 1997 constitution was abolished. A new military administration was set up.'^ 
5!. Aure! Croissant, "Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, Causes and Consequences since 2000,'" 
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11 can be safely concluded that the progress towards liberal democracy is 
neillier smooth nor promising. How the military regime paves the way for ushering 
again the democratization process has to be seen. It seems, unless the system matures 
a Httle further, it would not be easy for Thailand, like other countries of Southeast 
Asia, to come out of its illiberal mould. It is clear that political values and beliefs are 
being transformed. The unquestioned deference to authority and the military's role in 
politics is receding. The bonds of patron-client relationships are weakening. The 
political culture has been democratized and secularized to an extent, but tlie 
momentum for democratization is lost time and again. The political development is 
occurring but not exactly along western lines. Southeast Asian nations are devising 
their own ways, which suit their traditional culture, needs, distinct values and the level 
of economic and political development. Thailand is no exception to broad pattern of 
political development in Southeast Asia. Still, in many respects its progress is unique. 
It has never been straight, but cyclical. It has witnessed eleven successful coups and 
almost equal number of unsuccessful coup attempts since 1932. At the same time, it 
has experienced sixteen constitutions and twenty elections in its chequered histor\ of 
political development. Its political development has been described as a "\'icious 
circle" patterned by a coup d'etat, military rule, public unrest, constitutional reform. 
general elections, parliamentary governance, corruption, instability, another coup 
d'etat, resumption of military rule, and so forth, as a general rule. The political system 
in its recent history has been inundated with fragile coalition arrangements, inter-pany 
and intra-party maneuvering and disagreements, cabinet reshuffles, scandals, 
corruption, snap elections, no confidence motions, vote-buying and defections and 
finally the latest bloodless coup. Till the promulgation of 1997 constitution, the 
situation was chaotic, which stabilized for some time but again became chaotic with 
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the Thaksinisation of the political process. No military coup occurred for twelve 
years. The new constitution was supposed to take care of some of the fundamental 
problems associated with stability, coalition arrangements, civil rights, vote-buying, 
defections, frequent no-confidence motions and certain discrepancies in the electoral 
process. But these hopes have been belied. Though, it is not the failing of the 
constitution as such. The setback is the direct result of undemocratic political culture, 
authoritarian leanings of the leaders and the preponderance of clientilist electoral 
democracy. The political balance is gradually shifting into the hands of big business 
on the one end of the spectrum and the middle class on the other. Thaksin was a 
police cadet previously and has good connections with the police officials. This partly 
explains the free hand given to the police in anti-narcotic drive. Similarly, the former 
army general Chavalit, who also served as prime minister earlier, was Defence 
Minister in Thaksin's cabinet. He still enjoys strong connections with important 
factions and officers in the military. Thus, the government-military-police nexus 
persists. The big business and military-bureaucracy enjoy supremacy over the 
political system as can be best deciphered from the rise and consolidation of Thaksin 
and his party and later his ouster. 
In the early 1990s, the competition was between pro-military and pro-
democracy parties but later significant changes occurred in the composition of 
political actors. The competition mainly shifted to the civilian-cum-businessmen 
dominated political parties most of which are centrist parties, neither extreme rightists 
nor far leftists. The traditional elite came from military, bureaucracy or aristocracy but 
by the end of 1990s business class constituted the majority group in the Parliament."""^  
59. Surin Maisrikrod and Duncan McCargo, "Electoral Politics: Commercialization and Exclusion," 
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With the aboUtion of official seats under the new constitution, the military officers 
could not easily dominate over the system. Many retired officers joined electoral 
politics and succeeded. But then, democracy faced internal crisis and military got the 
opportunity to intervene. 
Voting behaviour, especially in rural areas is frequently based on patronage 
but not of traditional type under which powerful local bosses used to dictate to their 
social inferiors. Later the patronage came to be based on money, called "vote-
buying." It takes many forms, the simplest one is the straight-forward handover of 
cash to the voters through the local agents, or the "vote leaders" or the "opinion 
builders" in the constituencies just before the elections. Sometimes, votes are 
committed to the candidate in lieu of particular favour to the village, say a road or 
well or clinic in case the candidate wins. As there was no prosecutorial watch dog 
agency before 1998 in Thailand (The Election Commission was created by the new-
constitution), "vote-buying" had become almost an institutionalized practice and 
huge, and often unaccounted, funds were spent on campaigns. Poll Watch Committee 
(PWC), a monitoring group was established by Anand administration in 1992 but this 
body had the power to investigate only, not to punish. This body did a yeomen's 
service in monitoring the polls and in educating the citizens. But "Vote-buying" 
continued with impunity and even the Election Commission could not significantly 
contain this practice during subsequent elections. In the last elections, 20-billion 
baht were alleged to be spent on vote-buying. Accompanied with "vote-buying" as a 
result of excessive use of money in elections is the practice of candidate-buying 
which is known by different terms such as horse-trading, defections or party-hopping. 
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Once the elections are announced, former members of Parliament and other 
prospective candidates are offered financial incentives to switchover their political 
parties. Thai Rak Thai party of Thaksin owed its tremendous success largely due to 
tiiis practice just before the elections as the party had just been newly formed and did 
not have many prospective candidates to its side, otherwise. The Election 
Commission showed some teeth during 2001 elections by banning campaign 
entertainment and ordering a new round of elections in as much as 63 constituencies 
and disqualifying some victorious candidates for flouting election rules, still, a lot of 
dirt was left to be removed.^ 
Multi-party system prevailed but in highly disorganized and disarrayed form 
with candidates as well as parties kept on changing sides. Ideology is absent 
particularly in the recent past. Regionalization and proliferation of political parties 
occurred. The 1992-elections saw sixteen parties in the fray, 1995 elections twelve 
parties and the 2001-elections saw as many as thirty seven parties in the fray.*''* The 
regionalization and fragmentation militates against the emergence of pan-national 
political parties as well as ideologically inspired broad based two-coalition system or 
healthy two-party system. 
The track record of Thailand in terms of ensuring fundamental civil liberties to 
its citizens, in comparison to its counterparts in the region, is relatively better. The 
most positive aspect in this regard is that the Press has, more or less, aiways enjoyed 
some free space. Most of the time, during the military regimes too, the practice of 
self-censoring in the Press was more prevalent instead of frequent curbs imposed by 
the government. A very important safeguard with regard to the freedom of the Media 
63. Ibid. 
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was that the 1997 constitution prohibited the government from censoring, banning, or 
otherwise, restricting the Media, except by legislation during a crisis.^" The 
government's indulgences in corruption, authoritarian practices and human rights 
violations were frequently reported by the Media. Although, some major national 
television and radio networks were controlled by the government, the Media, 
generally, offered pluralist views and the increasing number of private networks 
frequently criticized the government. 
The role of the Press in the political development process can't be ignored. 
The pro-democracy demonstrations in 1992 could not have succeeded if the Press had 
not played the vibrantly responsible role of disseminating information to the public. 
The government of Suchinda struck newspapers by resorting to censorship but the 
editors of many important national dailies boldly left out large sections of their 
publications as blank, indicating disapproval of government's authoritarian 
measures.'''' The fundamental freedoms like right to vote, contest, assembly, speech, 
association and religion are well protected in Thailand as compared to its neighbours. 
The state religion is Buddhism and the king must be a Buddhist. However, all citizens 
are free to practice the religion of their choice. There is some problem with Muslim 
Malays in the south who constitute roughly nearly ten percent of the total population. 
They face unofficial discrimination at various levels. Private sector workers have 
full scope of bargaining. The government sector workers are free to join the unions 
65. Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1999-2000, 
Freedom House, New York, 2000, p. 479. 
66. CD. Neher and Ross Marlay, Democracy, op.cii., pp. 41 -2. 
67. Aurel Croissant, "Unrest in South Thailand: Contours, Causes and Consequences Since 2001," 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2005, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 21-43 (27-30). 
208 
but cannot negotiate wages or other matters through strikes. The 1997 constitution 
contained a Bill of fundamental human rights. 
The new Prime Minister promised to the people in the beginning of 2007 the 
restoration of democracy by the year-end. The Generals, however, have the propensity 
to perpetuate their rule if the conditions favour them. Though the strongest bulwark 
against the continuance of military rule in Thailand is civil society, the very institution 
assertion by which led to political chaos, propelling the military to intervene. 
However, people didn't invite the military. T he chaos was all part of the pains of 
democracy in a transitory phase. 
The latest and biggest case of democratic deficit shows the danger of 
"People's Power," in certain contexts. The assertion by civil society, this time had just 
the reverse effect. Instead of ushering in democracy this time, the resultant chaos led 
to the military coup. It represents a trend, the deeper crisis of elite democracies in 
developing countries where institutionalization falls short and civil society has 
overgrown, and the mismatch between two processes leads to the occasional 
breakdown of democratic apparatus. 
Indonesia 
The pattern of political development followed by Indonesia is as unique as 
Malaysia or Thailand but for entirely different factors. It can't be equated with any 
other country of the world. It is also very complex to be fit into any generalized 
pattern of political development. Unlike with the assistance of colonial powers, 
Indonesia's process of political development began with the armed revolutionary 
movement against the Dutch after the Second World War. Instead of granting 
68. Freedom, op.cit., p. 480. 
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independence after the defeat of the Japanese, the Dutch returned and re-asserted their 
control. In fact the very idea of Indonesia as a socio-political unit, hence an 
independent entity, could only be conjured up on the basis of anticolonial nationalism 
generated remarkably during this phase. 
It was after a lot of bitter armed struggle and international diplomacy, the 
Indonesians gained independence. Earlier, a constitution was proclaimed on August 
17, 1945 by the revolutionary government under the leadership of Sukarno. This 
constitution provided unitary structure and strong elective presidency but was 
intended to be provisional and in fact given up at the time of independence when 
Dutch actually surrendered sovereignty to the Indonesians. Strangely enough, the 
1945 constitution continued to serve Indonesia except for a brief period of experiment 
in parliamentary democracy in 1950-1958. It remained in force throughout a long 
phase of authoritarianism between 1959 to 1998 during which it was distorted and 
manipulated consistently to suit to the requirements and the fancies of the rulers of the 
day. Still, it has not been abandoned during the democratic transition phase since 
1998, having undergone a series of progressive amendments mandated by 
democratization wave. The political process in Indonesia after independence can be 
divided into four phases for the sake of comprehending its political development. 
1945-58 phase: When the process picked up amidst insurmountable problems linked 
to low level of integration and cohesion at both social and political level, 
parliamentary instability, underdeveloped economy, disorder unleashed by 
revolutionary struggle, and communist threat. 
1959-65 phase: The soft authoritarian phase of Sukarno's personal rule based on his 
advocacy of "Guided Democracy." 
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1965-86 phase: The ascendancy of Suharto and the New Order Regime represented 
by entrenchment of the mihtary into the state apparatus, rapid economic development, 
deepening authoritarianism and uncliallenged personal authority of Suharto. 
1986-98 phase: Softening of authoritarianism by the confident regime accompanied 
with the rising middle class and strengthening of civil society. The rift between the 
President and the ABRl over the possible future successor of Suharto during the 
closing years. 
1998-2004: Overthrow of the New Order Regime resulting from ABRI 
disenchantment with Suharto, radical mass demonstrations against misrule, cronyism 
and authoritarian style in the wake of financial breakdown. The transition and 
consolidation towards civil rights and political democracy took place. 
The participatory democracy after the independence following the 
revolutionary armed struggle accompanied disorder and dislocation, ft unleashed a 
variety of strong societal forces, which the democratic regime found hard to control, 
later. The armed struggle to remove the Dutch and the role played by the 
revolutionary troops (later converted into Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia -
ABRI, the acronym for Indonesia's military) in the movement had great implicatior^ 
for the future political development of the country. The Army's importance increased 
aller the independence instead of diminishing when nation-building project began 
within the unitary framework.^" The leadership under Sukarno opted for strong central 
government with no parallel arrangements at local level in order to achieve the unity 
of the country and to contain the separatist tendencies. The nationalist feelings thai 
had been shaped during the freedom struggle could not be maintained with same 
70. At the time of independence in 1949, a federal constitution was adopted mainly with Dutca 
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intensity in the remote areas like the central parts of Java, Sumatra etc. Therefore, the 
role of army was perceived to be quite significant and instrumental by the nationalist 
leadership in its task of nation-building as well as state-building. Thus, the army, in 
continuity, was assigned a central role in keeping peace and suppressing separatist 
currents. 
Along with the Army, two other social forces had great bearing over the pace 
and direction of future political development. The communists organized under the 
Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) had earlier attempted to snatch control from the 
nationalist leadership in 1948 but were defeated and purg ed by the ABRI.'^^ The 
communists, however, retained their hold over a large section of people particularly, 
the rural peasants in off-shore areas. Sukarno had strong left leanings but was not 
prepared to give the political initiative to the communists or to the particular creed 
they espoused. The other notable group was Darul Islam, a group of hardcore 
Islamists who were committed to the ideal of establishing Indonesia as an Islamic 
State. This sect was quite strong in West Java, northern Sumatra and Kalimantan 
(Indonesian Borneo).^^ This group did not recognize the legitimacy of the central 
government as it was not based on Syriah. So, there were four popular streams in 
those days each having some weight in its own right and each having large number of 
followers. They counter-balanced each other. Sukarno occupied the centre-stage. He 
could retain hold over the political system despite the weak presidency due to his 
revered personal charisma as well as continuous parliamentary instability. There was 
mushrooming of political parties after the independence and no political party gained 
71. Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Illustrated Introductory History, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 
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majority in the first elections in 1955. The elections held for the Constituent 
Assembly to draw up a permanent constitution also threw hung results. In such a 
scenario there could not be any agreement over fundamental issues such as Islamic or 
secular state, federal or unitary constitution, parliamentary or presidential system, 
socialist or capitalist framework, and so forth. In 1959, Sukarno dissolved the 
Constituent Assembly as no agreement could be reached among the parties as well as 
between the President and the Assembly over the structure of the constitution. The 
President unilaterally restored the 1945 constitution which vests executive power in 
the hands of the President independent of the legislature. The following year elected 
Parliament was also dissolved, the elections were postponed indefinitely and two 
parties opposed to his policies were bamied. The Parliament was arbitrarily 
reconstituted with appointed representatives from nine approved parties with curtailed 
powers. It was subordinated to a super-legislature - the Provisional People's 
Congress, which later came to be known as People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). 
More than half of its members were nominated and appointed by the President.^ "^  
The way to authoritarianism was earlier paved through strong Army backing 
to the President in the wake of a series of regional revolts in 1956-58 which were 
crushed by the Army, thus strengthening the logic of a strong and stable central 
government.^ *^ Thus, it is quite clear that the events throughout the first decade of 
independence brought about a decline in the parliamentary regime culminating in its 
overthrow and strengthening the hands of Sukarno with the help of military. It led to 
the gradual narrowing down of the democratic space. The early years were, however. 
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very important from the point of view of nation-building marked by the degree of 
social mobilization, political participation and integration of the polity. The 
experiment did not succeed, however, because of the interplay of various factors - the 
most important factor being the lack of democratic will on part of Sukarno. His style 
of functioning throughout those years shows that he did not have any love for 
parliamentary democracy and he did not like parallel sources of power to his own 
authority.^ '^  The experiment failed not just because political power was diffused and 
widely spread in the system^^ but because the chief political manager operating the 
system had contempt towards Western-style parliamentary democracy which he 
occasionally referred to as "fifty percent plus one democracy" 
Sukarno articulated his own notion of democracy as "Guided Democracy" 
applicable to a diverse, underdeveloped country like Indonesia which had distinct 
culture of its own rooted in musjawarah (consultation and discussion) and 
muafakat (unanimous agreement). He held that European liberalism was ill-suited to a 
diverse country like Indonesia as the Western model was divisive in nature, while the 
governmental system in Indonesia should be based on traditional values which 
emphasize authority over disobedience, hierarchy over equality and order over 
liberty. ^ The consultation and consensus could help in maintaining peace, harmony 
and growth. He made "gotong rojong" (mutual aid) and Pancasila to be the guiding 
pillars of his conception of democracy. The former stressed social cohesiveness based 
on obedience to authority after wide consultation while the latter emphasized five 
principles of unity in society, humanism, monotheism, social justice, and democracy 
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informed by cooperation and consultation. In a system of "guided democracy," the 
guidance and the decisions had to flow from above, which could be debated but not 
disobeyed. The discussion and consultation did not mean much when all the real 
authority was concentrated the hands of the President, whose decrees could not be 
challenged. 
Although, the authoritarian structure and style of functioning was adopted by 
Sukarno but he did not indulge in repression by any substantive means. The Press was 
relatively free. No elections were held. The political parties were weakened, but 
retained their independent social bases. Civil society had not been completely 
depoliticized. Army, though, given representation in People's Consultative Assembly, 
yet, it was subordinate to the civilian control. Sukarno drifted closer to the largest 
political party, the PKI. Sukarno wanted to balance the communists and the military 
against each other. More than that he needed the support of both. 
The command economy was adopted. Many industries had come under the 
direct control of the state while the private sector was regulated at strategic points. 
However, the economy did not improve and the government suffered high budgetary 
deficits which led to inflationary pressures. The state enterprise could not generate 
sufficient capital. The inflation spiraled to 400 percent per annum by 1965.^ ^ The 
production declined and the government could not proceed with its many 
development projects. As hardships increased, the people's unrest also increased. Fed 
up with Sukarno's mismanagement and his increasing reliance on the Left, some 
disgruntled army officers plotted a coup. It was crushed under the command of 
Lieutenant General Suharto. However, it triggered a chain of events in Indonesia 
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which amidst claims and counter-claims from both sides (the real reasons behind the 
attempted coup not clear to the people) led to the purge of communists, sanctioned 
and encouraged by the Army. The bloodbath continued for two years and resulted in 
around five lakh casualties. 
Suharto who had been named Chief of Army Staff by Sukarno after the failed 
coup in 1965, occupied the centre-stage in the politics of the country since then. He 
went on increasing his power base in the government and in a gradual phase with the 
strong backing of Army forced Sukarno into retirement by what is called by Neher 
and Marlay as "an incremental coup." The New Order Regime was declared and the 
Army took control over all the political and social forces of the country. The Army 
led by Suharto established distinct supremacy over civilian authorities in the country. 
Suharto became President in 1968 and assumed the role of a paternal guardian of the 
country. ^^ The Pancasila ideology was developed further by the new regime to bring 
bureaucracy, civil society as well as opposition under control. The following years 
were of deepening authoritarianism but Suharto always kept a symbolic gesture of 
exercising power, democratically. Under the 1945 constitution, the power to elect the 
President lay with the People's Consultative Assembly. It is altogether different 
matter that half of the members of 1000 members of MPR were appointed by the 
President, and that too, predominantly, from the Army. The rest were also controlled 
by the government as its political organization, Golkar, through electoral 
84. CD. Neher and Ross Marlay, op.cit. pp. 78-9. In a startling revelation, an American journalist, 
based on extensive research, claimed that the anti-communist pogrom in Indonesia was carried 
out with the direct support and intervention of the American government. The American 
Embassy officials provided the ABRI with a list of thousands of rebel communists. According to 
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manipulations was able to win more than two-third of the elected seats in the 
legislative assembly (House of Representatives - DPR) in each successive election. 
The members of legislative assembly were also represented in the MPR. The 
government could control the legislature tlirough the subjugation of opposition as well 
as facilitating the Golkar with wide resources, money and electoral manipulation at all 
levels.^' 
The New Order brought political stability, stabilized the economy, crushed 
opposition, established military control over the civilian and amiihilated the 
communist threat. As a result, the authoritarian trends and the state's control 
increased. The New order was firmly committed to a programme of capitalist 
economic development." It also got support from the West because of its anti-
communist purges. The economy picked up steam after the foreign aid increased since 
1968. By 1970-71, the growth rate of seven percent had been achieved. With the 
inflated oil revenues since 1973-74, the economy picked up new heights, which 
gradually helped the New Order regime in gaining performance legitimacy among the 
masses, particularly the elite sections who had greatly benefited in the early years.'^ '^  
A network of corporatist institutions, economic as well as political, were 
created to establish control over the key sectors and sections of society. With the 
consolidation of power in the first few years, there was sustained effort to de-
politicize the society and to politicize the military. Gradually, many of the societal 
forces which had helped Suharto's takeover of power from Sukarno found themselves 
nationalist parties and their affiliated organizations, which dominated politics at that time and 
were opposed to the dominance or active role of the Army. The Golkar was not officially 
registered as a political party. In official parlance, it continued to remain a political organization 
of the state. But for all practical purposes, it functioned as a political part> since 1971 elections. 
See, R.W. Liddle, "A Useful Fiction: Democratic Legitimation in New Order Indonesia,'" in 
R.H. Taylor, ed. The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, Cambridge University Press, 
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gradually constrained and alienated from the New Order as the regime became 
on 
increasingly patrimonialist and authoritarian. As the bureaucracy and the army 
stretched their muscle and increased control over the state apparatus, conversely, the 
de-politicization of the civil society was the logical result. Therefore, the same logic 
which had worked earlier by which the active politicized sections of the society had 
been excluded from the mainstream worked again, this time in a more sophisticated 
and systematic manner. 
Applying the Pancasila to reduce the opposition and friction in society, the 
government forced nine political parties to amalgate into two after the General 
Elections of 1971.^ ° By clubbing these parties into two groups, the intention of the 
government was not to unite the opposition, but to create factions within the two 
groups. The electoral opposition to the government assumed state-licensed forms 
represented by the Islamic United Development Party (PPP) under which four Muslim 
parties were clubbed together, and the Indonesian Democratic Party which united the 
five nationalist and other moderate parties. The amalgamated political parties were 
forced to work within the ideological framework as determined by the miiitan.^  
regime. There was too much interference by the governmental authorities in their 
internal affairs, particularly, in the selection of party leaders and determining their 
ideological positions which could not be highly divorced from the official ideology as 
represented by Pancasila principles and concern for stability. An important restriction 
imposed was the doctrine of the "floating mass" i.e. the isolation of the villages from 
89. Ibid, p. 76. 
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party politics except during the month prior to each national election.^^ The chief 
opposition came from the rightist Islamic front PPP in which Nahdwatul Ulama was 
quite dominant. The PPP took independent position over various issues of the day and 
cornered around a quarter of the votes at the elections held in 1977 and 1982. Still, 
Golkar continued to repeat its 1971-performance. On the whole, it seems that the 
opposition parties were retained by the government merely as a ploy to gain 
legitimacy as well as a safety valve. They could neither threaten the government, nor 
control the legislation in the Assembly, but continued to provide a vent to the 
oppositional forces against the government, just enabling the government to control 
and subdue the opposition at the door side, thus, not allowing to snowball into protests 
or violence.^^ 
It is quite clear that there was no right to free association available to the 
citizens. No third opposition party could be established. The two opposition parties 
that continued to function had derived their sanction and mode of operation from the 
state. Therefore, they could function within the parameters determined by the 
authoritarian state. The traditional patron-client relationships continued through the 
functioning of Golkar as being the goverrmient-backed party, it linked the people to 
the state upon which people became increasingly dependent. The Golkar just became 
an electoral vehicle for the military-dominated regime to ride the roughshod of 
politics with continuity. Its initiatives were never autonomous but always sponsored 
by the government. 
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The military increasingly assumed political role. Suharto backed the militar\" 
to promote his own interest. Its loyalty was secured with the help of a system of 
extended patronages. It was only with the complete domination by militar)' of all the 
important decision-making centres by the close of 1980's and its conflict of interest 
with Suharto over his succession matter, he started co-opting other potential forces in 
the society, particularly the Islamic elements as a counter-weight to the militar\-
during the 1990's.^^ The regime, so far, had worked on the principle of cooptation of 
all the important elements that could not pose challenge but serve the regime, with 
primacy to the military interests. The armed forces' political role was legitimized 
through the doctrine of dwi-fungsi (twin-functions), viz. the function of national 
defence as well as positive socio-political role needed for internal coherence and 
national integration. Logically, the doctrine of dwi-fungsi subordinated all 
independent bases of power and other organs of the society to the military projecting 
it as 
Juru Selamat (Savior) of the nation in moments of crisis .... that it is 
the pemersatu (unifier) of a pluralist nation; the pengayom 
(protector, as a banyan tree protects with its shade) of an 
unsophisticated and easily deceived rakyat ("people, " in the sense of 
the led as distinct from their leaders); and the dinamisator (driving 
force) of a people and economy that need to develop but have no 
source of political will other than the armed forces 
With so much interdependence between the President and the military and 
military's sway over the bureaucracy and bureaucracy further controlling the societv. 
there is problem in characterizing such a system. The problem is further confounded 
when the President was not directly deriving his powers from the militar\' but from 
94. See Harold Crouch, Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Iihaca, N.Y.. 
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the MPR which had the handpicks of the President, the presidential appointees from 
various socio-economic and functional organizations, regional representatives, 
military officials, bureaucrats, at the same time, substantial but not decisive numbers 
of elected representatives of the people. There is little doubt that the President was 
supreme and retained the final word. The New Order Regime has been aptly described 
as "Presidential-military-bureaucratic complex" by some observers.^^ The military 
officials held the key positions in Golkar. In 1985, out of thirty-seven cabinet 
ministers, fourteen were from military background. Military men filled three-quarters 
of the twenty-seven provincial gubernatorial posts. 
Another important factor that strengthened the hold of Suharto over the 
political system was the consistent and rapid economic development throughout the 
period, based on oil boom and foreign investment, resulting in the steady rise of living 
standards and opportunities. Special attention was also given to education. The private 
sector, despite its modest growth, increasingly became dependent upon state for 
goodwill, while the state, conversely, became less dependent upon private sector due 
to the increase in the funds at the disposal of state with the oil boom and FDI inflows. 
There was tremendous improvement in government revenues and balance of 
payments. While the public expenditure had been a meagre four percent of the GDP 
in 1965, it rose to twenty-five percent of the GDP by 1980.^ ^ Therefore, the 
patrimonialist character of the state was distinctly visible. Development and order had 
got precedence over liberty and the people were not averse to bear with the 
authoritarian regime as long as it delivered. 
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Despite its completely authoritarian character, the regime was not repressive, 
generally. Not all sort of opposition was crushed. Although there was no clear-cut 
distinction between tolerable opposition and non-tolerable opposition, but as a general 
rule, the opposition that was directed at destabilizing the regime or which was beyond 
the pale of pancasila orthodoxy"^'' was crushed by relying upon force. The 
Communists after the purge never posed threat. The Rightist Islamists posed some 
challenge but that was always within manageable limits. They could never reach even 
one-third mark in the legislature. Some elements among them were later begun to be 
accommodated and co-opted by the regime though not with much success. It was only 
in the 1990's that Suharto in order to checkmate the ABRI leadership started steadily 
drifting towards the Right. Thus, the opposition, faced by the government in the 70's 
and 80's was always within manageable limits for which Aspinall uses the plirase 
"semi-opposition" that was not dominant and it was willing to participate in power 
without fundamentally challenging the regime. The state was largely unfettered by 
societal interests in its determination of policy. 
The third phase was accompanied by slight progressive changes in the 
political discourse. These changes were not deep structural and institutional in 
character but the next decade certainly witnessed, more political space to the civil 
society, deregulation of business, and small-scale civilianization of governmental 
structures. All such developments did not lead to any discernible pattern towards 
democratization, still, broadened the democratic space, paving the way for the later 
push to the democratization wave in post-Suharto phase. The oil prices in 
international market plummeted to all time low in 1986. It severely affected the export 
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income, therefore, the economy was badly hit as the government had to cut back hard 
on its developmental expenditure. The economy suffered a sharp recession in 1986-
87. The governm.ent, therefore, was forced to deregulate some of the terms for the 
private sector and rely on private business to invest more.'""^ Although, much of the 
cake and the privileges were still cornered by the regime-connected business groups, 
including Suharto's own family, yet, the capitalist class in its own right was emerging 
as the terms of bargaining started shifting towards the business class away from the 
bureaucracy with the maturing and diversification of the economy. The State's 
patrimonialist character remained intact but it increasingly became more susceptible 
to the pressures from business class. By the end of 1980's the economy recovered 
fully. 
The change in economy was also accompanied by the co-optation and 
accommodation of the civil society, thus strengthening it, but this change was more 
the result of intra-elite struggles. The previous convergence of interests between the 
President and the ABRI was falling apart, at least, his relationship with some dominant 
sections in the ABRI deteriorated. However, his own supremacy over the ABRI, in 
other words, over the political system, remained unchallenged. The unquestioned 
persistence of the New Order Regime was based on the very close congruence of 
interests between the President and the ABRI, both complementing and consolidating 
each other's position. However, as his age was increasing, the politics of succession 
came to the foreground by the closing years of 1980s. ABRI leadership was not happy 
when a man disliked by ABRI was imposed as the vice-president by Suharto in 1988. 
The election of Sudharmono to the vice-presidency was criticized openly by the 
102. Ibid. p. 86-1. 
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dominant sections of the ABRI led by Benny Murdani who was just recently replaced 
as the ABRI commander.'^^ Thenceforward, a subtle rift ensued that lingered on. 
As an interesting development, both President and dominant Murdani faction 
in ABRI started advocating political openness, not as a move to kick-start 
democratization of the political system but to outmaneuver each other, particularly, 
over the presidential succession choice. Suharto himself came out in support of 
Keterbukaan (openness) in his Independence Day speech, stating, "Democracy 
requires a great deal of consultation, discussion, exchange of ideals and dialogue ... 
we must view differences of opinion as dynamics." ^ Just after the President's 
speech, various liberalizing measures, not concrete enough to be a real push for 
democratization, but certainly facilitating and paving the way towards opening up the 
political debate, were undertaken by the government. The Coordinating Minister for 
Political Affairs and Security announced that the publishing licences for the Press 
would no longer be revoked, and there woud be no interfere with the choice of the 
articles to be published in newspapers and magazines. Although, the government 
could not keep its promise for long and in June 1994 ordered the closure of three 
106 
magazines. 
An important link in the policy of openness was the establishment of the 
National Human Rights Commission (HAM) in 1993. Such a body, how much 
government-controlled, ultimately works to expose the human rights violations and 
sometimes can be embarrassment to the government - as it later proved, to some 
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extent. The human rights activists, however, saw it as a window-dressing, with no 
teeth and its members to be appointed and paid by the government.'**^ The period also 
witnessed the release of many political prisoners, accommodation of dissidents, 
increased tolerance towards protests, demonstrations and criticism of the 
government's policies, and co-optation of Islamic elements in the regime. Some 
prominent intellectuals, human rights activists and ex-officials released an open letter 
to a press conference in Jakarta in August 1990 describing Suharto's rule from 1968 
to 1993 as more than sufficient and asking him to step down in 1993 while also 
recommending that terms of future presidents be restricted to two and also that the 
MPR and the legislative Assembly (DPR) should be made fully elected bodies."*** 
The most remarkable feature was the Islamization of public face of the 
government. There was no threat to the stability of the regime by the Islamic 
elements, who had been quite active in the society, particularly, the largest Islamic 
group, Nahdwatul Ulama led by Abdurrahman Wahid. They were never a radical 
force in the society. Suharto sponsored a Muslim Intellectuals' Association (ICMI) in 
1990.'°^ By naming his close protege, B.J. Habibie as its head, he maintained a close 
control over its structure and functioning, thus co-opting the Muslim Intellectuals who 
could prove to be a potential source of support to the government as well as providing 
a vent to Muslim elements against their growing resentment at westernization and 
modernization of the society. The more potent reason was Suharto's well-crafted 
strategy to counterbalance the ABRl}^^ This was also followed by the appointment of 
increasing numbers of orthodox Muslim bureaucrats and military officers to important 
positions. 
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This strategy was extended further to the civilianization of the regime, 
although, to a smaller extent. Sudharmono, who had background of a military lawyer, 
as Chairman of Golkar had tried to reduce the influence of ABRI both within and 
outside Golkar. Habibie and Harmoke, two civilian ministers close to Suharto were 
continuously promoted and empowered in 1990's. Harmoko was made Chairman of 
Golkar. His elevation was publicly resented by the ^5/?/ . '" By the time of 1995, the 
relative decline of military personnel in political and official positions was 
discernible. ABRFs representation in Parliament was curtailed from hundred to 
seventy five and numbers of ABRI men in cabinet had also been slightly reduced."~ 
The polity had opened up but not enough to make for free competition for 
political power, not even at the level of DPR. There was only restricted democratic 
space available to the opposition and the masses. The President retained his hold over 
electoral vehicle for presidency i.e. MPR by keeping the non-elected seats. There was 
no right to free association, particularly at the political level. The right to Assembly 
could be curtailed. The right to freedom of speech and expression, despite the open 
debate on some issues, was quite restricted as the regime's legitimacy or the 
Pancasila principles could not be opposed. The middle class had come into its owii 
but still had much dependence upon the state and remained, more or less, tolerant of 
the regime. As one observer succinctly puts it 
Most activists have a more or less instinctive feel for the boundaries 
of tolerated political action beyond which their activities will attract 
repression .... In recent years, numerous activist groups have taken 
great risks to push open the boundaries into previously 
unimaginable areas ... and have profoundly affected the character of 
contemporary political debate and action. But such activists remain 
a minority in middle class legal oppositional circles. For the larger 
group, the effect of the ever present threat of coercion is that they 
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learn to identify the boundaries of state toleration and how to avoid 
overstepping them. 
At electoral level, the main opposition was emerging from the PDI, although 
not threatening the stability of the government in any way. The partial Islamization 
move by the regime had weakened the PPP. The withdrawal of the Nahdwatul Ulama 
from the PPP led to its vote share dropped from 28 percent in 1982 elections to 16 
percent in 1987."'* The PDI became more activist and increased its vote percentage 
from eight percent in 1982 to eleven percent in 1987 to fifteen percent in 1992. 
overtaking PPP as the second largest party. ^ In 1993, the party leadership came into 
the hands of dynamic leader, Megawati Sukarnopoutri, Sukarno's daughter. The 
government started harassing her and stage-managed under the supervision of top 
army officials, the ouster of Megawati in favour of Soerjadi in June 1996. Soerjadi 
was also not liked by the regime as he acted independent of government's control 
during his earlier stint as President of the PDI but he was preferable to more assertive, 
charismatic and independent Megawati. The immediate impact of the ouster of 
Megawati was that the PDI was routed in the elections for the DPR in 1997 getting 
just three percent of the votes while the Golkar was able to increase its share from the 
all-time low of less than sixty percent in 1992 to all-time high in 1997 at seventy-four 
percent.'"' It was the most violent campaign under the New Regime and widespread 
rigging and irregularities in counting of votes were reported by the KIPP, an NGO 
1 i 7 
that monitored the elections. 
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The economy was growing well around seven percent of the GDP per annum 
for the last decade."^ A strong middle class had emerged by now. However, the lack 
of the institutionalization of political and decision-making processes, authoritarian 
personal rule and restricted democratic space proved to be the Waterloo of the New 
Order Regime in the wake of the financial crisis that engulfed the whole of Southeast 
Asia and the Far East. It had most far-reaching repercussions for Indonesia. The 
developments in 1998 paved a decisive and, perhaps, iixeversible shift towards the 
democratization of the system. The consistent economic growth kept a lid on the 
democratic urges of the people for many years. Once, the economy slided, the lid was 
off and the absence of institutionalized democratic space led to the violent outbursts, 
and killings, which not only led to the overthrow of the regime but also to the 
disruption of civil society. More alarmingly, it brought to the foreground numerous 
regional currents for autonomy amounting to even separatist tendencies in many parts. 
The following months also saw a lot of inter-racial riots, killings of minority groups 
taking place at the hands of majority group. 
The things started falling apart for the New Order Regime immediately in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis during the latter part of 1997."^ Despite the severe 
economic crisis and pressure from international community, Suharto still decided to 
run for the seventh term of his presidency while choosing Habibie as his vice-
president. The latter move was highly detested by the ABRI over the imposition of a 
civilian as a possible future successor. Just after the formation of new cabinet the 
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reformasi movement gained momentum aiming at the overthrow of the dictatorial 
regime and introduction of the democratic process. It involved students in large 
numbers as well as peasants and workers from a cross-section of society. The 
movement was, however, highly disorganized, violent & sporadic. The immediate 
impetus came from the killing of four students in police firing on the twilight on May 
12, which led to lot of upheaval in Jakarta resulting in anti-Chinese rioting, killings, 
looting and torching of shops.'^ '^  The military as well as Golkar leadership deserted 
Suharto at this critical juncture. The ABRl Commander General Wiranto said he 
would protect Suharto if he steps down, thus, bringing a direct pressure upon Suharto 
to resign.'^' Suharto resigned on May 21 and Habibie was sworn in. 
Habibie immediately strengthened his position within and outside the 
government. He removed the restrictions from the Press and the electoral system. The 
MPR session held in November 1998 agreed to a mid-term election in 1999 under 
new rules that included reduction in military appointments in the DPR, multi-party 
system, open election for presidency along with reduced powers of the president and 
promises to investigate the corruption charges against Suharto's family.'^^ 
The democratic elections were held for the second time in Indonesia's history 
(the first in 1955) for the popularly elected House of People's Representatives with 
open competition for political power. Forty eight parties competed for the 462 seats 
(The representation of armed forces had earlier been reduced from seventy-five to just 
thirty-eight increasing the elected seats by thirty-seven). Simultaneous elections were 
held for legislatures in twenty-six provinces as well as for the local bodies. Ninety 
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percent of the registered voters turned up for voting. PDI-P under the leadership of 
Megawati emerged as the largest party capturing 153 seats and thirty-four percent of 
the votes. Golkar got 120 seats and twenty-two percent votes while the share of 
National Awakening Party'^ '* was fifty-one seats with twelve percent votes and 
National Mandate Party (PAN) winning thirty-four seats and seven percent votes. '~"^  
The elections for the President and Vice-President were held democratically 
by the MPR with the reduced strength of its non-elected members. They were reduced 
from 500 to 195, with 130 representing the regions. For the presidency, the direct 
fight was between Habibie and Megawati but Habibie was forced to opt out from the 
race just a day before, when his accountability speech was rejected by the Assembly. 
The political configuration immediately changed with Wahid emerging as a contender 
for the post. He was hitherto supporting Megawati. However, with the help of other 
Muslim parties, the PAN, the PPP and the Habibie faction of Golkar, he defeated 
Megawati by 373 to 313 votes. Megawati was chosen Vice-President, the next day.'^^ 
The removal of General Wiranto from the military commanid firt, and later as 
Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security too, could be marked out as an 
important political development, which went a long way in the establishment of 
civilian superiority over the military. Indonesia continued to be ravaged by separatist 
movements and accompanied violence particularly in Aceh and Irian Jaya provinces 
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as well as inter-racial riots in many parts, particularly in northern Moluccas, Ambon 
and central Sulav/esi. 
Within a year of his presidency, Gus Dur stood discredited partly because of 
his poor managerial skills and partly because of very poor support base in the 
legislature. The government remained elusive on taking bold economic decisions, 
particularly over corporate and debt restructuring. Wahid was finally impeached 
and removed by the Assembly on grounds of corruption and replaced by Megawati 
amidst high-voltage drama. Earlier, efforts to clamp down Emergency were 
repudiated by the military and police chiefs. His bid to dissolve the House and the 
Assembly was also negated by the Supreme Court declaring it as unconstitutional.''** 
Megawati started on a high note but she too was soon dodged by the same problems 
and controversies that confronted Wahid. However, she continued to rule till the 
completion of the term of the presidency till 2004. She was widely criticized not so 
much on account of personal integrity, but for her inaction and tolerance of corruption 
at various levels. The process of political development, however, was marked out for 
tremendous leap forward during her regime, especially, on two fronts. First, the 
revolutionary changes at the institutional level were introduced consolidating the 
democratic apparatuses. Second, despite high level of corruption, violence and 
divisions in society, the govermiient practised consociational democracy by co-opting 
all the major etlinic and functional groups and extending the cultural and financial 
autonomy, thus, contributing significantly to the secularization of political culture.'^ *' 
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Four sets of constitutional amendments during the period 1999-2002 in the 
1945-constitution altered and reformed its several provisions. The direct result of all 
these amendments was the abolition of military's representation in the DPR and Ml'R, 
making them democratic and fully elected bodies, vesting the people with the ultimate 
power to choose their legislators, the establishment of a Constitutional Court with the 
power of judicial review, decide the election-related disputes and pronounce over the 
alleged charges against the President and the Vice-President for their impeachment, 
and protection of basic rights of the citizens. ^ 
The DPR was made a fully elected body with the increase in seats to 550, at 
the same time abolishing the remaining thirty-eight reserved seats for the militar>'. 
The elections are now held on the basis of universal adult franchisehood requiring the 
voter to indicate his choice for the candidate as well as political party as a result of 
open list proportional representation system with province serving as electoral 
constituency.''^' The Regional Representative Council (DPD) represents regions and it 
is also directly elected. But it does not enjoy any powers in the passage of laws along 
with DPR. It can just propose and participate in discussion over bills relating to 
regional autonomy, relations between central and local governments and grants to the 
states.'^^ The MPR has been made flilly elected body consisting of DPR and DPD. 
The most remarkable, as well as indigenous feature of constitutional 
development pertains to the election of the President and the Vice-President, making 
the system neither presidential nor parliamentary, strictly speaking. A departing 
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feature from the presidential type is that though the candidates are elected by the 
people, but nominated by the political parties. Voters choose from amongst the pairs 
of candidates (presidential and vice-presidential) put up by the political parties, which 
have earlier secured at least three percent of the seats in the DPR or five percent of the 
nationwide vote. If no pair of candidates gets the absolute majority of the votes cast 
directly by the people together with at least twenty percent of the votes in half of 
Indonesia's provinces, then, the second ballot takes place in which the top two pairs 
of the first round compete.''^ '^  Given the multi-party system in Indonesia, there are 
remote chances of any pair elected in the first ballot unless the political parties enter 
into electoral arrangements. 
Independent candidates cannot fight the elections for either legislature or 
executive. It impinges upon free choice of the voter as well as contestant, when the 
internal democracy is lacking among polifical parties. Although, presidential and vice-
presidential nominees are elected by the members of the respective political parties at 
their national conventions, yet, the organizational structures of the parties are not 
democratic. This method seems to have been prompted by the desire of the leaders to 
continue their hold over respective political parties and play role in the selection and 
nomination of candidates. Otherwise, the system has great integrative value and it is 
fully consonant with the principles and prerequisites of consociational democracy. 
Not only it excludes the smaller parties from putting up candidates thus, avoiding the 
proliferation of candidates and confusion, but by adopting the second ballot system 
the polity has been able to target the divisive political culture apd differentiated socio-
ethnic configuration in the country. The principle of absolute majority along with the 
requirement of twenty percent votes in half of the provinces ensures that the winning 
133. Leonard C. Sebastian, "The Paradox ...., op.cit., pp. 258-9. 
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candidate represents the cross-sections of people as well as regions of the country. 
Otherwise there was always an impending feai- of Javanese candidate emerging as a 
winner as more than half of the population is concentrated in Java island.''*'' 
Therefore, the innovation augurs well for nation-building project that has suffered 
major jolts recently. 
An interesting feature of constitutional development is that the same 
constitution has been serving since it was first adopted as a provisional document in 
1945. The same document served the semi-authoritarian personal rule of Sukarno 
during 1959-66 as well as New Order Regime of Suharto from 1967 to 1998. After 
going through radical and progressive changes, it can be supposed to stand as a 
bulwark against the future attempts at authoritarian practices. The structural changes 
have also been accompanied by the people's mobilization and participation. In the 
elections to the DPR ninety percent of the electorate cast their ballots in 1999 polls 
while 84.06 percent of the electorate cast their votes in the 2004 elections.'^^ The 
culture of violence and demonstrations is giving way to institutionalized political 
behaviour, both at the individual and group level. The successful completion of the 
democratic elections for the DPP., local assemblies and presidency in 2004 in a 
peacefully organized manner augurs well for democratic consolidation. Money 
politics," however is creeping into the political culture of the country. Vote- buying is 
also reported in many instances at the local level. 
Philippines 
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Philippines has experienced a very different trajectory of political 
development than the rest of southeast Asia. It remained a colony for a longer period 
of time but the nature and stages of colonialism in Philippines were markedly 
different. It was the first to be exposed to the modern forms of political participation 
and governance. It was the first colony in Southeast Asia to get Independence. It is the 
only country in the region where nationalism had taken firm roots by the end of the 
nineteenth century.'" The U.S. attacked Philippines and defeated the Spanish in the 
wake of intense nationalist upsurge against the Spanish, which continued in guerrilla 
form against the Americans, too. However, the American rule was not based on 
repression and intense exploitation as was the case with the Spanish rule. Within a 
decade, the institutions of self-government were conceded by the U.S. By 1916, the 
elected legislature was in place. In 1934, the U.S. pledged to grant independence by 
1944 following an interim commonwealth in which the colony was promised internal 
autonomy.'•^^ The Japanese instituted a nationalist puppet government. After the re-
takeover, the Americans thought it safe to transfer power to the conservative elite who 
had cooperated with the Japanese, rather than the radical elements who had fought the 
T 139 
Japanese. 
Independence was proclaimed on 4 July 1946. The Americans helped the elite 
consolidate control over the system. Special concessions were clinched by the U.S. 
over privileged status to American citizens with regard to business activities in 
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Philippines, on tying the Philippines peso to the American dollar and retention of 
American military bases in Philippines. 
Philippines adopted a democratic constitution inspired by the U.S. 
constitution. It provided for presidential form of government, unitary structure of 
state, separation of powers, a bill of rights and independent judiciary. The plurality 
vote system was adopted for the presidential election. Each voter was to cast a single 
direct vote and the winner was to be determined by whoever could obtain a simple 
plurality. This method was different from the U.S. where the President is elected by 
absolute majority principle through an indirect electoral college. The term was four 
years and the President could run for maximum two terms. A distinctive feature of 
the political system of early era that contributed a lot towards stabilizing the system 
was the growth and persistence of two-party system. The political power revolved 
between the two political parties, namely, the Nationalists and the Liberals. The first 
President of independent Philippines, Mannel Roxas came from the latter.''*-' 
The Congress consisted of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The 
twenty four members of the Senate were elected from a nationwide constituency. The 
voters were not just required to indicate their choice but write the names of the 
candidates they preferred, since the electoral ballots did not carry the names of the 
contestants. The same method was used for all kinds of elections, including 
presidential elections.'"*^ The presidential veto over a bill could be overridden by two-
third majority in each house. However, generally, the President used to have his way 
and the tradition of strong presidency on the pattern of U.S. was maintained. 
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The democratic institutions functioned unhindered during the first two 
decades. However, the acute disparities and the feudal culture in society hampered the 
progress of procedural democracy towards substantive democracy. And finally, the 
gains of two decades of political development were lost in the course of rise of 
authoritarian regime of Marcos from 1972 to 1986. The traditional patron-client 
relationships that characterize and influence the political culture of Southeast Asia in 
general were much more pronounced in Philippines. ' With the democratization of 
the governmental structures, the economic and political elite fused together. The 
political democracy did not lead, significantly, to the erosion of traditional pattern of 
class divisions. The big landowning families reinforced their privileges by entering 
the competitive politics.''"' The democratization of polity rather suited the interests of 
elite class. Since money power as well as muscle power was extensively concentrated 
into the hands of a few extended families, and like everywhere success in elections is 
based on money and muscle power, a few dominant families monopolized important 
legislative and executive posifions in the government. Their hold, particularly in the 
rural and semi-urban areas was quite pervasive. To U.S. observers, Philippines 
resembled the wild West. But the real trouble lay deeper, 
Behind the faqade of democracy stood the fundamental fact that 
Philippine society was riven by extreme class differences. A few self-
aggrandizing rich families controlled every facet of society... the 
same families who had dominated their respective provinces for 
centuries now controlled the Senate and the house of 
Representatives. The new democratic political system actually 
provided them with a way to ensure and prolong their dominance. '^^ 
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To deepen the democracy, land reforms were imperative. All the Presidents talked 
about land reforms, some even initiated legislation, but none succeeded. Magsaysay, 
the most popular leader, came closest to push some land reform measures but faced 
recalcitrant legislature most of whose members came from elite class. Magsaysay, 
however, could not live long enough to carry the programme to any logical 
conclusion. The only mass level opposition to the elitist framework came from the 
communist Huks who did not take up the constitutional methods. Their activities were 
crushed by the government under the dynamic leadership of Magsaysay by adopting a 
148 
combination of politicd and military strategies. 
Despite the unresolved problem of extreme inequity, the credit must be given 
to the leadership provided by Roxas, Magsaysay and Macapagal carrying forward the 
tasks of state building and nation-building during early years. They tried to govern the 
state in a constitutional manner, provided political stability, held regular elections, 
strengthened the democratic institutions and facilitated wide political participation.'''^ 
The leadership accomplished the stupendous task of reconstruction after the havoc 
and dislocation caused by the Second World War. The legislature behaved 
independently and those men never tried to act dictatorially. The Press was free 
although, controlled by a few dynasties. The people had the right to criticize the 
government, to assembly and to form associations. Habeas corpus was available to 
the citizens. Powert\il interest groups had emerged and sought to influence decision-
making of the state. The civilian control over the military was well established. Over 
and above, the Philippines democratic process was considered to be one of the best 
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among the Asian countries in terms of institutionalization of polity and evolving 
political culture. 
Marcos was the first President to be elected for a second term in 1969. His 
first stint had been a moderate success. He, however, had begun to politicize military 
during his first tenure. Marcos' campaign for the second term was marked by 
excessive misuse of money including public money spent lavishly to ensure his 
return. This precipitated public unrest, which found expression in students' 
demonstrations against the government. The devaluation of peso just after his 
reelection added to the unrest. At economic front, there was rising concern over the 
likely affects of the abrogation of the Laurel-Langley Agreement in 1974 that would 
take away the preferential access available to sugar and other commodities in the U.S. 
market. At the deeper level, the gross inequalities ingrained in the system were a 
cause of dissatisfaction with the socio-economic conditions. Another reason of public 
unrest was the loss of sense of national sovereignty over American neocolonialism, 
the only beneficiary of which was perceived to be the elite class. Corruption was 
widespread. Violence ensued. An opposition rally was bombed in August 1971, 
killing and injuring many. Marcos suspended the writ of Habeas Corpus. In 
September 1972, strangely enough claiming a conspiracy between the Rightists, 
Oligarchs and the Maoist revolutionaries, Marcos declared Martial Law.'^' Both left 
wing and right wing opponents of Marcos were arrested. A new constitution was 
promulgated in 1973 that provided for a parliamentary form of government after an 
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nterim period. The elections for the interim national Assembly did take place in 
April 1978 but those were manipulated by Marcos' party. New Society Movement 
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(KBL) amidst widespread malpractices. Therefore, Marcos continued to enjoy real 
powers utilizing executive decree-making powers until 1985 facing no challenge from 
the puppet legislature and prime minister. 
In fact, the background for imposition of martial law was provided by tlie 
Constitutional Convention's (convened to frame a new constitution in 1970) failure to 
either extend the two-term limit on the presidency or switch over to the parliamentarv 
form of government. Marcos was not prepared to relinquish power at any cost at the 
end of his second term, which was drawing closer. He got crucial support from the 
U.S. by taking anti-communist stance as well as from the military of Philippines by 
giving it large pie in budget and role in politics. In the beginning, Marcos got some 
popular support by justifying martial law with the promise to end oligarchic rule, 
break the monopoly of the dynasties and to carry out land reforms.'^^ No doubt, he 
broke the monopoly of the oligarchic dynasties over the system. But that was replaced 
with much more concentrated, arbitrary and personal power of Marcos and his 
cronies. In the process, a new class of cronies, loyal businessmen and privileged 
bureaucrats was created while the power base of the old oligarchy remained intact, 
just lying a little dormant. New and far more entrenched monopolies were established 
fusing political and economic power. ^ No serious effort were made by Marcos 
towards socio-economic reforms, particularly, land reforms. 
During early years, however, Marcos regime was successful both on economic 
and administrative fronts. Peace and stability ensued. The reformist agenda, if not 
policy enforcement, strengthened the regime. Revenues as percentage of GDP 
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increased, considerably. Riding on the support, Marcos' party succeeded in the 
Assembly elections in 1978. The confidence helped in loosening some controls over 
the citizens' freedoms and the Press. The opposition had resurfaced as a consequence 
of re-introduction of electoral politics, making the regime defendant and vulnerable 
over many issues. Cronyism was at its peak and the people friendly stance of the 
reo;ime in its early years had given a decisive shift to governmental corruption and 
conservatism. The economic stagnation had eroded, whatever, little support the 
government was enjoying earlier. " 
Beniano Aquino, the dynamic and fiercely independent opposition leader who 
had been in jail from 1972 to 1980 was released in May 1980. He was forced into 
virtual exile in the U.S. till he was allowed to come back in August 1983. But, he was 
assassinated at the Manila Airport while stepping down. People sensed conspiracy by 
authorities'^'' that led to widespread organized as well as unorganized public rallies 
and protests. As the opposition to the government was increasing, the economy also 
started deteriorating. The annual grov/th rate dipped. The public sector enterprises, 
which had grown enormously by 1984 were showing huge losses. The interest rates 
due to oil crisis began to rise sharply making balance of payments precarious. To 
improve his tarnished image as well as bowing to pressure from the U.S., Marcos 
called for snap presidential elections in February 1986. Corazon Aquino, widow of 
the slain leader who had become a national martyr, was hailed by public with great 
enthusiasm as a symbol in her deceased husband's footsteps to fight against the 
coiTuption and authoritarianism of the regime. The previous presidential election was 
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boycotted by the opposition. But this time the opposition united behind Aquino 
after the personal intervention of cardinal Sin, the head of Roman Catholic church in 
Philippines. Marcos was declared winner but only after the serious allegations of 
gross irregularities in counting of votes by the officials. At this juncture three 
important developments tilted the scale in favour of Aquino and forced Marcos to fled 
the country. 
First, the revolt by some disgruntled army officers that was joined by Minister 
of Defence, Juan Ponce Enrile and Chief of Constabulary, General Ramos. They 
denunciated the election results as fraudulent and asked Marcos to step down in 
favour of Aquino. When Marcos tried to put down the revolt, the progressive rebel 
forces were joined by hundred of thousands of civilian demonstrators led by cardinal 
Sin. They forced the tanks to turn back as military refused to fire at unarmed 
demonstrators.'^^ Their ranks swelled and the last hope of Marcos, the U.S., too, 
withdrew support from the regime. ^ He was taken away in the U.S. helicopter to 
Clark Air Base from where he was allowed to proceed in exile to Honolulu."'*^ Thus, a 
combination of factors unseated Marcos. The most remarkable feature was the role 
played by the civil society, especially all its segments. This assertive role of the civil 
society and its further consolidation was later to prove the greatest bulwark against 
the reversion to authoritarian rule. The People's Power, as it came to be called, 
reflected truly the desire of the common people for meaningful democratic 
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participation. As soon as the country was redemocratized, the family constellations 
based on clientilistic foUowings resurfaced to compete with one another but the 
people's power was not washed away. The "ascendancy and dominance of political 
clans"'^'' has not displaced the evolving political culture in its enduring aspects that 
has witnessed the weakening of the personalism and the traditional patron-client 
bonds. Particularly, in the urban areas, it is accompanied with the ever-widening 
middle class, which provides strength to the civil society. 
The democratic revolution was accompanied by two contradictory strands in 
politics, one pushing the process of political development further while the other 
arresting the process. Aquino started with very weak organizational base.""^ Still the 
real accomplishment of Aquino came with the adoption of new constitution, patterned 
on pre-Marcos era 1934 constitution albeit with certain safeguards. In a plebiscite 
76.37 percent people approved it while only 22.65 percent voted against it.""-^  The 
separation of powers with checks and balances on the old pattern was adopted. The 
structure of the Senate is the same twenty-four seats, to be filled through nation-wide 
election. One half of the membership of senate is elected every three years. Treaties 
are required to be approved by the Senate by two third majority. No senator can serve 
for more than two terms while no member of House of Representatives can serve for 
more than three consecutive terms. The lower House can have maximum 260 seats 
which are filled through a combination of geographical representation based on 
single-member constituencies and a party-list system."''' The presidential 
appointments must be approved by the Commission of Appointments, which consists 
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of twelve members each from both the Houses to be elected through proportional 
representation.'^^ Not only the constitution trimmed the powers of the executive but 
also reduced the Presidential tenure to one term only so as to limit the President's 
sphere of influence which had led to authoritarian regime in the early 1970's. At the 
same time single term was extended from four years to six years so as to account for 
greater stability. The constitution also provides a Bill of Rights, including freedom of 
speech and free Press, right of access to the official information on matters of public 
concern, habeas corpus etc. Another significant development was that the 
constitutional amendments must be ratified in a nation-wide plebiscite. The 
constitution also prohibited the political dynasties from political power but details 
about the prohibition were left to the Congress to be determined. The Congress passed 
a bill prohibiting the candidacy of relatives of high-ranking government officials with 
the second degree of consanguinity. 
While strengthening the structural roots of democracy from above, Aquino 
government failed to strengthen the socio-economic roots of democracy from below. 
Her contribution in opening up the economy and dismantling the monopolies of crony 
corporations of Marcos era and introducing competition in hitherto closed sectors, 
was immense. She failed to institutionalize the overwhelming personal support she 
got in the beginning from the masses to break the personalistic patrimonial system of 
the past. She could not build onto the initial support and left the Agrarian reform 
package in the hands of the legislators. Of the 200 elected congressional 
representatives, 132 came from established landowning families and another 39 were 
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relatives of big farmers."'* In the face of steep inequalities in society, more than half 
of the population living below poverty line, absence of social security net, 
unemployment, the "people's power" failed to make a dent into the traditional bonds 
between the prosperous patrons and poor and dependent clients as the leadership was 
not willing to consolidate the gains towards substantive democratization. Her own 
coalition controlled all except two seats in the Senate and about seventy percent seats 
in the House of Representatives. This shows that Aquino had relied heavily on 
landowning elite families.'^ Hence, the elite-controlled Congress got bogged down 
over the modalities of the comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP) 
enunciated by the Aquino administration and was never taken up in the right 
earnestness with resolute political will. And when it was adopted, it progressed at the 
glacial pace with implementation lags, hi effect, the programme failed to pick due to 
antipathy of the government and bureaucracy. 
Another setback to the process of political development v/as a series of coup 
attempts by the military, which failed, of course, but not without making the position 
of Aquino increasingly vulnerable. To an extent, the problem was targeted at its root 
with the passage of the anti-coup law in 1990 that made rebellion punishable by life 
imprisonment and non-bailable. 
Many observers of Philippines' politics consider Philippines a dependency of 
the U.S. The neo-colonialist approach has been applied to understand political 
development in Philippines, which has been supposed to be influenced by the 
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American business and military interests. This approach may not be adequate to 
understand the dynamics of political change in Philippines, yet, it points out the 
foreign factor which impinges upon the autonomy of the political system. The 
constitution had specifically mentioned that the foreign military bases will not be 
allowed after the expiry of U.S. - Philippines Agreement in 1991, except under the 
provisions of a treaty approved by the Senate and if required by Congress to be 
submitted to the electorate in a national referendum.'^^ Thus, a renewed military-base 
treaty between the two countries entitled "A Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and 
Security" strongly backed by Aquino was rejected by Senate by a vote of 12 to 11 
ending nearly a century of American presence in the country. Even a lucrative offer of 
payment of more than two billion dollars by the U.S. in lieu of retention permit for 
U.S. bases could not bind the Senate. The rejection of treaty, though, detested by 
the U.S., was hailed as a great triumph and a matter of pride, by the Filipinos. 
Philippines is a huge country in terms of size as well population. It is also 
divided along ethnic, linguistic, religious and class lines and these divisions are 
reflected in voting pattern also. Yet the country has always been governed under a 
unitary framework despite the occasional voices and protests by various regions and 
groups for a larger share of local autonomy. The absence of federal framework 
increases the significance of decentralization initiatives by the government. During 
the last year of Aquino's rule. Local Government Code was passed which paved the 
way for devolution of extensive powers (particularly pertaining to local services such 
as health, education, public works, management of agriculture etc.) to the local 
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authorities. The code also seeks the active involvement of civil society particularly the 
NGOs in local governance. The elected Mayors and municipal councilors govern the 
1500 municipalities of the country. The villages (barangays) are also headed by 
elected heads. 
Ramos won the presidential elections in 1992 by capturing just 23.4 percent of 
the votes, among seven contestants. This was departure from the pre-authoritarian era, 
when two party system prevailed and the winning candidates required majority of 
votes. In 1992 elections, even the combined share of the President-elect and his 
runner-up did not constitute the majority. This is a clear drawback of the plurality 
vote system, particularly for such an important post in a presidential system. The 
Philippines in future will have to tackle this problem, if multi-party system persists. 
The divisions in society are reflected in party-system. A high degree of ethnic-
linguistic pattern of voting is observed in the elections. 
Ramos established Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) to deal with 
crimes at high levels. He also established Presidential Commission Against Graft and 
Corruption to deal with corruption cases involving presidential appointees while 
another, the Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was established to 
investigate all cases of graft or corruption. ^ Ramos envisioned a programme 
"Philippines 2000." It sought to transform Philippines into a newly industrialized 
country in league with Thailand and Malaysia by the turn of the century. His plan 
called for the democratic political system to take the lead in overturning undemocratic 
economic system in pursuit of the goal of rapid growth. Its key components were 
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envisaged as removal of corruption and feudal land system, export and oriented 
industries and FDI inflows to be sustained by high rates of growth.'^ "^ 
Ramos' coalition, Lakas-NUCD-UMPD controlled overwhelming majority 
in House of Representatives tliroughout his tenure and it was able to cobble majority 
in Senate too after the 1995 mid-term elections, still, the strains in executive -
legislature relationship directly as a result of separation of powers principle came to 
the foreground during his tenure. The weak party discipline, absence of whip and 
independence of both institutions from each other led to deadlocks over a number of 
bills which were not seriously taken up by the legislature. This led to the demands for 
parliamentary system in which executive and legislature work in close cooperation, 
which is imperative for developmental policies of the government to be translated into 
action. However, such demand was opposed by important sections of civil society 
including Cardinal Sin as well as Senate lest they feared the perpetuation of Ramos' 
rule and weakened and legislature. Attempts were also made by the supporters of 
Ramos to extend the term of the presidency but that was also opposed by the different 
segments of civil society. 
Another important development of the period entailing far-reaching 
consequences for the internal cohesion of the polity was Peace Agreement signed 
between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front in 1996.'^ ^ The 
176. CD. Neher and Ross Marlay, Democracy, op.cit., p. 60. 
177. Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of the Philippines 
178. The provinces in tiie southern part of Philippines are Muslim majority provinces and they have 
never been comfortable with the central government's attempt to stamp its authority in these 
areas. The MNLF picked up the arms in response to the imposition of martial law by the Marcos 
regime in 1972 after which more than 100000 people have been killed on both sides in the 
conflict. Although Tripoli Agreement was signed between the MNLF and Marcos government in 
1976 envisaging meaningful autonomy in the thirteen provinces and nine cities of Mindanao but 
the agreement was broken as the progress was stalled over interpretation of the terms and 
implementation legs. The 1996 Agreement was an improvement over the Tripoli Agreement. 
The cornerstone of the 1996 Agreement was creation of interim Southern Philippine Council for 
Peace and Development (SPCDP) covering the area of the original thirteen provinces where 
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agreement was signed in good faith by Indonesia and Organization of Islamic 
Countries. A more radical Muslim group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was 
not a party to the Agreement but entered into negotiations just after the signing of the 
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pact. 
Ramos was also successful in consolidating the civilian control over the 
military. The factor that he himself belonged to military greatly helped him. He 
proved, ultimately to be a true democrat. The military was not allowed any role in 
civilian matters. One legacy of the U.S. colonialism in Philippines had been the 
tradition of civilian control over military despite the military occupying important 
position and role in the scheme of the state. Marcos loosened that control to maintain 
his dictatorial grip over the system with the help of loyal supporters in military, the 
repercussions of which were faced by Aquino who faced a series of coup attempts. 
Ramos bought peace with the rebel military factions opposed to the government, 
finally, through negofiations in 1996, by extending a generous amnesty programme to 
the past coup plotters. 
The 1998 General Elections turned out to be one of the fairest and least violent 
elections in electoral histoiy of Philippines. An NGO, National Citizens' Movement 
for Free Elections (NAMFREL), which had been monitoring elections since its 
Muslim Filipinos were promised autonomy under the Tripoli Agreement in 1976. See, Jacques 
Bertrand, "Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement is 
Fragile," Pacific Affairs, Spring, 2000, No. 1, pp. 37-54. 
179. The SPCDP finally paved the way for Autonomous Region in the Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). 
Many sections from the MNLF joined the ARMM institutions, but the MILF along with Abu 
Sayyaf group continued to wage violent struggle in the region. The communist New People's 
Army (NPA) has also become quite active in violence in the region. However, all these fronts 
have some semblance of acceptance and tolerance among the local people. See, John Linatud, 
"The 2004 Philippine Elections: Political Change in an Illiberal Democracy," Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, 2005, vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 80-101 (87-9). 
180. No coups took place against Ramos (1992-98). Afterwards, the defence of successive civilian 
governments has kept some leverage of Army in the power echelons, but has kept it within 
barracks, and, more or less, subjected to civilian control. See, Ibid. p. 87. 
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creation in 1951 certified the elections as relatively free.'*" In the exit poll conducted 
by another NGO, the SWS, eighty-eight percent of the respondents stated that voting 
in their precincts was free and fair. Under new rules, twenty percent of the seats in the 
House of Representatives were to be filed by Party-list system on proportional basis. 
This system is extremely representative as instead of bigger parties, it is meant to 
ensure representation to the smaller parties. The three biggest parties are excluded 
(based on performance in previous elections) from the list system while any smaller 
party getting at least two percent of the votes becomes eligible for a seat (one seat for 
each two percent). Since hundred of parties participated in the elections in tlie hope of 
getting a pie, only thirteen parties crossed the minimum threshold of two percent.'^' 
Thus, thirty-eights seats in party-list component remained unfulfilled out of fifty-two. 
The presidential race was won by a former film actor and incumbent vice-
president, Joseph Estrada. Estrada fought the elections on popular slogans and pro-
poor agenda. He got substantial plurality of votes at forty percent'**^ in spite of eleven 
candidates in the race. While Lakas-NUCD won a majority of congressional seats, 
over one-half of them defected to Estrada's, LMP soon after the election results were 
announced. So, it was the repeat of the trend of previous elections when the LDP 
candidates had defected to Ramos' coalition. 
Four factors make party system very weak in Philippines. The first and the 
foremost, as usually the case with all presidendai systems in some degree, is the 
absence of concern for legislative majority, homogeneity and party discipline. 
Second, there is no anfi-defecfion law in Philippines unlike Thailand or Malaysia. 
Thirdly, ideological divisions are not pronounced in Philippines. The opportunism is 
181. CD. Neher and Ross Marlay, Democracy, op.cit., p. 64. 
182. Gabriella R. Montinola, "The Philippines in 1998: Opportunity and Crisis," Asian Survey. 1999, 
Vol. XXXlX,No. 1, pp. 67-8. 
183. Ian Brown , op.cit., p. 1192. 
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the guiding factor. Fourthly, and not the least important, is the extended culture of 
clientilism in politics. Carl Lande, figuring out the reflection of social relationships 
within Philippine society into the political party system wrote a long time back, 
which, to a great extent reflects present reality too, 
77?^  Philippine polity... is structured less by organized interest 
groups or by individuals M'ho in politics think of themselves us 
members of categories, i.e., of distinctive social classes or 
occupations, than by a netM'ork of mutual aid relationships between 
pairs of individuals... i.e. bonds between prosperous patrons and 
their poor and dependent clients. 
The clientilist culture remains the same, while bonds based on personal ties 
and family traditions are loose, unstable and often shifting,'^^ The crucial thing is 
political offices and favours. Issues and ideology are just window dressing for 
personal ambitions. Politics is a struggle to control the resources. However, this is not 
peculiar to Philippine alone. The culture of defections is found in all the democratic 
politics of Asia unless regulated by some anti-defection laws. 
Estrada had come into power by promising programmes to uplift the poor but 
within a year, instead of reaching out to the poor, he was seeing shifting towards the 
elite interests. He was criticized for creating new monopolies, for instance in the 
petrochemical industry, port services and telecommunications. In August 1999, a 
huge protest, "Rally for Democracy" under the leadership of Aquino and Cardinal Sin 
was organized in Manila against the government's moves to extend economic 
deregulation by removing the limits on foreign ownership in land and public utilities. 
Most business associations landed support to Estrada.'^^ Despite the creation of 
184. Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics, Southeast Asia 
Studies, Yale University, New Haven, 1965, p. 1. 
185. See Alfred McCoy, An Anarchy of Families: State and Familky in the Philippines, University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1993. 
186. Ian Brown, op.cit, p. 1173. 
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National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), the progress on alleviating poverty was 
slow. The World Bank withdrew certain funds, intended for development projects, 
ostensibly aimed at benefiting the poor, because of governmental inaction.'^^ 
Legislations were passed in year 2000 allowing the foreigners to enter into retail 
industry and giving them right to buy the domestic banks. The image of the 
government was shattered when the allegations were made that policy decisions were 
made during late night drinking and gambling sessions in what came to be known as 
the "midnight cabinet." 
The process of institutionalization got a beating with the exposure of 
corruption charges against Estrada and the resuhant proceedings forcing his ouster 
that did not take place exactly within institutional framework provided by the 
constitution. Yet, once again, the events proved the strength of the civil society 
making its mark on political development. The tiff was originally billed as the elite 
versus the populist Estrada. In the aftermath of the accusation that Estrada had 
received bribes and indulged in favouritism, the Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (the daughter of former President) resigned from President's Cabinet. The 
coalition which enjoyed more than two-third majority in each House of the Congress 
was reduced to just half of its size in House of Representatives and one-third of its 
size in the Senate as a result of defections. The lower House, as result of defections, 
moved the Impeachment Motion against the President to the Senate on charges of 
bribery, corruption, betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the constitution. 
A two-third majority in Senate (15 out of 22) was required to Impeach the President. 
187. /bid.p.\\14. 
188. Alejandro Reyes and Kristina Luz "The Elites Vs. Estrada," Asian Week, November 17, 2000, 
pp. 26-30. 
189. Mel C. Labrador, "The Philippines: in 2000; In Search of a Silver Lining..." Asian Survey, 
2001, Vol. XLI, No. 1, pp. 223-24. 
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As the trial progressed, the culpabihty of the President in amassing millions of dollars 
in banks came to light, which was suppressed by pro-Estrada factions in the Senate. 
On this account the prosecutorial team walked out from the Senate charging the pro-
Estrada senators with manipulating the trial.'''" Meanwhile, the street demonstrations 
and protests supported by Ramos, Aquino and Cardinal Sin snowballed. One by one, 
members of the cabinet withdrew their support and the final blow came with the 
military chiefs armouncement of withdrawal of support for the President, forcing 
Estrada to resign. 
The fact remains that the formal institutional procedures were by-passed 
despite the democratic apparatus well in place. Extra institutional process unfolded 
and the former presidents, opposition political parties. Church and business leaders 
made a covert lobbying to the military, police and allies to withdraw their support 
from Estrada. But such crisis itself got precipitated in the wake of resignation of 
prosecutors against the manipulation of proceedings in the Senate. The military's 
involvement in the end (which was hitherto maintaining a neutral stand) was a minor 
setback, otherwise, the civil society was able to reassert, once again, vis-a-vis the 
manipulations of state authority. Nevertheless, the whole episode was a setback for 
the process of institution-building but good for evolving democratization of political 
culture 'People Power' is not a constitutional devise since its initiation, conduct and 
contextual justification can't be delineated in the constitution. In any particular 
instance, it may degenerate into petty partisan and unprincipled politics.. Although, 
Estrada, legally tried to assert his claim to the presidency and thus immunity from 
190. Mel C. Labrador, "The Philippine in 2001: High Drama, a New President and Setting the Stage 
for Victory," Asian Swyey, 2002, Vol. XLII, No. 1, p. 142. 
191. Ibid. 
192. On state-civil society relationship, see, M.C. Ferrer, "The Philippine State and Civil Society: 
Discourse and Praxis," Korea Observer, 2004, vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 535-71. 
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prosecution, the supreme court ruled against both the claims and formally declared the 
presidency vacant, thus legalizing Arroyo's ascendancy to the presidency. Estrada 
was taken into custody. Arroyo, however, was able to consolidate her poshion in the 
most violent election in the Post-Marcos era, won the overwhelming majority in the 
lower House and eight of the thirteen seats at stake in the upper House.'"^ "^  
The money politics and the elite character of the democracy dilutes, rather, 
impedes the process of political development in Philippines. The politics even today, 
particularly at local level is considered to be a power struggle to dominate and control 
resources between the two or more well entrenched powerful clans. Majority of the 
members of House of Representatives come from old ruling dynasties. According to a 
1993 Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism study, 145 out of 199 members of 
the lower House had relatives who were occupying or had occupied public office.'^ '* 
More than ninety percent of the members of the Congress were millionaires. Elite 
domination of sectoral politics is reinforced by the failure to enforce conflict of 
interest laws in Philippines. The legislators continue with high stakes in big business 
and public agencies. Benedict Kerkvliet has defined the political parties as "polifical 
machines". It has brought money politics into sharper focus. The elite groups use 
them to seek lucrafic offices, personal fortunes and to control the resources. Showing 
the relationship between money politics and political parties, Benedict Kerkvliet puts 
it succinctly. 
Candidates rely heavily on their own social networks, wearing 
together cascading tiers of client supporters and supplemented 
where necessary with money, material incentives, and promises. ... 
Personal networks, while vital for stitching factions together, are 
193. Ibid. p. 143. 
194. Jeffrey Riedinger, "The Philippines in 1993: Halting Steps Toward Liberalization," Asian 
Survey, 1994, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2, p. 139. 
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insufficient and inefficient for winning offices in large electorates. 
For that reason, "political machines" became apparent in the 
I950s-1960s, fell on hard times during the Marcos years when his 
machine was the only game in the country, hut have been 
resuscitated since the mid-1980s. ... Elections that are battles 
between large political machines require politicians to come up with 
vast financial resources in order to stay in the game. This 
imperative, in turn, encourages politicians to concentrate on pork 
barrel programmes to curry favour with voters, to use public funds 
to finance their political machines and to resort to other illegal 
195 * 
practices. 
Philippines political process is interpreted to be characterized by various 
scholars as built upon patron-client relationships (ties of mutual assistance),'^^ 
domination of elite families (based on excessive wealth and uninhibited access to 
state's resources),'^'^ or bossism accumulation and exploitation of resources by the big 
1 Qk • 
states actors). Jennifer Franco, m an illuminating study, classifies Post-Marcos 
regimes as clientelist electoral. She describes a clientelist electoral regimes as "an 
electorally competitive national regime which falls short oft he minimum democratic 
threshold because of the persistence of local authoritarian enclaves.'^^ All these 
characterization are variants of the same model viz., elite democracy. The elite uses 
its power to still greater access to the state resources. The political and economic 
power gets fused and perpetuated in the process. The 'elite democracy' framework, 
though valid, but a little inadequate to comprehend the fuller scope and dimension of 
political development in Philippines. It obviously leaves out important threads like 
195. Benedict Kerkvliet, "Toward a More Comprehensive Analysis of Philippine Politics: Beyond the 
Patron-Client Factional Framework," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995, Vol. 26, No. 2, 
pp. 402-3. 
196. Ibid. Carl Lande, Leaders, op.cit. 
197. Fric Gutierrez, All in, op.cit., Paul Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the 
Philippines, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998. Hutchcroft likens his concept to the concept 
of patrimonial oligarchic state in which powerful oligarchic clans monopolise the financial 
system to advance their personal interests even at the expense of state's developmental 
objectives, pp. 16-20. 
198. John Sidel, Capital, Coercion and Crime: Bossism in the Philippiines, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, 1999. 
199. Jennifer Franco, Elections and Democratization in the Philippines, Routledge, New York, 2001, 
p. 16. 
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people's power, grass-root democracy, peasants assertion in the southern provinces 
and the growing strength off civil society including vibrant press. There is a class 
dimension, too, to the violent conflict brewing in southern parts. Hence, it becomes 
imperative to integrate some socialist framework to the elite framework of democracy 
in Philippines. 
In spite of the high level of economic growth attained, the countervailing 
forces that growth would be expected to have nurtured have not pressed as hard for 
democratization as might be expected. In Singapore, where the middle class is large, it 
could be expected that it would take the lead in demanding further democratization. 
Singapore's small size means that its population forms a relatively intimate 
community, one in which information is widely shared, conformity is encouraged, 
discipline is imposed and dissidence is instantly detected and effectively 
suppressed.^ *^  Growth produced a complex, differentiated class structure, including a 
strong middle class and a large working class. The Singapore middle class has 
prospered, but so has the large working class, despite the absence of a militant trade 
union movement. The early low-wage policy was accompanied by a huge expansion 
in public housing, schools, and health services, while during 1979-81 the government 
implemented a series of sharp wage mcreases. Singapore's overwhelming reliance 
on foreign capital and its aspiration to consolidate its position as the regional centre 
for financial and commercial services make it imperative that its reputation for 
701 
political and economic stability be maintained. 
200. Hussin Mutalib, "Illiberal democracy and the future of opposition in Singapore," Third World 
Quarterly, 2000, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 313-42. 
201. Natasha H. Hart, "The Singapore State Revisited," The Pacific Review, 2000, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 
196-216. 
202. Ibid. 
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The key to the middle class' effectiveness in Southeast Asia can be found in 
its status and wealth, and it becomes increasingly independent of the state as growth 
continues. The significance of higher education becomes clear in the light of the 
students, generally being the most active group in the occasional organization of 
'People's Power' for democratization across the region. The students constituted the 
core group in the pro-democracy demonstrations in Philippines, Thailand and 
Indonesia that eventually ushered into the establishment of democracies in these 
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countries. 
The big-business class pursues its interests more independently than the other 
classes. In Southeast Asia, businessmen have generally been reluctant to take a 
political lead for democratization until the opportunities are ripe and the trend is 
clearly in favour of democratic wave. Thus, it is very conservative and opportunist 
class. However, there are internal contradictions within capitalist class in an 
authoritarian regime. It is because only a handful of crony capitalists find full 
opportunities and facilities under authoritarian regime. A large chunk of enterprising 
class is not satisfied with the command structure of the economy, due to intermarriage 
of politics and business, finds itself tied to the entrenched power structures. With the 
establishment of democracy, these ties remain but the balance is titled in favour of 
business class as a whole away from a few cronies of the regime. 
The degree to which each society has been divided by ethnic, religious, and 
cultural differences among its indigenous inhabitants and later immigrants, has been a 
powerful factor in the politics of a number of Southeast Asian countries. Where the 
divisions deep, they are seen as tlireats to national unity and, thus provide additional 
203. Junhan Lee, "Primary Causes of Asian Democratization: Dispelling Conventional Myths," Asian 
Survey, 2002, Vol. XLII, No. 6, pp. 821-37 (832-4). 
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justification for authoritarianism. In Indonesia, for example, where the Javanese are 
the largest single community (although constituting only 45 percent of the 
population), the alienation of various non-Javanese communities was a principal 
cause of the regional rebellions that broke out in the 1950s, and the felt need to 
suppress them was an important rationale for the authoritarian regime that followed. 
The regional movements resurfaced as part of democratic wave in late 1990's, the 
moment the authoritarian. As a result of the decentralization package and political 
stabilization at the centre, some movements have subsided while some others like the 
Acehneze separatist movement continue. The adoption of federal framework can be 
one of the solutions of the problem. 
Of all the states in Southeast Asia, none has been so far, able to practice liberal 
democracy. Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia were swept under so-called third 
wave of democratization, but soft authoritarian strands are ever present in these 
democracies. Thailand has even reverted back to military dictatorship. If we judge the 
liberal-democratic yardsticks of "free and fair electoral contestation for governing 
offices based on universal suffrage, guaranteed freedoms of association and 
expression, accountability through the rule of law, and civilian control of the 
military,"'"'' no system fully-fits in this mould. The schism between the notions of 
liberal and illiberal democracy is all the more present in case of Malaysia, a vibrant 
procedural democracy in most of the respects. But such kind of schisms must be 
analysed against the backdrop that nation building and state building in these nations 
is still an ongoing process. 
In Southeast Asia, with the possible exception of Thailand which 
was not colonized, the state came before the nation. The task of the 
204. J. Fox, "The Difficult Transition From Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico," 
World Politics, 1996, Vol. 46, No. l,pp. 151-84. 
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independent state therefore was to create a nation, i.e. to commence 
the nation-building process while at the same time maintaining racial 
harmony, social security, political stability, and economic 
development. In dealing with the multifold challenges of post-
independence nationalism and regionalism, the track record of 
Malaysia and Singapore has been singularly impressive despite a few 
blemishes on the overall record. '^  
It is not to emphasise that there are no democratic virtues in Southeast Asian 
variants. In fact, the track record of Malaysia, Indonesia or Thailand in providing 
relatively free space to the media and civil society and maintaining electoral 
procedures is non-comparable to authoritarian regimes in West Asia or military 
dictatorships of Latin America or even the communist regime of adjoining China. 
They have remained colonies for long that seriously affected their socio-
economic development for centuries. After getting Independence, neither they had 
mature political culture and institutions nor the economic wherewithal to sustain the 
democratic experiments. In this connection. Dr. Mahathir's remarks are noteworthy, 
"there is a strong correlation between rapid economic growth and strong stable 
governments in East Asia for they provide the necessary stability consistency, and 
predictability so essential to long-term investments and economic progress.""°'' 
The regimes like Malaysia and Singapore not only rejected the western-liberal 
model of democracy but, to a extent, have been successful in providing some 
justification for their own brand of democracy. The leaders with authoritarian streaks 
have made good use of the precarious multi-ethnic nature of their societies, 
continuous high growth rates and pursuing free market policies gaining international 
acceptability for their brands of democracy. 
205. 1N;.N. Vohra and J.N. Dixit, Religion, op.cit, pp. 105-06. 
206. New Strait Times, December 6, 1993, pp. 1-2; cited in N.N. Vohra and J.N. Dixit, eds. Religion, 
Politics and Society in South and Southeast Asia, Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 1998. 
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There is too much emphasis in liberal-democratic model upon state-neutrality, 
whether in the distribution and providing access, to national resources or managing 
the plural identities. However, the state is well justified in playing assertively 
interventionist role if the market fails to rectify the inequity^"^ (In fact, it promotes 
inequity) or if any ethnic group faces acute backwardness. 
The Southeast Asian Economic Development Model, as it has been practiced 
with variations in these countries, while delivering growth and raising average 
incomes has also resulted in growing class-disparities and marginalization of the poor 
from the development process. It is a universal phenomenon, though. Still, it does 
not dilute the imperative of equity policies in addition to growth strategies and 
priorities. 
207. Richard A. Higgott and Helen E.S. Nesadurai, "Rethinking the Southeast Asian Development 
Model: Bringing Ethical and Governance Questions In," Asian Economic Bulletin, 2002, Vol. 
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CHAPTER - VI 
CONCLUSION 
Prominent leaders of Southeast Asia like Sukarno, Lee Kuan Yew and 
Mahathir Mohamad have championed the cause of''Asian democracy" that emphasize 
strong state and restrictive regime of human rights along with formal participation of 
people in politics. The hallmark of a democracy in a developing country, they argue, 
is the maintenance of socio-economic and political order permeated by consensus, 
discipline and mutual aid and not the intense competition and free action that suits the 
developed and homogenized societies of the west. The western values based on 
individualism and liberalism do not suit the developing countries, which are in the 
midst of the process of nation building and evolution of civic culture. The curbs on 
human rights are also justified in the name of 'Asian Values.' The subscribers to this 
view emphasise that individual rights though of great value must be subordinate to the 
collective interests of the larger society. The social well-being and communal peace 
assumes greater significance in case of multi-ethnic plural societies. Moreover, the 
strong arm of the state is needed in order to achieve quicker economic development 
and stability. Their plea is that Western ideals do not take into account the traditions 
and sensibilities of developing and plural societies, particularly Asian politics. 
The illiberal conception of democracy is thus justified on grounds of distinct 
cultural values with higher emphasis in Asian culture upon consensus, cooperation, 
deference for authority etc. Sukarno in support of his "Guided Democracy" had 
suggested the cultural notions like muafakat (consensus and unanimity) and 
mujaswarah (consultation and discussion). It emphasizes that decisions are to taken 
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after wide consultation and debate but the final decisions must flow from the 
leadership and has to be followed by one and all. This is important in order to achieve 
unity, integrity, peace, order and development in society. The Asian values highlight 
social justice and social spirit, while the Western values emphasize individual 
differences, competition and weakening of social bonds what Mahathir calls as 
"democratic extremism." The common good of the entire community, they claim, is 
best guaranteed by a strong state subordinating the individual interests to the public 
good. 
On closer analysis, however it becomes clear that the ideological construction 
of the strong state, in practice, tends to be self serving for these leaders. The 
proponents of 'Asian Values' concept have their own political agenda at hand, using 
those values to justify their unscrupulous political dominance and privileges. They 
shrewdly conceal the regime's interests as community's interest. And then the 
distinction between the state and the government is also blurred. And the attack on 
govermnent's policies is easily given anti-national colour. According to Aung Suu 
Kyi, recipient of Noble Peace Prize, cultural relativism serves as a pretext to "block 
the aspirations of peoples for democratic institutions and human rights." The 
corporatist-statist version of state's funcfions and regulations has been helpful in 
achieving quicker rates of economic growth helped by intelligent and bold leadership 
in some cases. But on no account can that be supposed to serve the process of political 
development, directly. The democracy which does not provide viable choices to the 
citizens in selecting their rulers and crushes the opposition is not conducive to the 
process of political development. Political equality i.e. open competition for political 
power entailing choices to the citizens and accountability of the rulers towards 
citizens is the foundation upon which the edifice of democracy rests. The political 
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development also entails a fair and adequate system of protection and enforcement of 
human rights. The human rights of the people can be curbed only for the sake of 
genuine public interest and the logical relationship between the restrictions imposed 
and the common interest sought has to be shown by the concerned authorities and 
should be generally acceptable to the civil society. The restrictions imposed upon 
human rights should neither mean nor generally perceived as to subserve the cause of 
only those in authority. Political development, strictly speaking, can be said to be 
taking place only when the overall choice of the people is increasing. Merely the 
improvement in standard of living can't be supposed to constitute political 
development. Otherwise, Singapore and Brunei would be considered as the most 
politically developed countries of the region. Even Saudi Arabia will score better than 
Malaysia or Philippines on the scale of political development. Therefore, denial of 
human rights can't be justified in terms of different set of values or requirements of 
Asian people. Although, it can be explained in terms of differences in political culture 
(with more emphasis upon personalism, deference for authority and clientilist 
traditions) and underdeveloped socio-economic conditions in developing countries. 
The concept of "Asian values" or "Asian culture" or "Asian democracy" has 
been advanced by the leaders like Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad more as a 
strategy to cling to power or to subdue the opposition in order to perpetuate their rule 
by emphasizing discipline and harmony over liberty and equality. Only by 
undermining liberal democracy, they could retain their hold over the system. The 
concept of "Asian democracy" provided the philosophical justification for the denial 
of fuller democracy to the citizens of Malaysia and Singapore, which is over long 
their due. The democracy must aim at increasing the control of people over decision-
making processes and if it is not progressing in that direction, political development 
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can't be supposed to be occurring at the institutional-processual level. In Malaysia, 
particularly, full-fledged procedural democratic apparatus coupled with rule of law 
has been maintained since Independence. Nevertheless, political development at 
institutional-processual level has been hampered by persistence in power of the same 
UMNO-dominated ruling alliance at the centre, which has craftily twisted the legal-
constitutional-electoral framework to retain its hold over the political system. No 
doubt, the government does it through lawfully enacted Acts and constitutional 
amendments, which in turn help it in keeping the opposition feeble and insipid. It 
must be noticed that the ruling alliance has always come to power winning more than 
two-thirds of the seats and the opposition's main consideration has generally been to 
deprive the government of two-thirds majority rather than to displace it. Thus, it is a 
case of authoritarianism practiced within a largely democratic mould or, in other 
words, democracy practiced in an authoritarian manner. The remarkable feature is that 
the leadership justifies authoritarian ways as part of 'Asian Values,' thus, good for the 
unity integrity and development of the country. 
Be that as it may, the opposition still is free to criticize the performance of the 
government and to present a viable alternative to the government in an open 
competition for political power despite the restrictions imposed by the government on 
the rights to free assembly and free speech. In the light of weak and subdued 
opposition, some observers of Malaysian polity call it as a hegemonic model of 
democracy. This is only partially true. The complex ethnic composition coupled with 
the Malay majority's economic backwardness make out a special case for the 
classification of its political system. It is very difficuh job to fit Malaysia into any 
prevalent model of democracy. Even though, civil liberties are curbed and opposition 
does not enjoy full democratic space for maneuvering the voters and stretch its 
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muscle, it can't be dubbed as merely hegemonic model of democracy. The ethnic 
minority groups who together exist in fairly large numbers do not face any restrictions 
upon their voting rights. The election procedures like balloting, voting and vote-
counting are relatively free and fair as compared to rest of Southeast Asia. The 
opposition, though, is legally prohibited from criticizing the government over certain 
sensitive state policies, still, it is free to put across its views over most of political, 
economic and administrative issues. The Chinese and hidians have sided with the 
ruling regime when their support mattered most for the opposition. In 1999, General 
Elections, particularly, when the opposition was united under a coalition in the 
backdrop of reformasi, it could have easily displaced the ruling coalition if only 
Chinese and Indians had voted for it with thumbing majority. However, more than 
three-fourth of the minority voters sided with the ruling regime. This fact underscores 
the point that merely hegemonic or single dominant party system variant model of 
democracy has not been practiced in Malaysia. A great deal of consociational 
elements and procedures are visible. The single dominant political party, the UMNO 
has never sought power alone. It has always been in coalitional arrangements with a 
galaxy of other political parlies. No doubt, it has practiced politics of accommodation 
as far as enjoyment of political power is concerned. No doubt, the regime has taken 
enough care to advance the interests of numerically majority group, the Malays, 
reasonably so, when they were lagging far behind the minorities in socio-economic 
domains. However, the interests of economically forward Chinese were never 
encroached upon. Nor their safety has generally been jeopardized. Within the 
democratic framework, the state has practiced soft authoritarianism by subverting the 
liberal elements of constitution and then denying free space to the opposition, but it 
has never indulged or assisted, in any sort of prosecution of minority groups. Rather, 
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the three major ethnic groups are always represented in government tlirough 
participation in the regime. 
Be that as it may, the UMNO has singularly dominated the ruling coalition 
axis. The ruling alliance has always exhibited multi-racial colour and character. It is 
convenient for all the coalition partners. This arrangement has paid rich electoral 
dividends to each one of them, the major beneficiary, of course, remains the UMNO. 
Given the ethnic configuration of the country and existence of Pan-Islamic, 
exclusively Malay-based political party, the PAS, the UMNO could not have captured 
political power on its own. Thus, just the electoral compulsions have moved it 
towards combining consociationalism with hegemonic model of democracy. 
Consequently, the ruling coalition, the UMNO being its patron, has never been 
displaced from political power. Whatever be the motives or compulsions behind the 
coalitional political culture, no denying that consociational form of democracy is a 
reality in Malaysia, and it is practiced within Malay-UMNO hegemonic mould. The 
variant model of democracy in Malaysia can reasonably be described as 
consociational-hegemonic. 
The most remarkable feature of the ruling regime in Malaysia from the 
economic as well as political development perspective is that it has been able to 
continuously deliver. It has been able to blend responsible administration with the 
authoritarianism. No doubt, the government is more responsive to the Malay interests 
and sentiments as compared to the other communities. But such flaw is inbuilt into the 
majoritarian democracy, the rigours of which can be contained by secularizing the 
political traditions and developing consociational methods. It should be noted that the 
Chinese and Indians' share in corporate wealth has not decreased while the Malay 
share has increased manifold. There are not any serious allegations of persecution of 
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minorities at the hands of state agencies. The rule of law prevails. The most visible 
and controversial intra-elite struggles have taken place within Malay elite, not 
between Malays and other groups. This has become possible due to consociational 
form of democracy practiced in Malaysia. Many important sections of the minority 
groups are co-opted in the government formation. This also provides a check against 
any serious violation of minority rights by the majoritarian state. 
The protective discrimination was justified in the beginning to help the 
majority community to overcome the highly disadvantageous effects of their extreme 
economic backwardness vis-a-vis other communities. It could be justified then not 
because of generally projected and perceived claim of their being indigenous group 
(the indigenous argument, though not entirely baseless), but being the politically 
dominant group, the amelioration of their economic disadvantages and backwardness 
vis-a-vis minority communities, only could ensure peace and harmony in society. This 
aspect became evident after the 1969-riots between the Malays and the Chinese on the 
perceived threat felt by the Malays against the dominance of Chinese business 
interests. Although, the riots were politically motivated, the angle of Malay sense of 
economic deprivation can't be ruled out. Hence the state undertook conscious and 
targeted measures to increase the Malay share in business, particularly in terms of 
share in corporate wealth. It is a success story. The empowerment of Malays has 
occun'ed at unprecedented scale within such a short period of time, a similar case not 
found anywhere else in the world. The fact that it has been achieved within a largely 
democratic framework only adds to the legitimacy of the move. Be that as it may, if 
affirmative action programmes were adopted to ensure peace and equitable 
development, once the objectives are fulfilled, it will soon be the right time to discard 
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the special privileges and quotas meant for Malays. This is essential for better national 
integration in the long run. 
Malaysia has witnessed reduction in inter-ethnic inequalities on account of 
successful completion of National Economic Policy in 1990. It has not only 
considerably eased inter-ethnic tensions but also predisposed the government towards 
undertaking various minority-friendly steps in the last decade, like liberalization of 
economic and education policies. However, the intra-group disparities are growing, 
which portends ill for the Malaysian democracy on the equity scale. What is 
problematic with the course of political change is that serious curbs on civil and 
political rights remain intact; despite the tremendous political and economic stability 
the system has witnessed post-reformasi. Granting full civil and political rights to the 
citizens might enhance the responsivity of the state towards people, particularly the 
disadvantageous classes who have not so far benefited from the economic growth. It 
will provide the state with opportunity to reduce the equity deficit by getting to the 
pulse of the ordinary masses. However, the elite led by Abdullah Badawi prefer to 
continue their rule within the elitist framework of democracy meaning support for the 
status quo, in other words, crony capitalism. 
It is high time that the initiative to liberalise the polity, particularly, the 
expansion of human rights and opposition space should come from the incumbent 
leadership. Mahathir is no longer at the helm, Abdullah Badawi appears to be 
relatively moderate and flexible but not likely by his own initiative to come out of 
status quoits mould while the strength of the civil society and the middle class can't 
be undermined in pushing further for political development in Malaysia. A very 
strong middle class autonomous of state control has emerged in Malaysia due to 
uninterrupted economic development and continuously rising living standards. The 
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civil society has come into its own becoming independent of state control on an 
increasingly basis. Though, its activities are regulated by the state at critical points, 
yet, state regulation in today's age of advanced means of communications is adding to 
the resentment and discontent only and sharpening the political awareness of the 
people. 
The biggest obstacle in the liberalization of the political system is the absence 
of strong opposition. In other words, it is the absence of alternative to the government, 
which is holding back the liberal development of the polity. The middle class is strong 
but divided between the Malays and the Chinese. Similarly, the institutions of civil 
society, while keeping check upon the authoritarian trends toward further developing 
are pushing the regime to be more accountable and responsive to popular demands. 
Still, civil society is not united on a sustainable basis as far as the opposition to the 
government is concerned. The Malay vis-a-vis the Chinese interests divide the civil 
society, too. There are only two formidable opposition parties in Malaysia with 
independent support bases and strong organizational machinery. Both are extremist 
parties at the opposite spectrum of political divide in Malaysia. 
hi the absence of strong opposition, the possibilities of fuller liberalization of 
the polity are dim. The government indulges in authoritarian practices with the 
backing of law, and not outside the legal framework. It is altogether different matter 
when the law is selectively and partially used against the opponents of the ruling 
regime. Therefore, only the weight of a viable opposition entailing the possibility of 
providing an alternative to the government will put some pressure upon the 
government to liberalize, especially the human rights regime. Much of autocratism in 
government's functioning in Malaysia stems from the arrogance of being in power of 
the same elite, uninterruptedly. As an example from India shows that the authoritarian 
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style of functioning of Indira government was softened to a considerable extent when 
the electorate voted out of office after the excesses of Emergency in late 1970's. 
The persistence of democratic apparatus, stability, peace and equity are very 
important links in the political development of Malaysia. The institutionalization of 
political structures and processes, and rule of law are no mean achievement. Further, 
the strong civil society, educated middle class and pluralism coupled with 
consociational model, check the state from crossing the threshold of authoritarianism. 
As crouch pointed out, "Malaysia's social structure provides substantial barriers to the 
adoption of a fully-fledged authoritarian system in that economic and social 
development has produced social groups with distinct interests which they seek to 
protect and advance." 
On balance, it is this same high level of communal consciousness which has 
found expression in the institutionalization of political parties coupled with 
consociational form of the government and intelligent leadership that appears to offer 
one of the most persuasive explanations for the persistence of quasi-democracy in 
Malaysia, in spite of certain socio-economic conditions in the past favoring 
authoritarianism. The minorities in Malaysia are both numerically and economically 
so important that they can't be kept away from sharing or participating in political 
power, nor their suppression can be the answer. The interests of these minorities must 
be taken into account and their representatives provided a place in the government for 
the sake of political stability as well as for the sake of economic growth. Although, 
the Malaysian government had moved in authoritarian direction after the 1969-riots, 
the multi-communal nature of the political elite, despite Malay predominance, 
provided an important check on the government's powers. The government was also 
moved by the consideration of implementing the objectives of the National Economic 
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Policy meant to economically empower the Malays. The cooptation of the minorities 
in the governmental pursuits could guarantee not only peace and unhindered 
development but also the accomplishment of the NEP objectives. Thus, consociational 
democracy should be seen as a catalyst for political development in the sense that it 
has kept formal democratic apparatus ticking (while it could not survive in other 
countries of Southeast Asia), provided checks upon the system from degenerating into 
full-fledged authoritarianism and facilitated the growth of vibrant civil society in a 
relatively closed political system. 
The democracy took in the course of twelve years in three of the biggest 
countries of Southeast Asia at the end of the twentieth century. Superficially, these 
democratic transitions appeared to be the handiwork of contextual variables in each 
case coupled with the growing public discontent with the authoritarian regimes as a 
result of financial hardships or repression felt by common folk in each of the 
countries. At deeper level, these isolated transitions show a systemadc pattern of 
political development viz. the emergence of a strong middle class, the strengthening 
of institutions of civil society, increased political consciousness, secularization of 
political culture, advanced means of communications, the spread of education and the 
inherent contradictions of an authoritarian regime pushing the political system 
towards democratization. The strengthening of the civil society in the wake of fairly 
adequate degree of economic development and modernization provides an impetus to 
the growing demands of the populace upon the political system, sometimes, leading to 
the openness by the political authorides in order to save their grip over the political 
system by co-opting more and more groups in the polifical process. Sometimes, it is 
also done to pre-empt the influence of opposifional forces growing in society. 
However, under advanced conditions, the authoritarian rule can't be maintained for 
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long. Even a slight mismanagement of economy or a minor socio-political crisis may 
unleash the forces of democratization. The evidence across the developing world 
shows a clear trend towards democratization of political culture in the wake of 
modernization independent of the political initiative. The ascendancy of the civil 
society vis-a-vis the state provides a thrust to the democratic institutionalization. 
However, the latest military coup in Thailand also points out towards the dangers of 
assertion by civil society which has came to be known as T'eople's power.' The 
People's Power this time had just the reverse effect. Instead of ushering in democracy, 
this time, it led to a prolonged chaos which provided the military with an opportunity 
to wage another coup in a series of military takeovers for last seventy five years. It 
represents, a deep crisis of representative elite democracies of the developing world 
where institutionalization falls short and civil society has overgrown, and the 
mismatch between the two processes lead to the occasional breakdown of democratic 
apparatus. In such scenario, the People's Power has proved to be the greatest catalyst 
in the third wave of democratization in Asia. But this time, it backfired. 
There is a continuing debate, particularly, in the context of Southeast Asia that 
whether econorhic developments provides a push to the democratization or that 
economic growth provides legitimacy to the authoritarian regimes and, thus, prevents 
democratization. Actually, the question is formulated on the wrong premises. The 
general perception is that economic grovv'th strengthens the causative forces of 
democracy. An argument was advanced that democracy in developing countries 
comes more easily in those that have reached upper-middle income status. While 
there is no problem with the first argument but the recent developments in Asia have 
belied the second proposition, howsoever closely the two are linked. No doubt, 
economic development leads to the empowerment of people, emergence of middle 
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class, more autonomous business class as well as working class, expansion of 
education and secularization of traditional authoritative-clientelist bonds, which in 
turn prove to be the active agents of political development in society. However, 
economic development also provides legitimacy to those in power, be they 
democratically elected or superimposed upon the people. Thus economic development 
has proved to be a catalyst for both the processes. It provides impetus for 
democratization as well as it also consolidates authoritarian regimes. However, in 
latter case, the support base is weak and short-lived. The moment the crisis develops 
or the regime fails to deliver, the civil society already strengthened as a result of 
economic development mounts heavy pressure upon the regime to pave way towards 
democratization. The economic conditions in terms of development as well as 
deterioration do have profound impact upon the political development. 
The countries, which have opened to democratization in the last decade or so, 
several of those had not attained upper-Middle Income Status. It can be proven from 
the examples of Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia and even South Asian countries 
like Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan. On the contrary economic growth did not reduce 
the cohesion among semi-authoritarian elite in Singapore and to a lesser extent 
Malaysia, and now Thailand, which has again reverted to military dictatorship. 
Rather, the very standards of economic growth in countries like Singapore, Malaysia 
and earlier in Indonesia provided the ruling regimes with adequate justification to 
perpetuate the existing elements of authoritarianism. 
The recent wave of democratization in Southeast Asia suggests that there is no 
uni-dimensional and uni-directional relationship between economic growth and 
democratization. In most of the cases, it was the economic crisis caused by high 
inflation rates and negative growth rates that facilitated the breakdown of 
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authoritarian regimes. Though, economic factor was, still, the dominant factor, but not 
the sole factor. The economic development pursued during the authoritarian years 
cannot lend legitimacy to the argument that people liked or even willingly tolerated 
the authoritarian regimes. The conclusion can be drawn that the rapid economic 
development along with rising living standards and employment opportunities kept 
the lid on people's democratic urges or that the benefits drawn from economic 
development prevented open and vigorous public protests. It was simply a trade-off 
People would simply bear with the patron till he delivers. They will not buy 
uncertainty in lieu of growing prosperity. This does not mean that political 
development is not taking place. As a result of industrialization, education and 
growing prosperity, the people's political consciousness gradually sharpens, the civil 
society grows stronger and democratic urges and aspirations i.e. desire of the people 
to control their government at critical points, come to haunt the authoritarian rulers. 
And when the patron fails to deliver, the discontent swells into mass public protests. It 
is always a matter of time and depends much upon the management of crisis, financial 
stability, elite cohesiveness and number of other factors. During the democratization 
wave in Indonesia all those factors were at display. The biggest and the immediate 
cause, of course, was the financial crisis that had engulfed the whole region during 
1997-98. Some imprudent policies and decisions by Suharto further aggravated the 
problem for him. The failure of administration was marked by elite factionalism 
which had been growing for quite a long time over the issue of succession to Suharto 
and ultimately culminated in the withdrawal of support by army to Suharto. The 
circumstances were not much different in Philippines and Thailand during their 
transition phases. It is not to suggest that economic crisis is a precondition or that 
economic crisis necessarily results in democratization of institutional apparatus. In 
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fact, Thailand was not going through an economic crisis when protests for 
democratization had occurred in 1992. Nor the crisis was economic in nature when 
political system again fell back into the hands of military in yet another coup this 
year. In a larger perspective, if we give a look at the democratization process in 
neighbouring regions, for instance, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal in South Asia and 
South Korea and Taiwan in Far East in late 1980's, we find that severe economic 
crisis did not precede democratization waves in any of those countries. 
Before delineating the causes of lack of democratization in Indo-China, it 
should be noticed that these countries do not have modernized economies. The 
industrialization is very low. They are predominantly inward-looking subsistence 
economies with the exception of Vietnam, lately. The civil society is not developed in 
these countries. In Burma, the military regime has been repressing the democratic 
urges of the people since well over one and a half decades in manner of most blatant 
use of force and disregard for proprietary norms. With economic and political 
liberalization taking place across the region, the military junta is in dilemma. 
Whereas, Cambodia experiences highly faction-ridden and violent political culture. 
Despite the introduction of democracy in mid-1990s, the democratic process has not 
moved ahead. It may take another decade for the institutional process to consolidate 
given the fragmented and tribal-state political culture in the country. 
The modernization of economy along with rising prosperity unleashes 
processes that inevitably intensify progress towards democratization while any big 
crisis affecting financial health or cohesiveness of an authoritarian dispensation has a 
great likelihood of ushering in institutional liberalization. Having argued that way, we 
would still like to emphasize that we are not making a generalization in the strict 
sense of the term. It is to suggest merely a trend or a broad pattern of political 
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development, at the most. No uniform model of political development can be 
discerned or delineated in Southeast Asia. Malaysia and Singapore stand out unique 
cases of political development for they can be classified as hegemonic-consociational 
models of democracy. Though Singapore relatively tilts towards authoritarianism, 
since opposition is not allowed any worthwhile free democratic space there. The 
ruling party has constitutionally monopolized political power. It can be better 
categorized as soft-authoritarian state in comparison to Malaysia's semi-democratic 
status. Burma is an absolute military dictatorship for a long time while Thailand, at 
present, is going through very volatile and uncertain phase. The democracy seemed to 
have taken roots there for the last decade, particularly, after the adoption of 1997 
constitution. However, a prolonged crisis granted it an opportunity to usurp power 
once again. How long will it continue despite promises of return to democracy by the 
military regime by the end of this year, only the time will tell. 
Be that as it may it is very difficult to classify the political systems of 
Southeast Asia in the ever changing context into some generalized model of political 
development. In fact, no model of political development exists, as such, except for 
accounting for generalizations as well as differences. Indonesia despite encountering 
tremendous problems in course of nation building and state building pertaining to 
penetration, integration and legitimacy is well on its course to practice consociational 
model of democracy. Partly, the resolute will of the present leadership and partly the 
constitutional provisions pertaining to presidential elections facilitate its transition 
towards further democratization. The Philippines is yet an evolving democracy, which 
eludes exact categorization. It cannot be classified completely as liberal, nor 
consociational. The plural majority system for the elections of president and 
concentration of economic power in a handful of elite make the character of its 
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democracy as clientelist-elitist. However, its track record in sustaining democratic 
procedures and experiences since 1981 is better than any other polity of Southeast 
Asia. 
A very loose pattern of political development can be deciphered in Southeast 
Asia as it is characterized by absence of liberal elements in general and the 
authoritarian practices even within procedural- democratic frameworks. All these 
polities are more or less characterized by strong values traditionally attached to 
clientelism, communitarianism, deference towards authority, strong state, and even 
personaHty cult. Still, the differences remain. Unlike rest of Southeast Asia, the 
military has never been able to exert supremacy over civilian institutions in Malaysia 
and Singapore. Likewise, both these systems unlike other Southeast Asian polities, 
have not generally experienced a breakdown with formal procedural democratic 
apparatus. It proves the resilience of democratic experience in Malaysia. 
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